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SUMMARY
This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel’s 1974 paper “What is it like 
to be a bat?” I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this 
paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the 
first chapter, I try to ascertain what Nagel meant by his use of the phrase “what it is 
like”, as there seems to be a number of different construals of this phrase in his “bat” 
paper. In examining Nagel’s use of the phrase “what it is like”, I mainly use the ideas 
o f H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips and J. Biro. In the latter part of chapter one, I examine 
the so-called Ability Theory of Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, whose origin, I 
believe, is contained in one particular construal that Nagel gives to the phrase “what it 
is like”. In the second chapter, I examine Nagel’s concept of a subjective point of 
view, and what this involves in relation to subjectivity and consciousness. Mainly 
using the ideas of Kathleen Wider, I also try to ascertain whether Nagel’s conception 
of the subjective point of view leads to epistemic solipsism, and if it does, what this 
means for Nagel’s views on consciousness, e.g., whether they conflict with the views 
of Wittgenstein (on which question I utilise a key distinction made by David 
Chalmers). This leads me to examine the relationship between subjectivity and 
solipsism, and whether the latter can be avoided whenever one takes the former 
seriously. In the third and final chapter, I examine Nagel’s concept o f the objective 
point of view, and his views on the effect that this viewpoint has on the phenomenon 
of consciousness, e.g., whether science will succeed in providing a reductive 
explanation of conscious experience.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation will examine the work of the philosopher Thomas Nagel, especially his 
work on the philosophy of mind, much of which has concentrated on the problem of 
consciousness. In particular, I will be examining the ideas concerning consciousness 
which are contained in his 1974 paper, “What is it like to be a bat?”1 I have decided to 
concentrate on this paper, as it is generally regarded as being a seminal article in relation 
to the topic of consciousness, whose arguments and conclusions are still being 
philosophically debated to the present day. Indeed, Daniel Dennett has described the 
paper as “(t)he most widely cited and influential thought experiment about 
consciousness...” Having said this, I will of course be referring to Nagel’s later work on 
consciousness when necessary, but the overall structure of the dissertation will revolve 
around the arguments in his 1974 paper.
It must be said that Nagel was not the first to ask the question of what it was like to be a 
bat. This accolade went to B.A. Farrell, who asked the question in his 1950 paper called 
“Experience”. It is interesting to note that the conclusions Farrell came to regarding 
experience were radically different to the ones Nagel would later come to. Farrell seems 
to have adopted a behaviourist position, seeing no distinction between “experience” and 
“behaviour”. Indeed, he took the view that science was on the verge of rejecting the 
notion of “experience” altogether, viewing it as “unreal” or “non-existent”. He went so
1 Nagel, T. (1974) “What is it like to be a bat?” In: Nagel, T. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 165-80.
2 Dennett (1991) p.441.
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far as to state that . .the notion of “experience” can be shown to resemble an occult 
notion like “witchcraft” in a primitive community that is in the process of being 
acculturated to the West”.4 I think it is accurate to say that when Nagel asked the same 
question about the little furry Chiroptera, some 24 years later, this inspired him to 
conclusions that were as different to Farrell’s as one can imagine. Nagel came to the 
conclusion that conscious experience most certainly did exist, that it was like something 
to be a bat. Indeed, he claimed that if a creature did possess conscious experience, then 
there would always be something it was like to be that creature (although, it must be 
noted that Nagel was not the first to make this claim, T. Sprigge (1971) has this honour, 
in a paper that was published three years before Nagel’s “bat” paper). In claiming this, 
Nagel was referring to the concept of phenomenal consciousness, as opposed to what is 
called introspective or access consciousness. The former involved the “what it is like” 
factor of consciousness, just the way it feels to be a conscious, experiencing, organism in 
the world, with all the associated perceptions and sensations that this involves. With 
introspective consciousness, this involved consciously examining one’s perceptions and 
sensations, which would enable one to recognize that one was in a certain state and 
perhaps give a verbal report about this. With phenomenal consciousness, there is no 
introspecting of one’s perceptions and sensations, they are just experienced as they are, 
with no “inner” analysis of them occurring. Of course, this point stands to reason, if 
Nagel was attributing conscious experience to a creature like a bat, which we must 
suppose does not have the introspective or conceptual capabilities that a human has, i.e., 
of being a self-conscious creature.
3 Farrell, B. A. (1950) “Experience”. In: Chappell, V.C., ed. The Philosophy o f  Mind. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., pp. 23-48.
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In the 20th Century, up to the time of Nagel’s “bat” paper, I am not aware of many other 
positive and supportive philosophical views for the phenomenon of subjective 
consciousness. It seems that the topic of consciousness was more popular in psychology 
than in philosophy. For example, towards the end of the 19th Century, William James 
was studying the topic of consciousness, applying his well-known metaphor of a 
“stream”, to the phenomenon of consciousness, as it presents itself to human experience. 
Following James, enquiry into the subject of introspective consciousness was very 
popular in psychology, until the rise of behaviourism, when the use of introspection in 
psychology was generally discredited. Verificationist and behaviourist influences were 
also to be felt in philosophy, especially in the middle of the last century, with the dual 
attack of Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953). While it is controversial 
as to whether Wittgenstein, and even Ryle, were actually bona fide behaviourists, it 
certainly seems as if both of these works had a negative influence on attitudes towards 
the existence of an irreducible, subjective phenomenon, such as consciousness. The 
general move was towards an objectification of what had previously seemed subjective 
and “private” phenomena. The influence of materialism also made itself felt in the 
philosophy of mind, beginning with behaviourism, then leading on to the mind-brain 
identity theories, to early types of functionalism towards the end of the 1960’s. All of 
these theories were fundamentally objective in nature, with the subjective elements of 
mind either being ignored or reduced to objective elements, e.g., behaviour, neural 
activity or causal/functional roles.
4 Farrell (1950) p.45.
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Therefore, this was very roughly the background against which Nagel’s 1974 “bat” paper 
was published. It was a bold statement of support to what Nagel viewed as a subjective 
reality, i.e., the existence of phenomenal consciousness; that he thought had not been 
adequately explained by philosophy or science. In addition to this, Nagel also gave an 
argument as to why he thought that science would find it extremely difficult to 
reductively explain the phenomenon of conscious experience. The argument is the 
following: if conscious experience is only comprehensible from the subjective point of 
view, how can science, which methodologically takes up an objective point of view, 
achieve an adequate explanation of it? Instead of moving closer to the phenomenon to be 
investigated, science is moving further away from it. It was this facet of Nagel’s paper 
that led M. Davies/G.W. Humphreys (1993) to claim that Nagel was responsible for 
starting the process that would lead to the modern-day intuition that phenomenal 
consciousness was “mysterious” and “.. .would elude a physicalist view of the world”.5 I 
think that this point is correct, although, as I have read him, it seems to me that Nagel 
was not claiming that consciousness would never be explained by science, but that it had 
not been adequately dealt with up until that time, and it would be an extremely difficult 
problem to solve in the future. Nevertheless, in connection with the point about 
promoting the “mystery” and “elusiveness” of subjective consciousness, I think it could 
be claimed that Nagel began this process even earlier, with his 1965 paper 
“Physicalism”.6
5 Davies/Humphreys (1993) p. 15.
6 Nagel, T. (1965) “Physicalism”. In: O’Connor, J., ed. M odem Materialism: Readings On Mind-Body 
Identity. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., pp. 99-116.
However, as stated above, this dissertation is mainly going to concentrate on his 1974 
“bat” paper. In the first chapter, the phrase “what it is like” will be examined, to try to 
discover what Nagel actually meant by his use of this phrase. It will be seen that there 
were several different meanings that could have been applied to his use of “what it is 
like”. In this part of the chapter I mainly use the ideas of H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips 
and J. Biro. I will then try to demonstrate how one of Nagel’s meanings of “what it is 
like” contributed to the later development of the so-called Ability Theory by Laurence 
Nemirow and David Lewis: whose results would have troublesome consequences for 
some of the earlier conclusions that Nagel came to in his “bat” paper, i.e., the existence of 
subjective facts of experience. In the second chapter, Nagel’s concept of the “subjective 
point of view” will be examined. This will involve looking at the connection Nagel 
makes between subjectivity and a point of view, and whether the points of view in 
question are tokens or types. The answer to the latter question will then lead on to the 
issues of epistemic solipsism and privacy of experience, issues which have been seen by 
some as the natural outcome of Nagel’s conception of a subjective point of view (on this 
topic, I mainly use the ideas of Kathleen Wider). This in turn will lead to an examination 
of whether Nagel’s views on conscious experience can avoid the challenge of 
Wittgenstein and his arguments against privacy of experience, in particular the private- 
language argument and the beetle-in-the-box analogy (in relation to this question, I use a 
key distinction made by David Chalmers). In the third and final chapter, Nagel’s 
conception of the “objective point of view” will be examined. This will involve working 
out what this point of view consists of, and examining the process of objectification 
which is required to achieve this viewpoint, or “view from nowhere”, as Nagel calls it. It
5
will then be shown how the objective point of view actually works in practice, with an 
example of a physical reduction of an objective phenomenon. It will then be determined 
whether this same process will work for a subjective phenomenon, i.e., consciousness.
(Note: For the rest of this dissertation, unless I specify otherwise, whenever I refer to a 
subjective point of view/viewpoint, I will usually mean a particular or individual 
subjective point of view/viewpoint.)
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CHAPTER ONE
NAGEL AND “WHAT IT IS LIKE”
This chapter will look at Thomas Nagel’s 1974 “bat” paper, examining in particular what 
Nagel meant by the phrase “what it is like”. There do seem to be several strands of 
thought involved with this phrase. One strand seems to involve knowing what the bat’s 
subjective facts of experience are like for the bat itself. Yet another strand of thought 
gives the impression that what is involved is the utilisation of the imagination in adopting 
a point of view, e.g., of a bat. In analysing Nagel’s use of this latter, conceptual sense of 
the phrase “what it is like”, a connection between this and the so-called “Ability Theory” 
will try to be made. I think that there is a connection, and it is of importance to the 
conclusions that Nagel reached in his 1974 paper. The reason for this is that the Ability 
theory makes the claim that “what it is like” only involves imaginative abilities, and not 
experiential facts. However, I believe that it was the existence of these experiential facts 
(e.g. of a bat) that was of vital importance to Nagel’s thesis about conscious experience.
Nagel. “What it is like” and Imagination
In his “bat” paper, Nagel makes the claim that the possession of conscious experience by 
a creature means that there is something it is like to be that creature, and this is what 
Nagel calls the subjective character of experience. In consequence of this, he further 
believes that this subjective consciousness relies on a specific point of view which can 
only be apprehended from the position of the experiencing subject. This then involves
7
certain subjective facts (or phenomenal information) of experience which are accessible 
only from this point of view,7 which goes to make up the subjective character of 
experience of the creature in question. By subjective facts, I take Nagel to mean the 
conscious experiences of a creature as they appear to the creature. A bat will know “what 
it is like” to have a certain sensation, this is an experiential fact for the bat (though not a 
consciously entertained one), and it is a subjective one because only the bat will be 
directly aware of this fact. Nagel does admit that the “what it is like” question he has 
posed could be misleading, “It does not mean ‘what (in our experience) it resembles’, but
Q
rather, ‘how it is for the subject him self”. This means that Nagel is really interested in 
the subjective, first-person, account of experience, not the objective, third-person, 
account of experience. Now this is important, as has been noted by H.O. Mounce in his 
paper “The Aroma of Coffee”,9 where he thinks that Nagel did not emphasise this idea 
enough. In his paper, Mounce was drawing attention to what he thought was a common 
fallacy amongst philosophers, that of confusing what they failed to understand with what 
passed beyond their understanding.10 Mounce was using Nagel’s example of the bat’s 
experience to show how some concepts pass beyond the understanding of humans,11 and 
this is what he thinks Nagel is trying to show as well. But he claims that Nagel had a 
problem, “His use of the phrase ‘what it is like to be’ is not entirely happy, because it is
7 On this point, Nagel states that “Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human 
being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point o f view”. Nagel (1974) 
p.171.
8 Nagel (1974) p.nl70.
9 Mounce, H.O. (1989) “The Aroma of Coffee”. Philosophy 64, pp. 159-73.
10 Mounce declares that “Many philosophers take for granted that there is nothing which cannot be 
described, at least in principle...What passes beyond one’s understanding is identified with what one fails 
to understand. I fail to understand something when I might have succeeded; but since I might have 
succeeded, even when I failed, there is nothing which passes beyond my understanding”. Mounce (1989) p. 
165.
11 Mounce (1989) p. 164.
19 •so often associated with differences of degree rather than of kind”. By this, I take 
Mounce to mean that when “what it is like” is interpreted as a difference of kind, then it 
is a difference that is beyond any act or effort to reconcile that difference. Whereas, if 
“what it is like” is viewed as a difference of degree, then there is the possibility that some 
act or effort can bridge the difference. However, is Mounce correct in his analysis of 
Nagel’s “what it is like” question?
When Nagel chose the example of a bat, he was trying to show that even though we could 
not comprehend what it was like to be a bat, it was still quite probable that the bat had its 
own subjective character of experience.13 He claimed that this led to the existence of 
certain facts which were beyond the conceivability of humans,14 because they were only 
accessible from the point of view of the bat. Therefore, because a human has a different 
subjective point of view from a bat, he could not know what it was like to be a bat, and 
vice versa. At this point, Nagel’s argument is that a bat has a unique point of view of 
experiencing the world, which enables it to perceive the subjective, phenomenal facts, 
which make up its subjective conscious experience, which is beyond human conception. 
It is this which Nagel claims is left out of an objective, physical analysis of the bat, no
12 Mounce (1989) p.164. A similar point is made by J. Biro (1993). Biro also distinguishes two strands of  
thought in Nagel’s 1974 paper, the weaker difference of degrees and the stronger difference of kind. 
However, Biro makes the further claim that the former is concerned with types of points of view while the 
latter is concerned with single points o f view (using Nagel’s sense of “points o f view”).
13 Nagel (1974) p. 170.
14 Nagel states that “My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the 
existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts.. .There are facts which could not ever be 
represented or comprehended by human beings...Simply because our structure does not permit us to 
operate with concepts of the requisite type.. .Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, 
therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth o f propositions expressible in 
a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to 
state or comprehend them”. Nagel (1974) p. 171.
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matter how detailed the analysis ends up being.15 Therefore, at this point, “what is it like 
to be a bat?”, means what is it like for the bat to be a bat. It is a difference of kind, as 
Mounce would say, one creature cannot know what it is like to be another creature, 
simply because they are different creatures and have different experiential points of view. 
It seems to be an epistemological problem, there are certain types of facts which are 
impossible for humans to access, due to their different biological makeup.16 I believe that 
Nagel’s main point behind asking “what is it like to be a bat?” is that just because we 
cannot access the bat’s subjective facts of conscious experience, it does not mean that the 
bat has no conscious experience (the bat’s subjective consciousness is an ontological 
reality, i.e., it actually exists, even though there are epistemic difficulties in ascertaining 
this fact). He backs this up by then talking of a similar situation if a Martian were to 
examine humans objectively, and fail to find the subjective facts of our consciousness. 
The Martian would be wrong to come to the conclusion that humans had no subjective 
conscious experience, because, quite obviously we do. But these facts of conscious 
experience are only accessible to the subjective point of view of the creature in question.
However, Nagel then discusses how one might try to extend our understanding to include 
what it is like to be a bat. Because we do not have the experiences that a bat has, or
15 Mounce concurs on this point, where he states: “Considering it as an object, one may describe what a bat 
is like. But one has not, in so doing, described what it is like to be a bat. One has ignored it as a 
subject.. .What has been m issed.. .is precisely what is essential to consciousness, namely, that it is a feature 
not of an object but of a living subject, that it is subjective in its very essence”. Mounce (1989) p. 163.
16 Biro makes the claim that to utilise physiological differences for explaining differences in experience 
between a human and a bat, is to come close to embracing a physicalist reduction, which Nagel is arguing 
against. Biro (1993) p .185. However, even if one were to accept this line of reasoning, the most it would 
show is that creatures with different physiologies might not have different experiences (Biro claims that for 
all we know bat experience might be like human experience). But the main point would still stand, we 
would not be able to verify this point, as the other creature’s subjective experiential facts were still 
inaccessible to us, for what ever reason. But despite this, the creature could still be said to have conscious 
experiences.
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possess anything like a bat’s sonar, he comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to try 
to imagine what it would be like to be a bat from the standpoint of a human being (this 
situation is also analogous to the situation of a Martian trying to form a conception of 
what it was like to be a human). He claims that our imagination is limited to the 
materials that our own experience gives us, which is inadequate to form anything more 
than a schematic conception of the bat’s experience.18 So here Nagel is admitting that 
humans can only imagine things that utilise the resources that their experiences have 
provided them with.19 One could imagine what it was like to be a bat, but of course this 
would be from a human point of view, and not from the bat’s point of view, which would 
not really answer Nagel’s “what is it like to be a bat?” question. And yet, he has 
mentioned trying to use the imagination to try to conceive what it would be like to be a 
bat, even though he says that this is not possible. However, Nagel then claims that the 
point of view he is concerned with is not a particular or individual point of view, but a 
type of point of view.20 He goes on to claim that creatures of the same type, could be 
able to imagine the points of view of each other, though not of creatures that were very 
dissimilar to them. So one human would be able to use his imagination to take up the 
point of view of another human being,21 and presumably one bat would be able to 
imagine the point of view of another bat. So even though it was declared impossible for 
us to know what it was like to be a bat, Nagel now declares that beings of the same type 
can know what it is like to be each other. Also, that the method to achieve this is
17 Nagel (1974) p. 170.
18 Nagel (1974) p.168/9.
19 Even though he is not an empiricist, this is a standard empiricist position taken by Nagel. See John 
Locke, E.smy Concerning Human Understanding, 2,1,2; and David Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature, 
1, 1, 1.
20 Nagel (1974) p. 171.
21 Nagel (1974) p. 172.
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supplied by the imagination. So, for Nagel, the “what it is like” question is still a matter
of kind concerning the bat, but is a matter of degree concerning humans. Nagel then
muddies the water even further, when he states:
It may be easier than I suppose to transcend inter-species barriers with the aid 
of the imagination...The distance between oneself and other persons and 
other species can fall anywhere on a continuum. Even for other persons the 
understanding of what it is like to be them is only partial, and when one 
moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser degree of partial 
understanding may still be available. The imagination is remarkably flexible.
My point, however, is not that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. I 
am not raising that epistemological problem. My point is rather that even to 
form a conception of what it is like to be a bat (and a fortiori to know what it 
is like to be a bat) one must take up the bat’s point of view. If one can take it 
up roughly, or partially, then one’s conception will also be rough or partial.22
Here then, Nagel makes the “what is it like to be a bat?” question also be one of degrees, 
like it is for other humans. Nagel explicitly states that he is not talking of an 
epistemological problem, now it seems to be a conceptual problem involving the human 
imagination. He gives the impression that “what it is like” is an ability to use the 
imagination to take up the experiencer’s point of view, which will have variable success 
depending on how close, physically and physiologically, the experiencer is to oneself.23 
Therefore, it appears that Mounce was correct in his analysis of Nagel’s “what it is like” 
question. The question started as one of a difference of kind, but has finished as one of a 
difference of degrees. And Nagel is completely responsible for this! According to 
Mounce this would be a case of something which was once inconceivable to humans, 
now becoming just something which humans fail to understand. So, Nagel would be 
committing the fallacy of which Mounce thought philosophers in general were guilty of, 
which was mentioned earlier. However, could it be that Nagel is simply trying to extend
22 Nagel (1974) p.nl72.
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his understanding, using the imagination, in a case that would be similar to ones that D.Z. 
Phillips argues for in his paper “From Coffee to Carmelites”,24 which was a response to 
Mounce’s paper. Phillips believes that Mounce does not recognise that understanding 
does not stay static in relation to a problem, but can change its form to try to 
accommodate a more successful analysis of the problem in question.25 However, in this 
case, I do not think that there could be such a radical change made to one’s 
understanding, that might enable one to know what it was like to be a bat.26 The 
subjective life of the bat is beyond human conception. No amount of change or 
extension, in the powers of the objective physiological analysis of a bat, or in the powers 
of the human imagination, would enable us to know what it was subjectively like to be 
the bat. My reason for believing this is the following: how would one know if a partial 
conception of the point of view of a bat had been achieved? Would a person standing in 
a dark room, with a bucket over his head and making chirruping noises have achieved a 
partial conception of the point of view of a bat? Or would it be the case, as is more 
probable, that the person had a complete conception of the point of view of someone 
standing in a dark room with a bucket over his head and making chirruping noises. My 
point is that we would not know what the point of view of the bat was, in order to judge 
whether our physical or imaginative efforts were partial, complete, or whatever 27 It is
23 Nagel (1974) p. 178/9.
24 Phillips, D.Z. (1990) “From Coffee to Carmelites”. Philosophy 65, pp. 19-38.
25 Phillips declares “What Mounce does not recognize is that not every acquiring of understanding is a 
matter of succeeding within the same mode of understanding within which one had previously failed.
One’s understanding may be extended or transformed”. Phillips (1990) p.22. Biro also endorses a similar 
view, where he claims “.. .our powers of imagination may change, as they clearly do for many reasons, not 
least as a consequence of additions to our knowledge and understanding”. Biro (1993) p.188.
26 A similar point is made by Torin Alter (1999) p.5.
27 Kathleen Wider (1990) p.n493, makes a similar point. Indeed, it is Nagel’s use o f the imagination to find 
out about others’ subjective experiences that Wider believes partly contributes towards a solipsistic strain 
in Nagel’s work. That is, the only experiences that one can be sure about are the experiences from one’s 
own subjective point of view. Imagination does not accomplish what Nagel intends it to, and other
13
somewhat similar to the problem which came about due to the representational theory of 
perception which was adopted by the Empiricists in explaining their theories of 
experience and knowledge. One could never compare the idea, impression etc., to the 
actual object of which it was a representation, due to the fact that the actual object or
thing-in-itself was beyond the understanding (we could never escape the representations
28 •or perceptions, as these were the immediate objects of the understanding). So it seems 
that to know “what it is like to be a bat” remains a difference of kind, not of degrees, and 
is inconceivable to human beings, whatever imaginative feats they can perform.29 In his 
later writings, Nagel seems to acknowledge that to try to use the imagination to 
comprehend the subjective character of a radically different creature to a human is 
doomed to failure.30 It was Nagel’s vacillation on the effectiveness of the imagination on 
this point that caused the shift from a difference of kind to a difference of degrees, which 
Mounce noted.
In his 1974 paper, Nagel also makes a distinction between the various types of 
imagination that can be used. There is perceptual imagination and sympathetic
subjective viewpoints are not as accessible as one’s own. This is roughly what I believe as well, Nagel’s 
“what it is like” question only seems to make sense as one of a difference of kind, rather than degrees (one 
has to take up the point o f view of the bat to know what it is like to be a bat, and that is imaginatively 
impossible). The solipsistic strain that this results in does not really worry me. It seems fairly reasonable 
to suppose that I can apprehend or “know” my own phenomenal consciousness better than someone else 
can, and vice versa (I might discuss this more when talking about subjective points o f view).
28 Locke recognised this, but still kept his belief in the causal efficacy of external objects. On the other 
hand, Berkeley used this situation to promote his belief that there were just minds and ideas. Meanwhile, 
Hume believed that there were external objects, but that we could never actually observe what they were 
like, as we could not get outside of our perceptions, which led him to scepticism.
29 In The View From Nowhere, Nagel claims that, “a being of total imaginative flexibility could project 
himself directly into every possible subjective point of view, and would not need such an objective method 
to think about the full range of possible inner lives”. Nagel (1986) p.17. The same objection would apply 
to this being, how would we know that he really was accurately conceiving the subjective points o f view  
that he claimed.
30 Nagel (1986) p. 17.
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imagination. Nagel states that “(t)o imagine something perceptually, we put ourselves in 
a conscious state resembling the state we would be in if we perceived it”, while “(t)o 
imagine something sympathetically, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the 
thing itself (This method can be used only to imagine mental events and states -  our own 
or another’s)”.31 An example of perceptual imagination, would be imagining what it is 
like to perceive, say, a man in pain; while sympathetic imagination would involve 
imagining what it is like to actually be the man in pain. Nagel does not elaborate on 
these two types of imagination, however, it seems fairly clear that when Nagel talks of 
using the imagination to comprehend what it is like to be a bat, he is referring to 
sympathetic imagination. He is trying to get a conception of what it would be like to be a 
bat from the inside, what the conscious states of the bat actually feel like for the bat. It is 
this sympathetic imagination which fails us in knowing what it is like to be a bat, due to 
the differences between our subjective characters of experience being too great. This in 
turn is due to us being radically different creatures, with different types of points of view, 
due to our different physical and physiological makeup. It is also this sympathetic 
imagination which Nagel believes we can use with more success in trying to adopt the 
points of view of other humans, due to the points of view being of the same type. It is 
because of this that Nagel explicitly states that the points of view he is talking about are a 
type and not private and particular ones applying to individuals.32 Perceptual imagination 
is not really mentioned in Nagel’s “bat” paper, except in a footnote (on page 176).
31 Nagel (1974) pp.n 175/6.
32 Nagel (1974) p. 171.
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It is time to take stock of what has been discussed in this section, before going on and 
tackling the Ability theory /hypothesis. The first, and I believe, most important construal 
of the phrase “what it is like”, involved knowing what it was like for the subject himself 
to have his own experiences (i.e., what it was like for the bat to be a bat). This 
knowledge was found to be inaccessible to any human efforts, including objective 
analysis and subjective imagination. So, at this point, as Mounce would agree, “what it is 
like to be a bat” is a difference of kind. In my opinion, it appears to be an 
epistemological problem for humans (contra Nagel), which must not lead them to think 
that just because they cannot access the bat’s subjective experiential facts, the bat has no 
conscious experience. However, the other construal that Nagel then gives to the phrase 
“what it is like”, is that it involves using the imagination to take up the point of view of 
the experiencer. With regards to the bat, this gives the impression that our imaginative 
capabilities might be able to partially succeed, so giving the impression that “what it is 
like to be a bat” is now a difference of degree. From being an epistemological problem 
for humans (how to find out “what it is like”), it is now viewed as a conceptual problem 
for the human imagination (how to imagine “what it is like”). But this was seen to be a 
dubious course of action, and the difference was still one of kind rather than of degree.
To “know what it is like” in Nagel’s (difference of kind) sense first involves having the 
relevant experience, which then gives the material for the mind to use its imaginative 
abilities. This is why it was strange when Nagel suggested that we might be able to 
partially conceive of a bat’s point of view, when we still did not have any of the bat’s 
subjective experiential facts to work with.
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What is the Ability Theory/Hypothesis?
The Ability theory or hypothesis has been put forward most coherently by Laurence 
Nemirow33 and David Lewis.34 There are differences between their versions of the 
Ability theory, but they both have the following in common. The claim is made that “to 
know what it is like” is equivalent to having certain imaginative abilities, and does not 
involve any subjective facts or phenomenal information. Both Nemirow and Lewis have 
identified their target, the subjective facts or phenomenal information of “knowing what 
it is like” to experience such-and-such. The reason for this is that the aforementioned 
facts/information are claimed to be overlooked or not accounted for in physicalist or 
materialist theories of consciousness and the mind. If this were true, then physicalism, 
which claims that all factual information in the world is physical in nature, would be 
false. There would be certain phenomenological facts that existed which were not 
covered by the physical sciences, which would essentially mean that there was non­
physical information in the world. Therefore, unless these so-called non-physical facts 
can be explained with the aid of physicalism, the next best strategy for nervous 
materialists could be to deny that they were facts or information in the first place. 
Therefore, Nemirow declares:
33 Nemirow, L. (1980) “Review of Nagel’s Mortal Questions”. Philosophical Review  89, pp. 473-7. 
Nemirow, L. (1990) “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance”. In: Lycan, W.G., ed. Mind 
And Cognition: A Reader. Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, pp. 490-9.
Nemirow, L. (1995) “Understanding Rules.” Journal o f Philosophy 92, pp. 28-43.
34 Lewis, D. (1983a) “Postscript to “Mad Pain and Martian Pain””. In: Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers 
Vol.l. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 130-132.
Lewis, D. (1988) “What Experience Teaches”. In: Lycan, W.G., ed. Mind And Cognition: A Reader. 
Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, pp. 499-519.
35 Lewis declares that, “We dare not grant that there is a sort o f information we overlook; or, in other 
words, that there are possibilities exactly alike in the respects we know of, yet different in some other way. 
That would be defeat”. Lewis (1983a) p.131.
36 As Richard Warner (1986) states, “...a  physicalist reply to Nagel has emerged since Nagel’s article: 
namely that the argument turns on misconstruing possession of a certain ability to recognise pain as (or as 
involving) knowledge of a fact about pain. It is this (supposed) fact that Nagel argues cannot be fully
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The principal importance of acquaintance in cognition is the production of 
sophisticated imaginative abilities that give rise to an elaborate network of 
other abilities...Thus it does justice to the cognitive significance of 
acquaintance to equate knowledge of what an experience is like with the 
ability to imagine.3
While Lewis states that:
...knowing what it’s like is not the possession of information at all. It isn’t 
the elimination of any hitherto open possibilities. Rather, knowing what it’s 
like is the possession of abilities: abilities to recognize, abilities to imagine, 
abilities to predict one’s behavior by means of imaginative experiments.3
With the quote from Nemirow, it seems that he is claiming that the actual having of the 
experience is of main importance in producing imaginative abilities. He bypasses any 
possible subjective factual/informational content that the experience might possess for the 
experiencer (i.e. what it is like for the person to actually have the experience), and goes 
straight to the subjective abilities that are gained. This is a major feature of the Ability 
theory. It seems to minimize the impact and importance of the actual experience, and 
maximize the importance of the imaginative abilities. Therefore, to know what x is like, 
for Nemirow, amounts to being able to imagine or visualise x. The actual experience of x 
goes towards producing the imaginative abilities which will enable one to know what x is 
like. Presumably, during the experience of x, before any abilities have been gained, one 
does not know what x is like, at least in Nemirow’s sense.39 Normally, one would think
described by a physicalist theory. The physicalist reply is that there is no such fact”. Warner (1986) p.249. 
Warner also comes up with an argument challenging physicalism, that depends on a limited incorrigibility 
between believing one feels a pain and of feeling pain. However, he also acknowledges that his argument 
is vulnerable to the Ability theory: a fact about a pain being construed as an ability to recognise pain.
37 Nemirow (1990) p.498.
38 Lewis (1983a) p. 131.
39 It could be that the Ability theorists’ version of “to know what x is like” is achieved after introspection of 
the “phenomenal concept” of x (according to Michael Tye (1999b) p.710). But this would be a different 
“what it is like” to Nagel’s sense, which I believe does not involve any introspection, but just immediate 
conscious experience.
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that, for example, an experience of seeing x would be quite separate and different from 
visualising x. However, with the Ability theory, there appears to be a conflation of the 
actual experience and the imaginative ability, with the result that the actual experience is 
pushed into the background, so to speak, and the imaginative ability takes centre-stage. 
For example, consider what it is like to see a blue vase. When would one know what it 
was like to see the vase? With Nagel, one would know while one was having the 
experience of seeing the vase: it would be a subjective fact of one’s conscious experience 
that the vase looked a certain way, a fact, which could then be later utilised by the 
memory, imagination, etc. However, with Nemirow it would seem that one would only 
know if one was able to imagine seeing the vase. What happens while one was visually 
experiencing the vase, is not really dwelt upon by Nemirow; the main importance of the 
actual experience (according to Nemirow) is that of producing abilities to imagine seeing 
the vase etc. It is in this way that Nemirow can then claim that there are no subjective 
facts involved in knowing what such-and-such is like, only subjective abilities. This 
point is reinforced by Lewis’ quote, where he denies that there is any information or facts 
involved in knowing what it’s like, there are only abilities. In claiming that there is no 
elimination of open possibilities, I believe that Lewis means that there are no possibilities 
of what the experience of x might have been like, which will then be eliminated when the 
subjective facts/information of the actual experience are apprehended by the person 
involved. No subjective information, only subjective abilities. Or put another way, it is 
not a case of knowing-that, but of knowing-how.
In a later work, Lewis makes the same claim:
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The Ability Hypothesis says that knowing what an experience is like just is 
the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize. It isn’t 
the possession of any kind of information, ordinary or peculiar...It isn’t 
knowing that. It’s knowing how. Therefore it should be no surprise that 
lessons won’t teach you what an experience is like. Lessons impart 
information; ability is something else.40
Here again, what goes on during the actual experience, that is, whether one knows what 
the experience is like while having it, is overlooked. Lewis thinks that only when the 
imaginative abilities are gained (due to the experience), does one know what the 
experience is like. Lewis seems to think that because lessons will not teach you what an 
experience is like, it must involve knowing how, rather than knowing that. But it is not 
as clear cut as this. It could be that lessons impart propositional information, while 
experience imparts experiential information. This point is similar to the one that is 
brought out by Frank Jackson’s famous “knowledge argument”. This involves a 
neurophysiologist called Mary, who has spent her life in a black and white room. Despite 
this, she knows all the physical facts there are to know about the physiology of vision, 
due to watching a black and white television. The crux of the argument is the following: 
if Mary left her black and white room and came into the world we live in, would she 
learn anything or not? Would there be a fact of reality that she had not acquired while in 
the room? Jackson certainly thinks so, as he says “It seems just obvious that she will 
learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is 
inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical 
information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false” 41 This
40 Lewis (1988) p.516.
41 Jackson (1982) p.471.
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example emphasises the point that knowledge might well be gained from having an 
actual experience (a case of knowing that, rather than knowing how).
It is interesting that Lewis does differ from Nemirow on one important point. Whereas 
Nemirow does not mention any sort of information or facts being present while one is 
actually having an experience of such-and-such, Lewis acknowledges that some sort of 
information-transfer might be involved during the actual experience. He believes that 
“what experience E is like” denotes E itself.42 This means that Lewis acknowledges that 
having an experience of something, is knowing what that something is like as you 
experience i t 43 However, Lewis denies that this “knowing what something is like” 
denotes a “subjective quality” that is part of the information being accessed by the 
perceiver. He also states that the abilities gained by experiencing something, may have 
as their causal basis “a special kind of representation of some sort of information.. .We 
need only deny that it represents a special kind of information about a special subject 
matter” 44 So here Lewis is saying that it is conceivable that the abilities gained by 
having the experience of E, could come from certain information gained from that 
experience. So knowing what something is like can occur during the actual experience of 
it, which then leads on to the abilities. He only denies that the information gained takes 
the form of “special phenomenal facts.. .which cannot be represented in any other way”.45 
However, this is the whole point of Nagel’s thesis of the subjective character of 
experience. That character is made up of subjective experiential facts or information
42 Lewis (1988) p.519.
43 This point is made by Tye (1999a).
44 Lewis (1988) p.517.
45 Lewis (1988) p.517.
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which is only available from the viewpoint of the subject concerned. Lewis claims that it 
might be possible that experiences leave “distinctive traces” in people, but what could 
this mean? Presumably, each person would have their own distinctive traces, which, in 
my view, would mean that they were subjective in character. Now, Lewis does not state 
that these traces are subjective in character, but it seems to me that they would have to 
have some sort of subjective element to them, if each person had their own distinctive 
traces in them. Again, presumably, these traces would enable a person to know what an 
experience was like, so this would be a subjective fact of what the experience was like for 
the person concerned. Finally, these subjective experiential facts would not be available 
to an objective viewpoint, because they were subjective in their very nature. Now, to 
reiterate, this is just my interpretation of Lewis’ position, he might well mean something 
else in talking of “distinctive traces”, but I cannot see how he is going to avoid a 
subjective element in his explanation of them.
However, it can be seen that the Ability theory is a direct attack on the notion of a 
subjective character of experience, as Nagel would call it, involving subjective facts 
which are outside the scope of physicalism. It is also an attack on the above-mentioned 
“knowledge argument” of Frank Jackson, which, while this latter argument differs from 
Nagel’s argument by not promoting the concept of a subjective point of view or a role for 
the imagination, still claims that there is phenomenal information which physicalism does 
not explain.46 If subjective phenomenal experience can be shown to involve abilities
46 However, Jackson is o f the opinion that Nagel is raising a different problem. He thinks Nagel is talking 
about extrapolating from our experience to the experience of another, through the use of the imagination. 
Jackson (1982) p.473. Jackson is here referring to “What is it like to be a bat?”, and the reasons why this 
impression is given in Nagel’s paper were looked at earlier.
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such as imagining and recognising, instead of certain facts or information, then the claims 
of physicalism will not be viewed as false or incomplete. This is because physicalism 
only claims that all the information in the world is physical in character, and so will not 
have to account for the non-factual/informational know-how of experience.47 Therefore, 
if Nagel’s hypothesis of subjective experience and corresponding subjective facts are to 
survive, the Ability theory must be dealt with.
Is “What it is like” an Ability?
It is my opinion, that Nagel’s definition of the phrase “what it is like” in his “bat” paper 
did vary as the paper progressed. Firstly, and I think most importantly, Nagel intended 
the phrase “what is it like to be a bat?” to mean what it was like for the bat to be a bat.
He was trying to show how subjectivity and a point of view were connected, with the 
subjective facts of the bat’s conscious experience only being accessible from the point of 
view of the bat. These subjective facts would include what a sensation felt like to a bat, it 
would be a fact that an experience would feel like something to the bat. Nagel came to 
the conclusion that a physical, objective analysis of the bat would fail to reach the bat’s 
subjective experience, on account of the fact that the analysis involved a different 
viewpoint to the bat’s point of view, and so the bat’s subjective experiential facts were 
impossible to access. However, just because a certain set of experiential facts were 
unknowable and unable to be analysed objectively, it did not mean that the bat had no 
conscious experiences of its own. So at this stage, in my view, the phrase “what it is 
like” seemed to be an epistemological question, not alluding to any imaginative ability. 
As Mounce would say, “it was a difference of kind”, one creature was radically different
47 Alter (2001) pp.2/3.
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to another creature, and could not access each other’s experiences. However, when 
Nagel then brings in the imagination, and starts discussing how we might be able to 
imaginatively adopt the point of view of the bat, the phrase “what is it like to be a bat?” 
then becomes one of human conceptualisation. It is now a “difference of degrees”, and 
could be equated with having an ability to take up the bat’s point of view using the 
imagination.48 Indeed, Nemirow declares that “As Nagel’s own theory provides, 
however, knowing what it’s like essentially correlates with knowing how to imagine”,49 
and later he then states his Ability Equation, “Knowing what it’s like may be identified 
with knowing how to imagine”.50 Therefore, I believe that Nemirow adopted the 
“difference of degrees” version of Nagel’s “what it is like” question. This would then 
enable Nemirow to claim that “to know what it is like to see x” is just the ability to 
visualise x, to imaginatively adopt the point of view representative of experiencing x. 
However, it can be seen that Nemirow talks mostly about the abilities that are gained 
through having the experience of perceiving something, but does not dwell on the actual 
having of the experience. And yet, could it not be claimed that to know what something 
is like occurs when you actually experience it? Nemirow’s Ability Equation could be 
amended to the Subjective Facts Equation: knowing what it’s like may also be identified 
with actually having the experience. From a knowing-how equation we have gone to a 
knowing-that equation. I am not claiming here that one cannot imagine anything which 
one has not experienced, but I am trying to show how the importance of actual experience 
is played-down by the Ability theory. I believe that this situation goes back to the two
48 At one point, Nagel states that “At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective 
character of experience without relying on the imagination -  without taking up the point o f view of the 
experiential subject”. Nagel (1974) p. 178.
49 Nemirow (1990) p.492.
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different meanings of “what it is like” with Nagel. To know what it was like to be a bat 
with the first meaning, would mean what it was like for the bat to be a bat, to actually be 
in the bat’s point of view and have its experiences. In the second meaning, it would 
mean what it was like to imaginatively take up the bat’s point of view, and imagine 
having the bat’s experiences. In the former case, one would actually know what it was 
like, while in the latter case one would imaginatively know what it was like. Personally,
I think that Nemirow’s possible conflation of “knowing” and “imagining” stems from 
Nagel, where he mixes up his meanings of the term “what it is like”.
Therefore, to finish this section, I will analyse an example of having a particular 
experience, to try to ascertain when it is that one first knows “what it is like” to have that 
experience. Therefore, what is it like to have a visual experience of the cover of David 
Bowie’s Lodger album from 1979? (It features Bowie somehow stuck on a wall, next to a 
sink, with his nose pushed out of shape). Firstly, experience of actually seeing the album 
cover is of vital importance, for this gives the raw material for the mental abilities to 
work on. Without this experience, we would not know what the album cover looked like, 
and so would not be able to visualise it, remember it, recognise it etc. Now, it could be 
claimed that just a description of the album cover (as I gave above) would be enough to 
enable one to know what the cover looked like, and so would not necessarily involve 
actual perceptual experience of the album. However, this point brings to mind Bertrand 
Russell’s distinction between “knowledge by description” and “knowledge by 
acquaintance”. If one was given a verbal or written description of the album cover, this 
would be called knowledge by description. It would involve propositional knowledge
50 Nemirow (1990) p.493.
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about the album cover. At this point, a person could only claim to know what seeing the 
album cover was like propositionally. In contrast, knowledge by acquaintance would 
involve one having direct perceptual experience of the album cover. After this kind of 
knowledge, a person could claim to know what seeing the album cover was like 
experientially. It is this immediate experiential knowledge of the album cover, that 
would enable one to actually know what it was like to visually perceive it. It would be 
knowledge of the object itself, rather than just knowledge of propositions about the 
object. One could still claim that after a description of the album cover, one would be 
able to visualise it. But this would be a visualisation of the description of the cover, not 
of the cover itself. The basis of propositional knowledge is experiential knowledge.51 
For there to be a description of the Lodger album cover, someone must have first been 
experientially acquainted with it.
Therefore, to get anywhere in knowing what a certain something is like, one first has to 
experience it (in this case perceive it visually).52 Now, Nemirow would not disagree with 
this, and David Lewis would also not disagree. The difference is what the Ability 
theorists believe takes place during the actual experience. As we have seen, Nemirow
51 Bryan Magee (1995) makes this point, where he says, “The totality of propositional knowledge about the 
world is dependent for its very possibility, let alone its existence, on there being experiential knowledge”. 
Magee/Milligan (1995) p.31. Also, see Tallis (1989) p.220.
52 However, in connection with this point, D.H. Mellor (1993) makes the claim that with some experiences, 
one does not need to have experienced them at all, to know what they are like. He claims that the ability to 
imagine is all that is required to know what certain things are like (he gives examples of composers and 
painters, who can imagine their music and paintings, before they have heard or seen them respectively). 
Mellor (1993) pp.5/6. However, it seems to me that Mellor’s claim is still debatable. As argued earlier, it 
seems that the Ability theorists conflate “knowing what something is like” with “imagining what something 
is like”. I suppose it all comes down to how one defines the phrase “to know”. It could be argued that a 
musician will only be imagining what his music is like before he actually hears it. Once he has experienced 
it, then he will know what it is like. And even if he claims that the previously imagined music was the 
same as the experienced music, it would still not mean that when he was imagining the music, he knew
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thinks that the main role of having the actual experience, is that it goes towards the 
production of various imaginative abilities, and Lewis takes roughly the same view.53 
And I think that this is the crux of the argument. If “what it is like” involved knowing 
what, then this would entail there being certain facts ascertained at the time of the 
experience. Whereas, if “what it is like” involved knowing how, then this would not 
entail any facts being ascertained at the time of the experience. So, is knowing what it is 
like to visually experience the cover of David Bowie’s Lodger album, only the gaining of 
abilities to imagine it, remember it and recognise it, or does one also “know” during the 
actual experience?
As stated earlier, the Ability theorists seem to want to rush past the actual experience, and 
concentrate on the abilities gained instead. But what happens when we actually 
experience something? By hypothesis, I am assuming that a person has had no previous 
visual contact with, or propositional knowledge of, the Lodger album cover. So, this 
person goes into a record store and discovers what it is like to see the cover of the Lodger 
album for the first time. It does not seem unreasonable to claim that while he is 
experiencing the cover he does at that moment know what it is like to be perceiving the 
cover; it is a subjective, experiential fact for him, that the cover looks the way it does to 
him. He knows “what it is like” during the actual experience. It also seems plausible that 
a number of possibilities have been ruled out by his perceiving the actual cover (contra 
Lewis). Before he had seen the Lodger cover, there were limitless possibilities as to what 
it might have looked like to him (a mischievous sales assistant might have shown him a
what it sounded like. It would only be after the actual experience of the music, that he would know that his 
imagined music was identical to it. Before the actual experience, all he had was his imagined music.
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Leo Sayer album cover, and pretended that it was the Lodger cover by covering Leo’s 
name and the title). But once he is certain that it is Bowie’s Lodger album cover he is 
looking at, all the possibilities are ruled out bar the one he is actually seeing, which is the 
Lodger cover.54 Also, it does seem to be a case of knowing that rather than knowing 
how. It is a fact that the cover looks like that only to that person, as he is experiencing it. 
Therefore, why not call what it is like to see the Lodger album cover, a subjective 
experiential fact for that person? It is just one fact of many that go to make up that 
person’s subjective character of experience, as Nagel would call it.
There is also no logical connection between knowing what an experience is like and 
gaining abilities from this knowledge. For instance, it is conceivable that the person 
seeing the Lodger album cover knows what it is like during the experience, but for some 
reason cannot form any mental images in his mind. So he has no abilities to imagine or 
remember what it is like to see the cover. However, when he then sees the cover once 
more he will again be able to know what it is like during the experience. This shows that 
knowing what it is like is not identical with gaining abilities.55 However, having said
53 Nemirow (1990) p.498, Lewis (1988) p.516.
54 David Chalmers (1996) puts forward this sort of argument, where he states “No doubt Mary does gain 
some abilities when she first experiences red, as she gains some abilities when she learns to ride a bicycle. 
But it certainly seems that she learns something else; some facts about the nature o f experience. For all she 
knew before, the experience o f red things might have been like this, or it might have been like that, or it 
might even have been like nothing at all. But now she knows that it is like this. She has narrowed down 
the space of epistemic possibilities”. Chalmers (1996) p. 145.
55 This argument is from Earl Conee (1985), who declares “...Mary might learn how the sky looks without 
getting any of these abilities. She might have no ability to form mental images at will, and no ability to 
recall the look of the sky when she turns her attention to anything else. Yet still, she could know how the 
sky looks while she sees it. Such considerations show that Mary’s learning is not identical to acquiring any 
abilities (abilities are neither necessary nor sufficient for the learning)”. Conee (1985) p.298. Michael Tye 
(1999a) p.7, makes a similar point. In relation to this objection, Torin Alter (2001) attacks the Ability 
theorists’ claim that “Know-how is ability”. Utilising the arguments of Noam Chomsky, Alter shows that it 
is questionable as to whether know-how completely reduces to ability. He does this by giving examples
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this, it is the case that most critics of the Ability theory, while claiming that knowing 
what something is like occurs during the actual experiencing of it, go on and claim that 
through this experience, abilities have been gained to imagine, remember, recognise etc. 
the experience.56 However, some doubt could even be cast over this claim. When a 
person has not seen the Lodger album cover, he does not know what it looks like, and so 
lacks the ability to imagine it, recognise it, etc. When he has seen the cover, this 
experience leads to the relevant abilities being acquired. But, is it a gaining of abilities, 
or just a gaining of experiential information for abilities which are already present?
While a person does not know what the Lodger cover looks like, he might well be 
acquainted with another album cover, which enables him to visualise it, remember it, 
recognise it, etc. And this applies to numerous other objects which he has had experience 
of, he is able to use his imaginative abilities with regard to these objects as well. So, 
while it is claimed that he lacks abilities concerning an object he has not experienced, it is 
quite clear that the imaginative abilities of his mind are still present and operating on 
previously experienced material.57
Could it be that the imaginative abilities are always present in the mind, but that they 
only become operative when experiential information is supplied to them. This could be
where people have retained know-how, but for some reason have temporarily lost the corresponding ability. 
Alter (2001) pp.7/8.
56 Chalmers (1996) p.145, Conee (1985) p.298, Jackson (1986) p.294.
57 Martine Nida-Rumelin (1998) makes a similar point. She splits up experiential information into 
nonphenomenal(np) belief and phenomenal(p) belief. In reply to the challenge of the Ability theory, she 
states, “This objection is however easy to reject. Marianna’s case shows that knowing that the sky looks 
blue(p) does not consist in knowing that it looks blue(np) plus recognitional abilities, the ability to imagine 
blue and the like. Consider the moment in Marianna’s life when she is already acquainted with colors but 
has not yet taken her second step of epistemic progress. At this point she is able to imagine blue at will, 
she can recognize blue, etc., and she has, of course, the nonphenomenal belief that the sky looks blue(np) to 
normal observers, but she still does not have the corresponding phenomenal b elie f’. Nida-Rumelin (1998) 
p.70.
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something similar to Kant’s categories of the understanding. These categories are a 
priori in relation to information from the senses, but are dependent on that sense 
information for their operation. The imaginative capacities of the mind would be 
dormant unless there were experiential information from the senses. Once this 
information is forthcoming, the abilities start their operations, and imagining, 
remembering, recognising, starts taking place using that information. So it could be 
argued that we do indeed need to experience something in order for the mind’s 
imaginative abilities to start working, but that experience does not supply the abilities, it 
gives material for the already present abilities to process. In trying to give the impression 
that knowing what something is like is a matter of knowing how rather than knowing 
that, Ability theorists may have played on a confusion in the definition of the word 
“ability”. In relation to overt, physical abilities, then one can be said to gain these. For 
example, the ability to ride a bike is gained, as it was not present before. This is quite 
straightforward, first of all one could not ride a bike, then eventually one could ride a 
bike, and so an ability had been gained. And more importantly, it could be said that one 
now knows how to ride a bike. But is it as straightforward with mental abilities? Well, 
one could learn how to do mental arithmetic, and so be said to gain an ability that one did 
not have before. But, is it feasible to claim that just by looking at an object one gains an 
ability? An Ability theorist would say yes, by seeing an object you gain the abilities of 
being able to visualise it, recognise it, etc. But there is an important difference in this 
case. Imaginative abilities are not intrinsic to the perception of the object, they are 
dependent on the perception, certainly, but one cannot be said to gain imaginative 
abilities just by perceiving an object.
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The Knowing That/How Distinction of the Ability Theory and of Gilbert Ryle
To conclude this chapter, it might be interesting to compare the Ability theory with an 
earlier theory that had a knowing that/how distinction in it. This earlier theory was by 
Gilbert Ryle, which he explained in his famous book, The Concept o f Mind. Both 
theories try to argue that certain assumptions of subjective, non-physical, elements are 
wrong, and that the relevant factors can be explained by other means. The Ability theory 
tries to argue that subjective facts/information are non-existent in subjective experience, 
whereas, Ryle’s thesis was that the mind was non-existent. Ryle thought that the 
conjoining of “mind” and “body” was a type- or category-mistake,58 which resulted in 
people thinking that mind and body both existed, but were separate, each involving 
mental and physical processes/activities respectively. This would be similar to the 
category-mistake involved in saying, “He came down stairs and opened the door in his 
pyjamas”, to which the jocular reply would be “That’s a funny place for a door”.59 Here, 
the terms “door” and “pyjamas” are of different types, and so should not be conjoined. I 
suppose that Ryle wanted us to see the absurdity of talking about “a mind in a body” in a 
similar manner, so that we might reply “That’s a funny place for a mind”. However, it 
appears that Ryle did not completely rule out the existence of mental processes, but was 
just arguing that the propositions “mind” and “body” should not be conjoined. If it was 
realised that they were two different types, then “the argument will not show that either 
of the illegitimately conjoined propositions [i.e. mind or body] is absurd in itself’.60
58 Ryle described the category-mistake as representing “the facts o f mental life as if they belonged to one 
logical type or category(or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another”. Ryle 
(1949) p. 16. This category-mistake resulted in what Ryle called “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine”, 
the idea of an immaterial mind contained in a material body.
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It could be said that the Ability theory also believes that there is a category-mistake, this 
time involving the terms “subjective facts” and “experience”, and that the two should not 
be conjoined. The difference between Ryle’s category-mistake and this one, is that the 
Ability theorists would be nervous about what sort of “subjective facts” one was talking 
about. I suspect that some Ability theorists (e.g. David Lewis) would not object to the 
terms “subjective facts” and “experience” being conjoined, as long as the subjective facts 
were physical ones. Whereas, they would object if non-physical subjective facts were 
involved. So perhaps it is not a category-mistake after all, but an argument concerning 
the type of subjective facts concerned. Despite this, it does seem that both their attacks 
are on the same targets, which are types of non-physical objects. Also, both the Ability 
theory and Ryle’s theory come to use the knowing that/how distinction to help them in 
their respective arguments, by turning to abilities to help with their attack on the non­
physical “subjective facts” and “mind” respectively. As we have seen, the Ability theory 
claims that knowing what something is like consists in gaining mental abilities, such as 
imagining, remembering, recognising, etc. Gaining an ability is viewed as “knowing- 
how” to do something. This is in contrast to gaining certain experiential subjective facts 
of what something is like, which would involve “knowing that”. Similarly, Ryle claims 
that to see the workings of a person’s mind, one only has to observe their overt, physical 
ability in doing various tasks. He states that quotes of intelligence describe “not the 
knowledge, or ignorance, of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability, to do certain 
things”.61 According to Ryle, an intelligent performance of a physical ability, consisted 
only in the execution of the physical ability itself, it was just doing one thing. The
59 Ryle’s example is, “She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair”. Ryle (1949) p.22.
60 Ryle (1949) p.22.
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influence of “Descartes’ Myth” would have one believe that two things were happening, 
the carrying out of the physical ability and a corresponding mental operation which 
provided the intelligence to the physical behaviour. So, Ryle thought that there was only 
“knowing how” involved in physical, intelligent, actions, and not also a preceding 
“knowing that” to the physical actions, which would come from the supposed mental 
judgements of propositions concerned with the physical behaviour.62
So, both the Ability theory and Ryle’s theory use “abilities” in arguing that certain non­
physical phenomena which would involve “knowing that” certain propositions were the 
case, do not in fact exist. For example, an Ability theorist would claim that to know what 
it was like to see a red patch would involve the ability to imagine or remember the red 
patch, and not any subjective, experiential facts of how the patch appeared to one. 
Similarly, Ryle would claim that a person who played a clever shot at tennis had the 
ability of making an intelligent, overt action only, which did not involve any mental 
operations mirroring the overt behaviour. It is interesting that the Ability theory utilises 
mental abilities while Ryle’s theory utilises physical abilities. Indeed, it could be argued 
that Ryle might not be very supportive to the ideas behind the Ability theory. It is not at 
all certain that Ryle would agree that knowing what something was like consisted solely 
in the ability of imagining it. His assertion of the importance of the physical over the 
mental, would surely mean that he would support the view that actually having the 
experience of seeing what something was like took precedence over just being able to 
imagine it mentally. For Ryle, being in close physical proximity to the perceived object,
61 Ryle (1949) p.27.
62 Ryle (1949) p.32.
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would be the truest way of knowing what something was like. However, both the Ability 
theory and Ryle’s theory have one further similarity, they both have an air of 
implausibility hanging over them. In getting rid of the “ghosts” of subjective experiential 
facts and the mind respectively, they seem to be getting rid of something of vital 
subjective importance. Possibly, it’s the subjective character of experience, what 
something subjectively feels like when a person perceives something or carries out a 
physical action. With Ryle, physical behaviour or dispositions to behaviour are meant to 
replace subjective mental states. But even if we accept this, there still seems to be a 
discrepancy between this view and what entities we are aware of, existing in the world (in 
an ontological sense). There is physical behaviour, but there is also a subjective, 
conscious mentality. While the latter can certainly be seen as affecting the former, there 
is no way that physical behaviour exhausts the analysis of conscious mental states. 
Physical behaviour and mental states seem to be different elements of human experience, 
and it would be a mistake to conflate them. The Ability theory also contains an 
implausible conflation, but not of such a stark nature as with Ryle’s theory. This time, 
the conflation does not involve physical and mental entities, but only mental entities; that 
is, subjective mental facts and subjective mental abilities. Once again, in an ontological 
sense, there seem to be both subjective experiential facts and subjective abilities in the 
world. If a person is experiencing a pain, then there is a subjective fact of what this pain 
feels like to that person. This is different to having the subjective ability to imagine or 
recognise the feeling of pain. In my opinion, it would be a mistake to conflate the two.
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Conclusion
In his article “What is it like to be a bat?”, it seems to me that Nagel had in mind several 
conceptions of the phrase “what it is like”. H.O. Mounce labelled these different 
conceptions as a difference of kind and a difference of degrees. The difference of kind 
version of “what it is like” had Nagel wondering what it was like for the bat to be a bat. 
He came to the conclusion that it was impossible for us to gain this knowledge, as we had 
a totally different point of view, and so had none of the bat’s subjective experiential facts 
to work with, only possessing our own, human, experiential facts. To put it another way, 
the subjective character of experience of the bat was too unlike the subjective character of 
experience of a human. However, and I think that this is Nagel’s important point, even 
though we could not access the bat’s subjective experiential facts, it did not mean that the 
bat was not having conscious experiences of its own. At this point, in my view, “what is 
it like to be a bat” was an epistemological problem for humans (although Nagel denied 
that he was referring to this particular problem). There were certain subjective facts 
which were out of reach of human investigation. The bat could be objectively analysed 
by science, but science would not discover the bat’s experiential facts of what it was like 
to be a bat, as these were accessible only from the bat’s subjective point of view. 
However, Nagel then introduced his difference of degrees version of the “what it is like” 
question. Here, Nagel mooted the idea that it might indeed be possible for a human to get 
a conception of “what it was like to be a bat” by the use of the imagination. From being 
an epistemological problem for humans, it now became a problem of imaginative 
conception for humans. The difference of kind version of “what it is like”, which was 
deemed impossible, had changed to the difference of degrees version of “what it is like”,
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which was deemed difficult, but not impossible. However, we then saw that “what is it 
like to be a bat” was still a difference of kind, despite any imaginative efforts that could 
be made. This was because we still did not possess any of the subjective facts of the 
bat’s experience, and so would not be able to determine how close/far away our 
imaginative efforts got us to the bat’s conscious experiences.
However, with Nagel bringing in the imagination to the “what it is like” question, this 
resulted in a change of emphasis to the question. Nagel gave the impression that the 
“what it is like” question now involved the use of imaginative abilities. And I think that 
this provided the inspiration to Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, which resulted in 
the creation of the Ability theory. Nemirow and Lewis were able to declare that knowing 
what something is like did not involve any subjective experiential facts, that escaped an 
objective physicalism, but only involved the gaining of abilities to imagine, remember, 
recognise etc., the experience. Unwittingly, Nagel had planted the seeds to undermine 
his thesis of subjective, perspectival, facts of experience, in the very paper that he had 
introduced the thesis, by bringing in the concept of imaginative abilities. However, all is 
not lost for Nagel. It was hopefully shown in the second part of this chapter that the 
Ability theory is a very dubious theory, to say the least. Ability theorists have a habit of 
diminishing the importance of the actual experience of such-and-such, while 
concentrating on the mental abilities gained due to the experience. It seems that during 
the experience, there is no “knowing what it is like” going on, only with the gaining of 
the imaginative abilities, does one start to “know what it is like”. The Ability theorists 
version of “what it is like” seems to involve some introspection, whereas, Nagel’s version
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of “what it is like” does not (by introspection, I mean that one consciously makes an 
effort to examine one’s inner thoughts/sensations). I am fairly certain that Nagel is 
referring to the immediate phenomenal consciousness of a being, what such-and-such is 
like to that being, as they are perceiving it, before any introspection has occurred. This 
led me to question whether Ability theorists were confusing “knowing” with 
“imagining”. If one had actually experienced an event, then one could claim to know 
what that event was like. However, if one had not experienced the event, then one could 
still claim to imaginatively know what that event was like. But this would not be the 
same “know” as the one used previously, it would not be experientially known, only 
imaginatively known. Even if Ability theorists were to actually experience such-and- 
such, it still seems doubtful that it is the gaining of imaginative abilities that is the 
important point, and not the having of the actual experience, in knowing what such-and- 
such is like. It seems that in trying to get rid of Nagel’s subjective facts of experience, 
the Ability theorists must always curtail or diminish what happens during the having of 
the actual experience. The Ability theory appears to be another questionable attempt to 
turn a conception of “knowing that” into one of “knowing how” (the first being Ryle’s 
concept of the mind), which does not seem convincing, as something of subjective, 
experiential importance is being left out. It is still possible that this “something” of 
importance could well be Nagel’s subjective facts of experience, which go to make up a 
creature’s subjective character of experience.
37
CHAPTER TWO
THE SUBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW
What is the Subjective Point of View?
The idea of a subjective “point of view” is of extreme importance to Nagel and his thesis 
of consciousness. In Nagel’s opinion, the conscious, phenomenal, experience of a 
creature is intimately connected to its subjective point of view. He declares that, 
“ ...every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of 
view.. .”,63 and, “Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human 
being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of 
view”.64 However, what does Nagel mean by the expression “point of view”, and what is 
the connection with subjectivity? Ordinarily, when one speaks of a subjective point of 
view, one is referring to a situation like the following, where someone may declare, “I 
think The Matrix is a better film than Star Wars: The Phantom Menace”. This statement 
is basically a subjective opinion, whose truth or falsity cannot be gauged by comparison 
with any objective facts in the world. It might be an objective fact that others agree with 
the person’s opinion, but it still remains a subjective opinion or point of view. It seems 
certain that Nagel is not referring to this ordinary usage, when he talks of a subjective 
“point of view”. I think that Nagel means that if a subject is capable of having conscious 
experiences, then, as a consequence of this fact, it has a subjective point of view on the 
world. Any creature or being which is capable of having conscious experiences is
63 Nagel (1974) p. 167.
64 Nagel (1974) p. 171.
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classed as a subject. This is the difference between being a “subject” and being an 
“object” in the world. For example, a lump of rock would be classed as an object, as it is 
not alive and having any conscious experience, and this would stay the case for its entire 
existence as a “rock” in the world. It would not have any viewpoint on the world and 
would not realise that it was classed as an object in that world. In contrast, a person 
would be classed as a subject in the world. After coming into existence, a person would 
become a conscious, experiencing subject, with a point of view on the world. Like the 
rock, a person would be a physical object in the world, but unlike the rock, the person 
would also be a subject in the world. There would be something it was like to be a 
person (a subject), but nothing it was like to be a rock (an object). (It is an interesting 
point as to what the status of a person would be who died. The person would still be a 
physical object in the world, but would no longer be classed as a subject, as they were not 
having conscious experiences any more. Put harshly, the dead person could possibly be 
viewed as an object, like the rock, there being nothing it was like to be a dead person.65 
But of course this is not really the case. People who have died are treated with respect 
and dignity. While they may technically (in Nagel’s sense), be only objects, they are 
remembered as the subjects they once were, when they were alive.66 As for the rock, it is 
just remembered for being an object, although it might still be treated with respect and 
dignity, e.g., if it had religious significance, if it had been autographed by Bob Dylan, and 
so on).
65 Wittgenstein writes that, “I am inclined to speak of a lifeless thing as lacking something. I see life 
definitely as a plus, as something added to a lifeless thing”. Wittgenstein, ZETTEL, 128.
66 This is emphasized by the way people differentiate between talking about the corpse and the “the dearly 
departed”, etc.
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So, for Nagel, a subjective point of view is something that every creature, which is 
capable of having conscious experiences, could be said to possess. However, some
f i lphilosophers, such as Douglas Hofstadter, have tried to argue that the point of view in 
question could be an artificial one (a physical representational system), for example, 
centred on a computer. Hofstadter then claims that if there is a connection between a 
point of view and a physical representational system, one could think of a bat’s point of 
view, for example, as a complicated version of a physical representational system, and so 
objectify some of the subjectivity of the point of view of the bat68 (its memories, its 
history etc.). However, I do not think that this is the sort of point of view which Nagel 
has in mind. The key elements of Nagel’s point of view is that it is conscious and 
subjective, both of which are missing from Hofstadter’s version of a point of view. A 
computer has no conception of being conscious or of being subjective (i.e., a subject of 
experiences). This means that there would be something it was like to occupy a 
conscious, subjective point of view, e.g., of a bat, a human, etc., but nothing it was like to 
occupy the “point of view” of the computer. Indeed, I think it is extremely doubtful that 
a physical representational system could be thought of as holding any sort of point of 
view at all. If one considers a system as holding a point of view, because, for example, it 
has memory facilities and holds a certain position in relation to incoming and outgoing 
data, this would mean that a television set could be said to have a “point of view”, but 
this seems highly implausible. So, for Nagel, his concept of a point of view, essentially 
involves subjectivity and consciousness. Further to this, it is only from a creature’s 
specific, subjective, point of view on the world that the subjective facts making up its
67 Hofstadter, D.R. (1981) “Reflections on “What is it like to be a bat?”” In: Hofstadter, D.R. & Dennett, 
D.C., eds. The M ind’s I. Brighton: The Harvester Press, pp. 403-14.
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character of experience can be apprehended. This was the reason why Nagel brought in 
the example of the bat, to show that only from the bat’s point of view could its subjective 
facts of experience be accessed, and not from, say, a human point of view (although 
Nagel suggested that this might be possible through the use of the imagination). Having 
said this, Nagel does not really elaborate on the concept of a point of view, so I will 
endeavour to build up a picture of what I take to be the subjective point of view of a 
human being.
First of all, I think that the point of view of the subject is an experiential or perceptual 
one. Nagel is concerned with the phenomenal or conscious experiences of creatures, not 
necessarily involving any introspection of thought. The phenomenal consciousness of a 
human consists in subjectively experiencing the world, with all the perceptions and 
sensations that this involves. The human subject perceives the objective world from his 
own subjective viewpoint,69 and can never escape this perspectival view as long as he 
lives.70 The reason why a human cannot escape his subjective point of view is because it 
is through his physical body, his sensory organs, that he receives his experiences of the
68 Hofstadter (1981) p.411.
69 John Searle (1992) p.95, makes this point.
70 Briefly, it is an interesting question as to whether one should be frightened o f dying or not. There are 
those who believe that we should not be fearful, by looking at death from an “objective” point of view and 
just seeing it as “Nature’s way” of working. However, I do not think that one’s subjective point o f view on 
death can be so easily replaced by an objective one. It is quite reasonable to suppose that death is a natural 
process, which one can objectively observe occurring all around one. If death only occurred objectively, 
then perhaps it might not be that frightening. However, death is a natural process which also occurs 
subjectively, that is, to one’s self. One might not actually experience death as such, as one will already 
have stopped existing after dying, but this does not stop one fearing the process of death. This is the 
frightening part about death, it is only from one’s own subjective point of view that one will directly 
experience the process of dying, knowing that death is the end result o f this process. The experience of this 
process is not shareable, you are “on your own” so to speak. Therefore, I don’t think it is irrational to fear 
one’s subjective point o f view coming to a permanent end, even if it is the result of an inevitable process of 
nature.
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world, of which he is then conscious.71 I do not believe that there is any other way of 
consciously experiencing the objective world, other than through the organs of sense. 
This is why I am suspicious of so-called Out Of Body Experiences (OOBE’s), which 
claim that people are able to somehow leave their bodies and travel about as spirit-like 
entities. When a person is out of his body, how is he perceiving the world? Does the 
world appear as it did from the vantage point of his physical body, which he claims to 
have left behind. Or if it is different, what does the difference in perception amount to?
It seems to me that in order for any part of the universe to be perceived in some way, 
there has to be an existent perceiver, who must have perceptual apparatus in order to 
carry out the perception. The perception then provides the conscious experiences that go 
to make up the subjective character of experience of the perceiver. The experiences of 
the objective world that a subject is conscious of, are always mediated by the sensory 
organs of that subject. It could be said that one’s entire body is one’s perceptual point of 
view on the world, as the skin which covers our bodies gives us the sensory qualities of 
touch and feel. However, I think that the main perceptual locus for a human is the head 
area, which houses the eyes, ears, nose and mouth (as well as the skin covering). It is 
from the sensory organs in the head area where humans get most of their phenomenal, 
conscious experience of the external world. Because of the mediation of the sense 
organs, it is not a direct experience of outer reality that a human receives, but
71 For example, Searle states, “However, speaking in the most general terms, it seems clear that 
consciousness serves to organize a certain set o f relationships between the organism and both its 
environment and its own states. And, again speaking in very general terms, the form of organisation might 
be described as “representation”. By way of the sensory modalities, for example, the organism gets 
conscious information about the state of the world... we can say that in conscious perception the organism 
has representations caused by states of affairs in the w orld ...”. Searle (1992) p. 107.
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representations of that reality.72 However, even though we are only acquainted with 
representations, this is basically reality for the human, as he cannot subjectively
73experience reality any other way, due to his contingent physiology (by “contingent”, I 
mean that the physiology could have been different, e.g., we might have had an extra 
sensory organ on the top of our heads).
The idea that all we get of reality are biologically manufactured representations is driven 
home in Oliver Sacks’ book, An Anthropologist on Mars. In this book, Sacks looks at a 
number of people, who, through accident or disease, have had their perceptions of the 
world radically changed. After a car accident, a “Mr I”, lost his ability of producing 
normal colour vision, and could only visually perceive the world in black and white. As 
can be imagined, this had a shocking effect on Mr I, especially as he was a painter, who 
relied on his visual perception of the world for his work. Part of his normal, subjective, 
perceptual, point of view on the world had been altered, and he had to battle to get used 
to the new point of view on reality that he possessed.74 As it turns out, it was certain 
parts of Mr I’s brain, the V4 areas, which were responsible for producing and processing
72 Bryan Magee makes this point, and also claims that there is a common confusion involving Empiricists, 
where, “The great...tradition of the past to which most professional philosophers in the English-speaking 
world still see themselves as most closely related is that o f Empiricism. And I am afraid that for this reason 
they are still mis-taking our experience of reality for reality -  in fact they frequently use ‘experience’ and 
‘the world’ as interchangeable concepts...they mis-take epistemological entities for ontological ones”. 
Magee/Milligan (1995) p.25.
73 This is like Kant’s “transcendental idealism”, where all we are given are representations and not the 
things in themselves. Kant does not doubt that there are external objects, but that “If we treat outer objects 
as things in themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge o f their 
reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the representation which is in us”. Kant, Critique o f Pure 
Reason, A378.
74 Concerning this, Sacks writes that, “Mr I., it was clear, could discriminate wavelengths, but he could not 
go on from this to translate the discriminated wavelengths into colour; he could not generate the cerebral or 
mental construct o f colour...Mr I.’s primary visual cortex was essentially intact, and it was the secondary 
cortex (specifically the V4 areas, or their connections) that bore virtually the whole brunt o f the damage”. 
Sacks (1995) p.27.
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our visual colour images, that were not working properly. So it can be seen that what we 
term as our visual reality of the external world, depends on certain neural processes going 
on in our brains (I take this to be the case, not just for sight, but for all our sensory 
modalities). Indeed, the importance of the brain in processing the input from our sense 
organs, so it is presented to us in the form it is, cannot be overstated. In his paper “Brain 
Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness”,75 Nagel looked at the results of certain split- 
brain experiments, and drew attention to the fact that our concept of a single subject of 
consciousness and mental operations may only be an illusion. One naturally thinks that 
there is one mind per brain, so to speak, but Nagel tells of how the two cerebral 
hemispheres each have the same perceptual, memory and control systems contained in 
them.76 Each of the hemispheres could run the body without the assistance of the other; 
indeed, when the corpus callosum, which connects the hemispheres, is severed, it seemed 
as if there were now two brains where there was only one before. As can be imagined, 
this result certainly complicates one’s outlook on the unity of consciousness of a human 
being. However, with regards to a human’s subjective point of view, I don’t really think 
that these split-brain experiments have much effect on the concept of it. Nagel talks of 
there being an “illusion” of conscious unity, but surely, this illusion is our subjective 
reality. With a normal brain, both cerebral hemispheres work together in tandem to 
produce the perceptual point of view that a human is used to. Now, there may very well 
be duplication of brain processes in the two hemispheres, but this only comes to the fore
75 Nagel, T. (1971) “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness”. In: Nagel, T. Mortal Questions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 147-64.
76 Perhaps this is evolution’s idea of having a backup of the really vital, controlling parts o f the human 
body. Possibly, earlier evolutionary models of the brain had all the functions together in one brain mass, 
but it proved more fruitful to separate and duplicate them for the long term survival o f the human being. 
Then, after some time had elapsed, the two separate hemispheres might have started exchanging
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when they are physically separated by surgery. When the hemispheres are still 
conjoined, it is essentially one brain doing the work; the perceptual point of view stays 
the same, even though there may be various exchanges of information between the two 
hemispheres. The perceptual point of view of a human is real enough, never mind how it 
is neurophysiologically produced. In Nagel’s 1974 “bat” paper there is certainly no 
appearance/reality distinction in connection with consciousness and experience. One’s 
conscious experience can only be apprehended from one’s subjective point of view, and it 
is real for the subject, there is no appearance of conscious experience. Conscious 
experience is a subjective reality, for what would be the objective reality of one’s 
conscious experience? If the brain was examined, one might see various neurons firing 
in the two cerebral hemispheres, but there would be no consciousness on view. The brain 
probably is responsible for our conscious experience, but it is only from the subjective 
point of view that it is experienced as it is. I take one’s consciousness to be an 
ontological reality, that is, as something which does exist in the world, even though it can 
only be apprehended subjectively, and so cannot be said to have the usual “objective” 
stamp of reality.
Therefore, the subjective point of view of a human, is just that, a biologically processed 
point of view by a subject, of the outer reality that surrounds him.77 Indeed, in relation to 
the conception that Nagel has of a subjective point of view, it could be said that it
information, and so coalesced into “one brain”, operating for the maximum benefit of the concerned 
organism.
77 Schopenhauer, who also held a representationalist theory of what we perceive, wrote “It then becomes 
clear and certain to him [a man] that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a 
hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as representation, in other words, only in 
reference to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is h im self’. Schopenhauer, The World as 
Will and Representation, 1, 3.
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necessarily requires that biology and physiology are involved in any such point of view. 
As a consequence of this, it seems to me that in order for outer reality to be perceived, 
this has to involve the perceiving apparatus of some creature, which in turn means that 
the only access to that reality will be mediate or indirect, through the representations that 
the sensory apparatus provides to the creature. But for the subject, these representations 
are reality, as this is the only way that the subject can access the external world. Because 
of this, it might as well be claimed that oranges really are orange and that tomatoes really 
are red. We can take our representations of reality as the way things really are, because 
there is no other subjective point of view on reality that we can take. It is only when 
one’s perceiving apparatus undergoes a radical change, as occurred with Mr I, that one 
realises that the way the world looks to us depends on biological processes in ourselves. 
The “things-in-themselves” of the external world will never be immediately or directly 
perceivable by any subject, as the actual act of perception involves the biological, 
subjective, representation of that external world. Having said this, there is of course the 
theoretical, scientific, objective, point of view on reality, which does claim to view the 
world free from any subjective viewpoints (this objective point of view will be looked at 
in more detail in the next chapter). However, the point is that science claims to see 
reality as it “really” is, that is, free from subjective representations. Using Locke’s 
terminology, the secondary qualities of external objects are relocated in the mind of the 
perceiver, while the primary qualities of the external objects are seen as being intrinsic to 
those objects. For example, with a red snooker-ball, the redness of the ball would be 
viewed as not really belonging to the ball, but belonging to the subjective representation 
of the ball. However, the round shape and mass of the snooker-ball would be viewed as
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actually belonging to the ball. I suppose that this means that if there were no perceivers 
of reality, or perceivers with a different type of visual apparatus, the snooker-ball might 
not appear red anymore, but would still appear to have a round shape. While this view on 
reality does have its problems, it does show up an important point, that is, if there was no 
subjectivity in the universe, then there would be no conscious apprehension of the 
universe, there would just be unobserved, unexperienced, reality. This in turn, means that 
the conscious experience of the external world is always accessed from an individual, 
subjective, point of view. This is the connection between subjectivity, a point of view 
and consciousness that Nagel is claiming is so important. Every creature that has 
conscious experience (or phenomenal consciousness), has a subjective point of view with 
which it apprehends this experience.
Points of View and the Possibility of Epistemological Solipsism
However, this idea of an “individual” subjective point of view creates some problems for 
Nagel. It raises the philosophical issue of solipsism and the related issue of the so-called 
“privacy of experience”.78 There are strong and weak versions of solipsism. Someone 
holding the strong version believes that only their own mind exists, and that other 
peoples’ minds do not exist, or are just illusory. However, this seems highly implausible, 
and outside of media and advertising circles, not many would subscribe to this view. By 
contrast, the weaker version is far more plausible, and problematic. This claims that one 
can know that one’s own mind or consciousness exists, but cannot have that same 
certainty that others’ minds and consciousnesses exist as well. All one can do is just
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assume that others have minds and conscious experiences similar to one’s own, due to
physiological and behavioural similarities with oneself. It is this form of solipsism that
Kathleen Wider (1990) accuses Nagel of advocating, due to his theory of subjective
points of view and his use of the imagination in finding out about others’ points of view.
Wider argues that, “ ...he [Nagel] never directly confronts or attempts to overcome what I
will call ‘epistemological solipsism’, i.e., the view that the only experience I can know
exists is my own. Nagel simply assumes that others (including other non-human animals)
have experience”. 79 So, what is Nagel’s strategy to escape the charge of epistemological
solipsism? It is quite simple, he claims that:
I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor.
The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. 
Rather it is a type.m
By this, Nagel seems to mean that one member of a species can have some idea of the 
point of view of another member of the same species, due to their similar physiological 
make-up, producing similar subjective experiences. For example, if one human said that 
he was experiencing fear, then another human could claim that he understood this feeling 
of fear in the first human. This was because the two humans would have a point of view 
of the same type, and so have an understanding of the “human” feeling of fear. This 
example is based on a point made by Norman Malcolm (1988), where he states, in 
contrast to Wider, that “Nagel seems to have been persuaded by Wittgenstein that ‘mental 
concepts do not refer to logically private objects of awareness’ .. .Nagel allows that this
781 should acknowledge here that much of the discussion in this section, in relation to the idea of Nagel’s 
use of the imagination leading to epistemic solipsism, has been influenced by Kathleen Wider’s excellent 
1990 paper, which is far more lucid than what follows.
79 Wider (1990) pp.483/4.
80 Nagel (1974) p. 171.
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fear does not belong to me alone; others may have the same fear; this fear that I have is 
not ‘a logically private object’”.81 This result is possible because, as Nagel states, 
“someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription” is able “to adopt his point of
89view -  to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third...” This 
means that because one human has experienced fear in the first-person subjective, he is 
then able to understand the feeling of fear in another human, even though this is only in 
the third-person objective. One human is capable of adopting the point of view of 
another human, due to their physiological, and therefore also psychological, similarities. 
However, the more different a creature is, in physiological terms, then the greater the 
difficulty in understanding that creature’s point of view. So, for example, a human would 
have much more difficulty in adopting the point of view of a creature that was 
physiologically much more different to a human, e.g., a bat. By this method of defining 
the point of view as a type, rather than an individual point of view, Nagel makes the 
attempt to escape the charges of epistemological solipsism and the privacy of experience. 
But, is he successful? There is a forceful objection to Nagel’s idea that the type of point 
of view is differentiated by physiological means, which is mentioned by Wider (1990) 
and also J. Biro (1993). What Nagel is arguing for is that physiologically similar sensory 
organs produce a similar type of experience for the creatures which possess those sensory 
organs. Whereas, a creature with a physiologically different set of sense organs will have 
a different type of experience again, due to the physiological differences. Now, this all 
seems quite sensible, and a good way to separate the types of points of view that different 
species will have. However, there is a problem for Nagel, which both Wider and Biro
81 Malcolm (1988) p. 149.
82 Nagel (1974) p. 172.
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seize on. Nagel has been arguing against psychophysical reduction in explaining 
conscious experience, so one would not expect physiological differences to make any 
difference to the experience that a creature is said to have. On this point, Wider argues 
that:
Even given the abundant evidence that most humans have similar neuro- 
physiological processes occurring within them when, for instance, they see, it 
would not follow given Nagel’s view of the relation between the physical and 
the mental that similar kinds of phenomenological features attach to 
everyone’s seeing. Nagel has always argued against psychophysical 
reductionism...83
On the same issue, Biro declares that:
If we can individuate experience types only in terms of physiological 
differences, we have already embraced a kind of physicalism, indeed, one 
might think, something perilously close to a reduction...If qualia really were 
nomological danglers, one would not expect a creature’s physiology to imply 
anything about its experiences.84
By referring to qualia as “nomological danglers”, I think Biro means that qualia, or the 
qualitative character of experiences, are viewed [supposedly by Nagel] as properties that 
fall outside of the nomological net of physical science, they are something that scientific 
laws cannot explain. So, it can be seen that Wider and Biro are using Nagel’s supposed 
antireductionism against him, when he tries to differentiate types of experiences by 
different physiologies. They are arguing that if Nagel claims that conscious experience 
cannot be reduced to the physical, then he cannot legitimately use the physical to 
differentiate conscious experiences. On the face of it, this is a good argument, but, does 
it accurately describe Nagel’s position on psychophysical reductionism? In his 1974 
“bat” paper, one could argue that Nagel was not against psychophysical reductionism per
83 Wider (1990) p.490.
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se, but only that the reductionism that had been put forward so far, did not give a 
reasonable account of conscious experience. Nagel points out that reductionist analyses 
of the mental at that time usually involved functional, intentional or behavioural 
characterizations, which, in his opinion, did not directly address the subjective character 
of conscious experience.85 So, Nagel is not saying that there never will be an adequate 
psychophysical reduction, but only that the psychophysical reductions that had been 
made, were, to him at least, inadequate to explain conscious experience. It could be said 
that Nagel was still of the opinion that conscious experience probably did have a physical 
basis, but that it was not apparent how this would be discovered.86 Our position on 
physical events causing mental events, could, Nagel argues, be similar to a person who 
locks a caterpillar in a safe, and opens it later to find a butterfly inside. If that person had 
no conception of insect metamorphosis, then he would be at a loss to explain what had 
exactly occurred inside the safe. However, as he was quite sure that only the caterpillar 
had been in the safe, he would have to come to the conclusion that it had played a part in 
the production of the butterfly, but he would not understand the process involved.87 So it 
might be argued that Nagel could still hold a position against the psychophysical 
reductionism of the time, but still believe that conscious experience did ultimately rely on 
physical causes. And so, this would mean that he was still entitled to claim that it was 
probable that different physiologies would result in different experiences, and use this for 
the basis of his theory of different types of points of view. So, using his types of points 
of view, Nagel can claim that, for example, two humans (sharing the same type of
84 Biro (1993) p.185.
85 Nagel (1974) pp. 166/7.
86 Alter (1999) makes a similar point on pp.6/7.
87 Nagel (1974) p. 177.
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viewpoint), were capable of adopting the point of view of each other, and so have an 
understanding of each other’s experiences. This would enable Nagel to escape the 
charges of epistemological solipsism and the privacy of experience that were levelled at 
him.
However, there is a further problem for him, and, as Wider has stated, it concerns the way 
that one would take up the point of view of someone else. For one person to adopt the 
point of view of another person, Nagel once again turns to the imagination to carry out 
the task. As we saw in Chapter 1, he was depending on the imagination in trying to take 
up the point of view of a bat. That is, he was suggesting that a human could use his 
imaginative abilities to try to get a conception of what it was like to be a bat. However, it 
was seen that the success of this strategy was extremely doubtful. A human could 
certainly use his imagination to come up with whatever point of view that he imagined, 
but how would one know how far or close this imaginative viewpoint was to the bat’s 
actual viewpoint? Part of Nagel’s argument was that only the bat itself had the correct 
subjective point of view on being a bat, so a human would face great difficulties in 
attempting to imagine the point of view of a bat, as he had a completely different point of 
view. So, a human did not have access to the bat’s subjective conscious experiences, in 
order to gauge the success or otherwise of his imagined “bat” point of view. Now, the 
question is, will Nagel have more success with one human imaginatively taking up the 
point of view of another human? After all, Nagel could claim that a human and a bat 
have radically different types of point of view, and so the task for the one to imagine the 
other’s viewpoint was always going to be difficult. With two humans, both having the
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same type of point of view, surely it would be that much easier for the imagination. For 
example, say that someone is drinking a pint of Guinness. Now, if another person wanted 
to imagine the point of view of that first person drinking the Guinness (i.e., what it was 
like for the person to drink the Guinness, the “gustatory experience”), what would this 
involve? If he was also drinking a pint of Guinness at the same time, it seems fairly 
straightforward. He takes a sip of his Guinness, taking note of the qualitative character of 
this experience (what it feels like in his mouth, going down his throat, and the strange 
sensation he then has in his stomach). Having done this, he then watches the other person 
take a sip of his Guinness, and then brings to mind the sensations that he felt during his 
Guinness-experience, and imaginatively tries to transfer them to the other person, to try 
to be the other person having those sensations. Now, it could be that the result of this is 
that one person quite accurately takes up the point of view of the other person who is 
drinking the Guinness. After all, they are both humans, they have the same physiologies, 
the Guinness was taken from the same tap, etc. In effect, there does seem to be a rational 
warrant for assuming that the imagined point of view taken up by one person is similar to 
the actual point of view of the other person. But, in reality, how can we confirm this?
The person doing the imagining is remembering his own individual point of view, and 
then imaginatively transferring this to the other person. At no time does he directly know
no
what the other person’s subjective point of view is actually like. Of course, as humans 
do have a conception of language to describe and compare the actual and imagined 
experiences, they may very well agree that their Guinness-experiences were similar. 
However, they will still only have subjectively experienced their own feelings and
88 The difficulty o f trying to imagine another’s sensations is also discussed by Wittgenstein in the 
Philosophical Investigations, 302.
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sensations, and will have come to a warranted and rational assumption about their shared 
experiences; but they will still not know for certain that their Guinness-experiences were 
actually similar. It seems that the point of view of a bat and another human are both 
ultimately inaccessible to an imaginative effort to adopt their respective viewpoints.
In his “bat” paper, Nagel addresses the problem of solipsism and his use of the
imagination, by claiming that solipsism will result:
if one misinterprets sympathetic imagination as if it worked like perceptual 
imagination: it then seems impossible to imagine any experience that is not 
one’s own.89
To understand what Nagel is getting at, one has to remember the distinction he made 
between perceptual and sympathetic imagination. To imagine such-and-such 
perceptually, involves putting oneself in a conscious state resembling the state one would 
be in if perceiving such-and-such. While to imagine such-and-such sympathetically, 
involves putting oneself in a conscious state resembling such-and-such itself. An 
example would be the following. To perceptually imagine a person in pain, would 
involve putting oneself in a conscious state resembling the state one would be in if 
perceiving a person in pain. In contrast, to sympathetically imagine a person in pain, 
would involve putting oneself in a conscious state resembling what it was like to be the 
person in pain. With perceptual imagination, the view is an objective, third-person kind, 
while sympathetic imagination involves a subjective, first-person view. So, what does 
Nagel mean by talking of mistaking sympathetic for perceptual imagination? Perhaps he 
means that one tries to imagine what it was like to have the subjective point of view of
89 Nagel (1974) p.nl76.
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another person (sympathetic), but one only ends up imagining the objective view of that 
person (perceptual); that is, there appears to be no way that one can imaginatively gain 
subjective access to the person’s point of view. Therefore, it would appear to one that the 
only subjective, first-person access one could imaginatively achieve, was with one’s own 
thoughts and experiences. I am not sure if I have understood this correctly, however, it 
seems to me that this does not really help Nagel overcome the charge of solipsism. 
Whether the type of imagination involved is perceptual or sympathetic, and whether they 
are mixed up or not, it is still one’s own subjective imagination that one is utilising. One 
can certainly sympathetically imagine another’s subjective viewpoint, what experiences 
and sensations another person is feeling. But this is only one’s own subjective 
imagination doing this, at no time is one actually feeling what the other person is 
experiencing. One only has subjective, first-person access to one’s own experience, 
which one then tries to imaginatively project or transfer in to the other person. Therefore, 
when one talks of having the “same experience” as another person, one is just assuming, 
quite rationally, that one’s own subjective experience is similar to another person’s 
subjective experience. For example, if you saw someone sit on a drawing pin that had 
mysteriously found its way onto their chair, you would be entitled to exclaim “Blimey, 
that’s painful isn’t it, the same thing happened to me last week”, or words to that effect.
In this instance you would be quite entitled to think that you and the other person had had 
similar experiences. However, you would not actually know how the other person felt, 
you would just recall your own subjective experience of sitting on a pin, and transfer it to 
the other person. But, in ordinary, everyday life, you would still be quite justified in 
claiming that you and the other person had the “same experience”, or that you “know”
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how the other person felt; as you and the other person have similar physiologies, the pin 
entered the same parts of your bodies, your behaviour after the event was similar, etc. 
However, in the final analysis, this would only be a rational assumption of similar 
experiences, as you are only directly aware of your own subjective experiences. Now it 
could be that this is all that Nagel is claiming, after all, he does say that it is because one 
knows what an experience is like in the first-person, that one is able to apply it in the 
third-person, that is, to someone else.90 Nagel could claim that the result of this is that 
one can understand or know the quality of another person’s experience. However, there 
is still no certainty in this, one does not really know, in the subjective sense, what another 
person’s experience is like. So, even though Nagel tries to claim that the point of view he 
is talking about is a type, there is still the inescapable subjectivity of the “individual” 
point of view involved. And along with the subjectivity of the individual point of view, 
there are also the twin consequences of epistemological solipsism and privacy of 
experience. So it seems that Wider was quite correct when she charged Nagel with these 
consequences, as a result of his ideas on points of view and the role of the imagination.
Subjectivism and Solipsism91
However, I think that any theory which proclaims an irreducible, subjective, aspect of 
mind and consciousness, would face accusations of promoting solipsism. Subjective 
theories of this sort are basically claiming that there is a subjective reality, which does 
exist, but is not objectively observable. A consequence of this is that this subjective
90 Nagel (1974) p. 172.
91 I should make it clear that the following section only contains my own views on solipsism and 
subjectivity, and not those of Nagel himself. Indeed, I don’t think that Nagel would agree with my 
solipsistic conclusions.
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reality can only be apprehended from the point of view of the person whose subjective 
reality it is. This of course means that each person is directly or intrinsically aware of 
their subjective reality, but are unable to have the same sort of access to another person’s 
subjective reality. This means that one knows directly of the existence of one’s own 
subjective reality, but does not know in the same way of the existence of others’ 
subjective realities. This results in a certain element of one’s subjective experiences 
being private and to a situation of solipsism. Of course, if one is able to objectify or 
eliminate the subjective aspect of mind and consciousness, then the problem of solipsism 
does not arise. For example, if one takes a behaviourist stance, then there is no problem 
of other minds. A person’s “mind” is viewed as nothing over and above a person’s overt 
behaviour or dispositions to behave. There is no subjective aspect to the mind, 
everything is objectively observable and checkable, and solipsism is not a problem. 
Again, if one takes a functionalist stance to the mind, the problem of solipsism is also 
avoided. Functionalism concentrates on mental states and the causal relations these 
mental states have with each other, in producing specific outputs from specific inputs to 
the mind. Whereas behaviourism eliminated the subjective aspect of the mind, 
functionalism just basically ignores the subjective aspect of experiences and sensations, 
as these are viewed as having no functional purpose. Therefore, no subjective aspect of 
mind, no danger of solipsism. Philosophical theories of mind and consciousness seem to 
go out of their way to avoid solipsism and privacy of experience. The view seems to be 
that if a theory entails some sort of solipsism then it is untenable and a non-starter as a 
theory of mind.
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In finding epistemic solipsism a result of NageTs ideas on consciousness, Wider is of the 
opinion that this result . .needs both acknowledgement and defense”92 from Nagel. She 
also quotes Anthony Kenny as finding “...an odd solipsistic strain”93 in the work of 
Nagel. However, is the idea of solipsism really that strange? Of course, I am not 
advocating a metaphysical solipsism, that is, trying to claim that only my mind exists in 
the world. I have no doubt that every other living human in the world also has his/her 
own respective mind. It is an epistemic solipsism that I think is in existence in the case 
of humans, that is, each individual can only know that their own mind/consciousness 
exists in the direct, first-person manner, due to the subjective viewpoint that they occupy. 
Now, is it really that odd to claim that one is aware of one’s own thoughts and 
experiences in a way that is not available or accessible to anyone else? It seems to me 
that this is an inevitable outcome of the situation that we find ourselves in. Human 
beings are physical creatures, individuated into separate bodies, and by some processes, 
probably occurring in the brain, find that each of them are also subjects of conscious 
thought and experience. Of course, I don’t know that other humans are in this position, 
as I have access only to my own conscious thought and experience. The subjectivity of 
my situation will only allow me to have this unique, first-person access to my thoughts, 
while I just assume that others each have their own unique, first-person access to their 
thoughts, due to physiological and behavioural similarities to myself. This is the classic 
asymmetry involved between finding out about one’s own mind in the first-person and 
finding out about another’s mind in the third-person. I think that conscious creatures are
92 Wider (1990) p.483.
93 Wider (1990) p.482.
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like little “packets”94 of subjectivity, moving in, and observing, the objective world.
Each little “packet” has its own point of view on the world, which is only available to 
itself.
To explain what I mean by this, consider the following example. There are a hundred 
people sitting in a cinema, all watching the same film on the big screen. They are all 
engrossed in the film, laughing at the same time, gasping in unison at the exciting bits, 
etc. However, despite this communal and inter-subjective correspondence between their 
reactions, their perceptual experiences are still only apprehended in the subjective first- 
person mode. Any corresponding thoughts that they may have concerning those 
perceptual experiences are also first-personal and subjective in character. Because many 
of the hundred people laugh and gasp at the same time, there may well be public 
conceptions involved, of what counts as humorous and exciting situations respectively. 
But, each person only has direct access to his/her own perceptions and thoughts in the 
first-person. Consider just one person in the audience. That person has his own 
subjective perceptual experiences, they feel like something to him as he is apprehending 
them. The feelings of humour or excitement that these perceptions lead to are also 
experienced subjectively, even though the conceptions of “humour” and “excitement” 
have public meanings that everyone can understand and apply to everyone else. Indeed, 
these public conceptions of “humour” and “excitement” may possibly mould or refine the 
subjective experiences themselves, but it still seems to me that there is an ineliminable 
subjective element to the experiences. Now, I realise that this is not quite what 
Wittgenstein thought, as he was of the opinion that it was the public conceptions
94 Colin McGinn (1993) p.169, talks of little pockets or packets o f consciousness.
59
themselves that completely made our experiences what they were. Or, to put it another 
way, the direction of the process was from the third- to the first-person, and not the other 
way around. However, even if one accepts this, it still seems to me that there is a 
subjective, first-person element in the picture. One person in the audience, will laugh or 
be excited along with everyone else, but only he will know what his experiences directly 
feel like in the first-person. By saying this, I do not mean that only that one person will 
know what it is like to be “happy” or “excited”, the conceptions themselves have a public 
meaning, but only that person will know what the experiences subjectively feel like to 
himself. When he looks around, and sees everyone else laughing or gasping as he is, he 
does not know what their subjective experiences are like, he can only observe their 
objective behaviour of either laughing or gasping. It is from the observation of this 
objective behaviour, which is similar to his own, that he makes the quite plausible and 
rational assumption that their subjective experiences are similar to his.
In the ordinary and everyday situation, these rational assumptions about other peoples’ 
subjective experiences will be made quite naturally, so that we may not even realise that 
they are just assumptions; to us, we just do “know” what everyone else is actually 
feeling. However, I think that this attitude is due to the habit of human nature, which of 
course, none of us can get away from (this might be similar to Hume’s theory on habit 
and the association of ideas, in relation to causality). Now, in response to this, it might 
be argued that as assumptions may be false, if there is no way of telling whether the 
above assumptions are false, why talk about assumptions in the first place? This is a 
good point. In reply to this, I can only say that assumptions can also be true, but if there
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is no way of finding out that the above assumptions are true, then we can’t know that 
something is actually the case, so we just have to assume or believe that we know. 
Therefore, it seems to me at least, that it is possible that a person’s subjective experiences 
are private and first-personally available only to that particular person. It must also be 
said that this situation is only a contingent one, as it could well have been different. For 
example, humans could have evolved with an extra, telepathic sense, which enabled each 
of us to access another person’s thoughts and experiences as if they were our own. This 
would mean that there would be no more problems in adopting another’s subjective point 
of view, as this could be achieved as easily as accessing one’s own point of view ( I don’t 
know how this process would actually work, but let’s just pretend that it is the case!). 
Now, in a situation like this, it would make no sense to claim that there was 
epistemological solipsism, as it was possible for everyone to access everyone else’s 
thoughts and experiences in the first-person subjective manner. To claim solipsism and 
privacy of experience in a situation like this, would indeed be “odd”, and need a defence 
of some sort. However, we are not in a situation like that. Each human has his/her own 
subjective point of view, from which they apprehend their own thoughts and experiences 
in a specific and unique manner. We do not possess a telepathic sense to access others’ 
thoughts in the first-person, only third-person, objective access being available. In a 
situation like this, does it really seem that “odd”, or to need a defence, to claim that there 
is epistemological solipsism and that an element of one’s subjective experience is 
actually private? It just seems a necessary consequence of the contingent situation in 
which human beings find themselves in. Indeed, it leads me to think that if any theory of 
mind or consciousness is to have any resemblance to the reality of the situation, there has
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to be an element of some sort of epistemological solipsism contained in it. If it does not, 
then it cannot claim to be a complete theory, as the essential subjective, private, aspect of 
mind and consciousness has been omitted. Therefore, while I agree with Wider that 
Nagel’s thesis leads to epistemic solipsism, I think that this result is a plus for Nagel, as it 
shows he is taking a realistic stance towards the subjective aspect of mind/consciousness 
(although, of course, Nagel himself would probably not agree with me!).
Criticisms against the view I am advocating usually have a Wittgensteinian colouring to 
them, such as Phillips (1995).95 The strategy seems to be to try to break the so-called 
“privileged access” that a subject is said to have to his own experience. For example, 
questions can be asked as to whether “I” is a referring term. When someone says, “I am 
in pain”, who exactly is that person referring to? Maybe his body? Or his 
mind/consciousness? Or maybe a combination of both? In relation to this, I think that 
“I” certainly is a referring term. When one uses “I” with a psychological predicate, one is 
referring to the particular subjective mind/consciousness of a particular objective body.
It seems to me that the phenomenon of consciousness is probably dependent on neuronal 
interactions in the brain and central nervous system of a human, even though it is not 
known how this process actually works. This means that one can talk of a connection 
between mind and body, even though one may not understand it. For example, I can 
stand in front of a mirror, and observe the reflection of the body called MD. This body is 
objective and available for public scrutiny (for a small fee). Now, I do not think that it is 
asking too much, for me to have the opinion that it is my objective brain inside my
95 My discussion of Wittgenstein in this section and the next is influenced by Marie McGinn (1997) and 
discussions with my supervisor.
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objective body which is responsible for producing my subjective mind/consciousness. It 
is this consciousness which enables me to look in the mirror and identify the body with 
which my subjective consciousness appears to have a connection. When I look in the 
mirror, I only see one objective body, not a multitude of bodies, but only one. Of course, 
if I saw many different bodies when I looked in the mirror, then the question could arise 
as to which body is mine. But I only see one body, and I think it is a safe bet that this is 
the body with which my subjective consciousness has its connection. Of course, I cannot 
give a spatial location of my subjective consciousness, but the important point is that 
wherever this phenomenon actually is located, it does appear to have some sort of 
connection with the neurobiological activity inside my brain. Therefore, when I say “I 
am in pain”, the “I” could be said to refer to my objective body and my subjective 
mind/consciousness at the same time. There seems to be an intrinsic connection between 
my objective and subjective reality. Now, at this point, it could be claimed that I am 
fairly certain which body is mine. However, a further question could be asked, namely, 
how do I know which consciousness is mine? In Phillips (1995) there is the following 
passage:
Consciousness cannot tell me who I am. As J.R. Jones says, [‘My’ 
consciousness can ‘pick itself out’ in the required manner, that is, purely 
introspectively, only if it is supposed that I inwardly see a number of different 
consciousnesses. And this supposition is senseless].96
In the above passage, I think that Jones is quite correct in his judgement of supposing to 
introspectively pick out different consciousnesses. Introspection of one’s experiences is 
sometimes seen as analogous to observing or perceiving an external object. It will be 
seen that in the latter case, there is a clear distinction between the act of observation and
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the object which is observed. However, with introspection, there is no distinction 
between the act of observation and the thing observed, or between the perception and the 
perceived.97 The reason for this is that one is attempting to subjectively perceive what 
only exists in a subjective mode, or to put it another way, one is trying to use one’s 
subjective consciousness to observe that very same subjective consciousness. With 
introspection, it seems that all one can observe are the “contents” of one’s subjective 
consciousness, and not the consciousness itself.98 It is somewhat similar to the fact that 
the view from a periscope cannot include a view of that same periscope in its own field of 
view,99 or of Wittgenstein’s example of how the eye itself is not included in the field of 
vision that it has. Therefore, in relation to Jones’ example above, one would need one’s 
consciousness to be able to “pick out” one’s own consciousness in the first place. Having 
said this, it is interesting to note that in the above examples, both the periscope and the 
eye could appear in their respective fields of view, if a mirror is placed in front of them. 
They would then see themselves in the reflection from the mirror. However, this is not 
the case for consciousness. If I look in the mirror, I will not observe my own 
consciousness, but only my objective body which I believe is responsible for my 
consciousness.100 The reason for this is that my consciousness is intrinsically subjective 
in its existence, it can only be apprehended from my subjective point of view. This leads 
me to think that just through the fact that I am apprehending a certain conscious 
experience, then I am quite entitled to claim that this is “my” consciousness. It will be
96 Philips (1995) p.239.
97 This point is made by Searle (1992) p.97.
98 This is perhaps why Hume was only able to observe “bundles” of perceptions when he carried out an 
introspection of his mind.
99 This example is from Gunderson (1970) p.300.
64
seen that I have used the words “I” and “My” quite liberally in the preceding sentences 
concerning which is “My” consciousness. There appears to be no way round this. Just as 
there is no distinction in the subjective realm between perceiving and perceived, there 
seems to be no distinction between ownership and apprehension of that same subjective 
realm. Therefore, to misquote Descartes, it might be a case of “I think, therefore this is 
my consciousness”.
However, even if the above discussion is not seen as convincing in arguing against the 
criticisms of epistemic solipsism and privileged access, it seems to me that these 
arguments are all attacking the concept of first-person conscious experience at a level 
which is above the level of the actual experience. What I mean by this can be illustrated 
by the distinction made between the phenomenal and psychological in Chalmers (1996). 
With this distinction, the conception of the phenomenal is seen as primitive, as something 
which is felt in a “raw” kind of way. However, the conception of the psychological is 
seen as causal in nature, it is in effect a judgement made by the subject on his 
phenomenal consciousness.101 An example of psychological consciousness, would be the 
exclamation “I have a pain in my shoulder”, made by the subject. Chalmers puts great 
importance on this distinction between the phenomenal and psychological, claiming that 
the former is the “hard” problem of consciousness. If one accepts this distinction, it can 
be seen that most of the Wittgensteinian attacks on the concept of privileged access refer 
to the psychological concept of consciousness. The phenomenal consciousness of a
100 Despite this, perhaps this is why we talk of “reflecting” on our own thoughts, giving the impression that 
we are actually considering our thoughts in an objective manner, using our consciousness to examine the 
thoughts as if they were objectively reflected in front of us.
101 Chalmers (1996) pp.11/12.
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subject is indeed private and privileged, even if the psychological judgement on that 
consciousness then enters into the objective and public world. To illustrate this, imagine 
that I have a pain in my right foot. At the primitive, phenomenal level, it is feeling like 
something to me to experience this pain. Only I know that at this particular moment in 
time I am having this subjective experience, it is private as only I have the direct, 
privileged access to the sensation. I am not introspecting the sensation, I am just 
experiencing it, and it is feeling like something to me as I am experiencing it (even 
though I cannot describe it). However, if I then make a psychological judgement on my 
phenomenal experience, and make a statement of the type “I am now experiencing a pain 
in my right foot”, this brings “me” and my “pain” into the objective world. It is at this 
point, that awkward questions can be asked, such as “Who are you referring to when you 
say ‘I’?”, or “What are you referring to with the term ‘pain’?”, etc. It can be seen that 
Wittgenstein’s arguments are attacking the psychological conception of experience, when 
the subject of the experience is using psychological terms to describe his experience of 
pain. However, the actual phenomenal experience of the pain itself, is at a different, 
more primitive level than the psychological, and so is, at least I think, impervious to 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against privileged access.
I think that this distinction can also be applied to Wittgenstein’s private-language 
argument and his beetle-in-the-box analogy. With the latter, this is usually understood as 
showing the difficulties involved in believing that each person has a private “something”, 
which also has a public name. The analogy shows how it is not possible for all the 
private somethings to actually give any meaning to the public name for the somethings,
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there appears to be an unbridgeable gap between the private and public worlds. There 
does seem to be a similarity between Wittgenstein’s beetle-in-the-box analogy and what 
Chalmers calls the “paradox of phenomenal judgement”.102 In the former, the private 
“something” is seen as irrelevant to the meaning attached to the public name of the 
something; while in the latter, the judgements about consciousness can be 
psychologically analysed separately from the consciousness itself, which has the result 
that the consciousness is explanatorily irrelevant to the judgements about that 
consciousness.103 Taking all this into account, it can be seen as very tempting to just 
decide that there is no inner, private, “something”, which accompanies the public, 
psychological conception of our perceptions and sensations. However, I am of the 
opinion that we are indeed in a similar situation with regards to perceptions/sensations as 
is outlined in the beetle-in-the-box analogy. We have no idea what each other’s “pain” 
actually feels like, even though we have the public label of “pain” which refers to our 
individual, private, phenomenal experience of “pain”. I would say that I don’t think that 
Wittgenstein’s analogy does translate exactly to the reality of the situation of human 
sensations, i.e., while the analogy seems logically sound, I am not so sure whether it is 
empirically sound. For example, if we have ten people, each claiming that they have a 
pain in the back, it is quite possible that some of those people will be lying, that is, they 
are not experiencing any phenomenal sensation of “pain”. I suppose that this would be 
the equivalent of the empty matchbox in the beetle analogy. However, I do not think it 
makes sense to then claim that for the others, their inner “pains” could also be either 
something or nothing, and so decide that the inner something then drops out of the
102 Chalmers (1996) p. 177.
103 Chalmers (1996) p. 177.
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picture. It seems to me quite realistic to take the view that most people, when they say 
they have a pain, are indeed experiencing some sensation at the private, phenomenal level 
of consciousness. The question is then how this private, phenomenal experience comes 
to play the role it does in the public, psychological conception of “pain”. I have no really 
convincing answer to this question. I can only think that if a group of people are each 
privately experiencing certain phenomenal sensations, for which there is no public label, 
then it is only through a method of intersubjective agreement on discussions of their 
private sensations and any corresponding behaviour, that they eventually produce an 
objective, public conception and label for all these private sensations, even though they 
do not know what each other’s sensations actually feel like in the first-person (I continue 
the discussion of these points later).
I believe that this is the case with subjective experiences of a more physical nature. For 
example, I happen to have a large cluster of floaters which appear in front of my left eye, 
forming a rather irregular, blackish shape. Now, these floaters are a subjective, 
experiential fact for me, the shape they form can only be apprehended from my particular 
point of view. Of course, the concept of “floaters” is not a logically private object for 
me, other people can also have “floaters” in front of their eyes. However, the point is 
this, before I knew the public-label for my floaters, I was still experiencing them. The 
experience of seeing that blackish shape in front of my left eye did not come into 
existence only when I found out the objective identification of what that blackish shape 
was. It seems as if there is a logical privacy of experience for my floaters and I, even 
though the concept of “floaters” is not a logically private object. Of course, the case of
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floaters is importantly different to that of sensations, in that it is possible for the former to 
be analysed in an objective manner, which the latter cannot be. This is because the 
subjective experience of floaters is actually produced by cells or other debris which are 
contained in the vitreous humour of the eye, and which I suppose are capable of being 
observed by some suitable ophthalmic device. However, I think that this situation is still 
analogous to subjective experiences in general, that is, sensations, perceptions, thoughts, 
etc. There would still be the subjective experiences even though they might not have 
objective ascriptions, they would still feel like something to the person who was having 
them. For example, imagine a prehistoric caveman witnessing a solar eclipse, and the 
feelings that he might have had as a consequence of this event. Now, it is quite possible 
that the objective ascriptions of “fear” or “wonderment” for what he was experiencing 
may not have been in existence then, but that does not mean he was not having 
experiences similar to those that we would later give the public-names of “fear” and 
“wonderment” to. Of course, Wittgenstein does not deny that we have inner, subjective, 
experiences, but he thinks that these inner experiences are also affected by the outer 
environment that surrounds us, which includes public language and behaviour. Now, I 
think that Wittgenstein may be right about this. The natural, instinctive, feelings that we 
subjectively experience may well be moulded or refined by the way we learn about these 
feelings, and how we publicly discuss and apply the concepts in question.104 So, it could 
well be that the caveman’s subjective feeling of “fear” would not quite be the same as a 
modern-day human’s feeling of “fear”, with the modem human’s subjective feeling of 
fear possibly being more focussed and definite than the caveman’s feeling of fear (by
104 In connection with this point, Nagel himself states that “They [mental concepts] are not pure first-person 
concepts: To try to detach their first-person application from the third-person results in philosophical
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focussed and definite, perhaps I mean that the modem human would know and 
understand that his feeling was one of “fear” to a greater extent than the caveman, due to 
the former’s more complex and structured environment, e.g., well established teaching 
and language concepts). However, I still think that even though there might not be a well 
defined language-structure in the environment of the caveman, we would still be able to 
recognize that he was experiencing a feeling of “fear”, even if this primal “fear” might be 
much more fuzzier and less well refined than the modem version is. The caveman would 
still have a subjective experience that was private to him, it would feel like something to 
the caveman. Perhaps what I am trying to say is that I think that experiential knowledge 
is antecedent to propositional knowledge, and necessarily so.105 If there were not the 
subjective sensations of pain, then there could not be the objective concept of pain, as it 
would have nothing to refer to. Now, it might be argued that the concept of pain might 
refer to one’s behaviour alone. However, it seems to me that one’s pain-behaviour would 
in turn also be dependent on the subjective sensations that one felt. If this was not the 
case, then what would be the reason for one’s pain-behaviour in the first place? After all, 
I don’t think that Wittgenstein is denying that we have sensations, or that we can 
introspect these sensations. It is the conclusions that we come to after our introspection 
of a sensation, that he is attacking. He might quite happily allow that one introspect a 
sensation to find the qualitative character of that sensation, that is, what it felt like to 
oneself. Therefore, I am not denying that the public concepts we form of our subjective 
experiences might well mould or refine those experiences in some way, but I think that 
there is still an ineliminable subjective element to our experiences, to which we only have
illusions...”. Nagel (1998) p.341.
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access in the first-person. I am also not denying that in the ordinary, everyday world, 
people would still believe that they did “know” what everyone else was feeling.
However, I am not going to get bogged down with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, as this 
is a deep and confusing area of thought (at least it is for me). The idea that epistemic 
solipsism might necessarily be involved in an explanation of the subjective aspect of 
human consciousness was just an idea that I thought was quite reasonable, considering 
the situation that we find ourselves in. I am sure that Nagel does not believe this for one 
moment, and this is a dissertation about his ideas on philosophy after all. Nagel was of 
the opinion that his subjective points of view were types and not tokens, and so the 
situation of epistemic solipsism would not be reached, as each human could understand 
or know what another human was experiencing. Indeed, as I hope to show in the next 
section, Nagel’s conception of the “what it is like” of subjective, phenomenal 
consciousness, seems to escape any conflict with the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Nagel’s “What it is like” and Wittgenstein
The arguments of Wittgenstein which are normally used against Nagel’s views on 
consciousness are the private-language argument and the beetle-in-the-box analogy (from 
the Philosophical Investigations), both of which deal with the topic of privacy of 
experience/sensation, and how this relates to our public use of sensation words. The 
reason for my belief that Nagel’s “what it is like” generally avoids these arguments of
105 This point is made by Magee, in Magee/Milligan (1995) p.31. Nagel makes a similar point in claiming 
that thought is antecedent to language. Nagel (1997) p.38.
71
Wittgenstein,106 is that the latter’s treatment of the topic of privacy of experience seems 
to revolve around what results or conclusions can be gained from introspecting one’s own 
sensations and perceptions. For example, Wittgenstein’s private-language argument 
involves the introspection of one’s sensations, followed by an inner ostensive definition 
of a sensation as being, for example, a “pain”. There then follows the problem of being 
able to check whether one is using the definition of “pain” in a correct manner, without 
being able to publicly verify this point. It turns out that one cannot verify this private use 
of a definition for a sensation, and so it is not possible to have a legitimate private 
language for one’s own sensations. Wittgenstein’s point here is that the proper use of a 
language requires that certain rules are adhered to. The above argument is meant to show 
that one does not have the same justification for labelling an inner sensation as one does 
for labelling an external object. For example, if one calls an external object a “bucket”, 
then this designation of the object can be verified by considering whether it resembles the 
common description of a bucket. By this method, one should be able to decide what is a 
bucket and what is not. Therefore, if a person suddenly started calling his grandmother a 
“bucket”, one could quickly conclude that he is incorrect with his designation, as his 
grandmother would not bear a resemblance to the common description of a bucket. 
However, when one introspects a sensation, and then tries to treat it as an internal, private 
object, by designating it a name, there is no way of verifying if one is using this inner- 
name correctly, as there is nothing independent of the sensation by which to check 
correct usage. With the beetle-in-the-box analogy, Wittgenstein imagines that everyone
106 Among the philosophers who think otherwise are L. Nemirow (1980) on p.476; K. Wider (1990) on 
p.494; and Marie McGinn (1997) on p. 119. Of course, Wider thinks that Nagel’s views conflict with 
Wittgenstein’s arguments because she is of the opinion that his views lead to epistemic solipsism and 
privacy of experience.
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has a box, and that each individual person knows what is in their own respective box, but 
does not know what anybody else’s box contains. Each person then calls the something 
in their box a “beetle”, then he/she claims that they know what a beetle is, only by 
referring to the something that they have personally labelled a “beetle” in their box. The 
result of this would be that each person could have something completely different in 
their respective box, which they had called a “beetle”. There might not be anything at all 
in some boxes. Wittgenstein’s aim was to show that in a situation like this, the word 
“beetle” would have lost any public meaning it had in referring to a particular something, 
and that a person would not really know what the something in his box was . This was 
analogous to a person introspecting and naming a privately experienced sensation as if it 
was an object, which would result in the name one gave to the sensation losing its 
meaning, and the object (sensation) not really being identified by the person. This would 
mean that one could not have privately-named sensations that were only known to the 
person having them. It also showed the problem that these privately-named sensations 
would have in connecting to the public-name that was in use for the sensations.
Therefore, it can be seen that with both the private-language argument and the beetle-in- 
the-box analogy, introspection and naming of one’s experiences plays a major role. 
However, with regards to Nagel and his “what it is like”, I am fairly certain that this 
conception does not involve any introspection and inner naming. Nagel is concerned 
with the conscious, phenomenal, experience of a human, that is, what it subjectively feels 
like to be a human, living a life. It will involve perceptions, sensations, and thoughts. 
There would be no conscious “inner” examining of one’s perceptions and sensations,
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they would just be experienced as they occurred, and would feel like something to the 
subject concerned. In saying this, I think that there is a distinction between experiencing 
a sensation and introspecting the experience of a sensation. For example, when one 
experiences the sensation of a pain, there Is no effort to designate the sensation as a 
private object, by introspecting the sensation, and trying to “understand” or “define” the 
sensation, by this inner examination. One just has the sensation and apprehends its 
qualitative character. This is the same idea as the distinction that was made between 
phenomenal and psychological concepts in the previous section. The actual experience 
of having a perception/sensation is at the primitive, phenomenal level; it is a “raw feel” 
which has a certain qualitative character. However, when the experienced sensation is 
introspected and given an inner name, or if  the person concerned declares “I have a pain”, 
then this is at the psychological level, which can be analysed causally. As I stated earlier, 
I think it is at the psychological level that Wittgenstein’s arguments start to operate on 
our experiences, while the phenomenal level of our experiences is “below” the 
psychological, and remain untouched by the arguments. The phenomenal consciousness 
of a creature is experienced subjectively, bu t at the psychological level, the creature’s 
experiences are brought into the objective world, so to speak, with the ascriptions and 
descriptions that we give to them. It is at the phenomenal level of conscious experience 
that Nagel’s idea of “what it is like” operates. After all, it is not just humans which Nagel 
believes have conscious experience, but other creatures as well, such as bats, which do 
not appear to have a structure of language or concept-formation comparable to humans. 
Nagel is not expecting the bat to be introspecting its experience of what the bat sonar 
feels like, the bat is just living its life, but It feels like something to the bat, while it is
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living this life. Indeed, I think this shows up an important point. The point is that 
subjective, phenomenal experience will be present in conscious creatures, irrespective of 
whether they have linguistic or concept-forming capabilities.107 Now, it so happens that 
humans have phenomenal consciousness and well developed linguistic/concept-forming 
capabilities, but having the latter does not mean that there is suddenly doubt about 
whether we have the former. If all the linguistic and conceptual capabilities disappeared 
from the human world overnight, is it really plausible to think that humans would no 
longer experience various subjective sensations and feelings in the first-person? I do not 
think it would. In the same way as the bat, it feels like something to be a human at a 
particular moment in time. For example, at the moment the computer looks a certain way 
to me, the sensation of sitting on a chair is feeling like something to me, etc. At no point 
am I inwardly examining these perceptions and sensations, I am just experiencing them 
as they are occurring. Indeed, this sort of phenomenal consciousness is mentioned by 
Wittgenstein in PI 275, where he talks of looking at the blue of the sky in a spontaneous 
manner without any feeling of “pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies ‘naming 
the sensation’ when one is thinking about ‘private language’”. Wittgenstein is of the 
opinion that this mood occurs when one has no philosophical intentions, and this seems a 
good way of putting it. Nagel’s “what it is like” just involves how the conscious 
experiences of a subject feels or appears to that subject, as that subject goes about living 
his/her life in an unphilosophical manner.
107 Nagel makes a similar claim in connection with the contents o f thought and language. Nagel (1997) pp. 
38,53. Even though Nagel is here referring to thought-contents, I think that it is a similar case with one’s 
phenomenal consciousness and language.
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There have been other Wittgenstein-influenced critiques of Nagel’s position, for example, 
from Norman Malcolm (with D. Armstrong)(1984) and Patricia Hanna (1990). The 
method followed by the Wittgensteinians is usually to examine the language used to 
describe the topic in question, to show how this use differs from ordinary usage, and then 
try to show that a confusion is involved with the meanings of the words that someone is 
using to discuss their topic.108 For example, Malcolm questions what Nagel means by the 
phrases “what it is like” and “subjective character of experience”. There is an ordinary 
usage of “what it is like”, where (to use Malcolm’s example), one could ask a lorry driver 
what it was like to be a lorry driver.109 This would involve the lorry driver talking about 
what his job involved, how he felt about his job, etc. With regards to the “subjective 
character of experience”, Malcolm asks what experiences are involved?, can we put this 
subjective character into words?, do I know what my own subjective character is like?, 
etc. Now, these are all worthwhile questions, especially if Nagel is using phrases in 
unusual ways. However, I also get the feeling that Malcolm is trying to bring everything 
back to the terms of language, to what can be expressed in propositions. He asks whether 
we can give a description of the subjective character of our seeing or hearing, and comes 
to the conclusion that we cannot.110 For Malcolm, the result is that “these questions show 
that I don’t know what I am talking about.. .Not only cannot I display the ‘subjective 
character’ of seeing or hearing to others; I cannot even display it to m yself’.111 But 
Nagel is talking about conscious experience, “what it is like” to be a bat, just is the 
conscious experience that a bat has as it goes about its daily life. Similarly, the
108 Wittgenstein gives an indication of the method to be used in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.53.
109 Armstrong/Malcolm (1984) p.46.
110 Armstrong/Malcolm (1984) p.48.
111 Armstrong/Malcolm (1984) p.49.
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“subjective character of experience” of a person, just is what that subject phenomenally 
experiences while he/she lives his/her conscious life, e.g. all perceptions, sensations, 
thoughts etc., that are apprehended from his/her own point of view. To put one’s 
conscious experiences into words is extremely difficult, maybe impossible, but this does 
not mean that a subject’s conscious experiences do not have a particular qualitative 
character to the subject concerned. Again, Malcolm wonders whether some sort of 
introspection of one’s perceptions is involved, to get at the inner “content” of one’s 
experiences.112 But I am of the opinion that no introspection is involved with Nagel’s 
idea of a subject’s conscious experience, it is just how it perceptually and sensationally 
feels to the subject, as he lives his life as a conscious creature. For example, the 
subjective character of hearing a whistle being blown, just is what that sounds like to the 
subject concerned, with no philosophical intentions involved. Contra Malcolm, there is 
no introspecting of the subject’s perception of the whistle, and an inward exclamation of 
the type “It is this” in reference to it. This phenomenal experience is hard to put into 
words, so hard in fact, that if one was following Wittgenstein’s line that “The limits of 
my language mean the limits of my world”,113 one would be tempted to say that there was 
no such thing. However, I think that this outlook unfairly constrains my world to what 
can be described in words. The limit of one’s world should be what one is capable of 
experiencing. By this, I mean that just because such-and-such cannot be adequately 
described through language (and so understood?), it does not mean that it is not part of 
my world. After all, the aroma of coffee is difficult to describe in words, but no-one 
doubts that it is part of the human world (not even Wittgenstein himself). Similarly,
112 Armstrong/Malcolm (1984) p.49.
113 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.6.
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phenomenal consciousness is difficult to describe in words, but I am of the opinion that it 
is an integral part of the human world. Indeed, a human would necessarily require his 
subjective phenomenal consciousness in order to perceive the aroma of coffee in the first 
place.
With Hanna’s discussion-article, “Must Thinking Bats Be Conscious?”,114 we get a 
similar Wittgensteinian attack on Nagel’s position. This time the target is a private, 
accessible-to-me-only consciousness (which she calls p-consciousness). Hanna is of the 
opinion that the existence of a p-consciousness would lead one to solipsism, as one would 
not be able to say whether other people also had their own p-consciousnesses, and comes 
to the conclusion that this is an “untenable thesis”.115 Her reasons for thinking that the 
concept of a p-consciousness is untenable appears to be that it leads to a dilemma. On the 
one hand, for the claim to be made that consciousness is essential to thought, it needs a 
conception of consciousness that can apply to oneself and others, however, “...to give 
such an account is to abandon the claim that something private is required for 
thought”.116 The only other option is to stick with the claim that thought does have a 
private feature, which would mean that no general theory of thinking would be able to be
117constructed which applied to oneself and others, which would result in solipsism.
However, as I have argued earlier, some may find epistemological solipsism untenable, 
but to me it just seems the natural outcome of the human condition. One does have a
114 Hanna, P. (1990) “Must Thinking Bats Be Conscious?” Philosophical Investigations 13 (4), pp. 350- 
56.
115 Hanna (1990) p.354.
116 Hanna (1990) p.350.
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subjective, first-person access to one’s own perceptions, sensations and thoughts, which 
is not available to other people. Others can only have a mediated, objective, third-person 
access to my sensations, etc., through behaviour, language, etc. I assume that this 
situation is the same for each human being, though of course I cannot prove this; this is 
due to the asymmetry which is inherent to the situation. Therefore, it seems to me that 
despite there being a private, first-person access to my consciousness, it does not stop me 
having a conception of each person having their own private, first person access to their 
own consciousness. The public conception of thinking/consciousness would, in my 
opinion, come about through intersubjective discussion and agreement on each person’s 
own subjective experiences; probably utilising the objective, psychological statements 
that people made concerning their own phenomenal perceptions/sensations, and any 
consequent behaviour that was involved. So, contra to Hanna, I think that one can keep 
the conception of a private “something” that is related to thought for oneself, and still be 
able to have an idea that this situation is applicable to other people. However, Hanna 
comes to the conclusion that we do not have to accept p-consciousness and solipsism, as
1 I Q
“we can give a public account of consciousness”. This “public account” turns out to be 
peoples’ behaviour, which is seen as evidence of consciousness. She then ties this 
behaviour in with Wittgenstein’s views on natural expressions of behaviour, claiming that 
consciousness is similar to pain, in that if “pain” is separated from its associated pain- 
behaviour, then it is not “pain” anymore.
117 Hanna (1990) p.350.
118 Hanna (1990) p.351.
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Now, it is tempting just to label this position as behaviourist, and go on to claim that we 
are no longer talking about Nagel’s concept of consciousness, or indeed any form of 
consciousness, we are simply talking about behaviour. However, Wittgenstein’s views 
on this topic (which Hanna is basically repeating) are not quite as straight-forward as they 
first seem. The first, and perhaps most important point to mention is that Wittgenstein’s 
position is not strictly behaviourist. A behaviourist, such as Ryle, would claim that a 
person’s so-called inner goings-on are shown completely in their overt behaviour; there is 
no accompanying inner processes to the outer behaviour. So, for example, a behaviourist 
would claim that a description of a person in pain just involves their outward wincing, 
crying, etc., and not any inner mental states that are said to accompany the outward 
behaviour. The behaviourist position is plainly an objective, third-person analysis, with 
no analysis of the subjective aspect being made. In contrast to this, Wittgenstein does not 
deny that we subjectively experience sensations, such as pains. From PI 304, when 
discussing the sensation of pain, he famously declares that “It is not a something, but not 
a nothing either!”. From what I can understand, Wittgenstein’s view seems to be that 
even though there may be a subjective sensation which accompanies, for example, a cry 
of pain; when we ordinarily observe the cry of pain, it is a mistake to conceive of there 
being an inner something in addition to the cry of pain. Due to the language-game which 
we are used to using, when we see someone crying in pain, the idea of the pain-sensation 
is intimately wrapped up in our understanding of the pain-behaviour. Wittgenstein 
illustrates this point in PI 297, where he compares the case of a real pot, containing 
boiling water, with steam coming from it, with the case of a picture of a pot with steam 
coming from it. Wittgenstein believes that it would be a mistake, a confusion of
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language games, to believe that the pictured pot must have something going on inside of 
it, to produce the steam. It is just what it is, a picture of a boiling pot, which is taken as 
such by an observer. Similarly, with a person crying in pain, it would be a confusion to 
think of an inner something that is separate from the cry of pain. Due to the language 
game which we are used to, when we see the pain-behaviour, our understanding of this 
concept encompasses the pain and behaviour together. Just as we see “a boiling pot”, so 
we see “a person in pain”. From this, it can be seen that it could be claimed that if pain is 
not accompanied by the requisite pain-behaviour, then, according to the language-game 
that is in use, the “pain” is not “pain” as we usually understand it. I think that 
Wittgenstein does have a valid point on this issue. It could be said that he is attempting 
to take a middle-path between outright behaviourism and claims that only private mental 
processes are involved in sensations, consciousness, etc. With one’s conscious 
experiences of, say, pain, there is an inner something that one is aware of, but this inner 
something is shaped by the outer, public, concept that is utilised in our language game.
So for Wittgenstein, a description of a person’s pain would involve inner and outer 
aspects combining together to form the concept of pain that we are used to (although 
Wittgenstein would probably claim that we could not properly refer to the inner aspect, as 
we can to the outer aspect). Therefore, while a behaviourist takes a strictly objective 
view of mental states, Wittgenstein allows that there is a subjective element to the 
concept of mental states, although it is the objective element that is important in shaping 
these concepts.
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However, it still has to be said that there is no logical connection between consciousness 
and behaviour, even though humans may have formed a linguistic/grammatical 
connection through habit and human nature (perhaps something akin to Hume’s ideas of 
association through constant conjunction and human habit). This basically means that 
one could still be having conscious experiences but displaying no observable 
behaviour.119 For example, one could be in pain, but still not exhibit any behaviour 
which is normally associated with pain. Now, a Wittgensteinian could still claim that this 
“pain” would not be “pain” as we understand it through our language-game (due to the 
lack of pain-behaviour). However, I think that the important point is that one would still 
be experiencing a subjective, private, something, even if one could not refer to it as 
definitely as one can to an external object. This subjective sensation might need to have 
an objective, third-person identification to refine it (to objectify it for meaningful public 
use in the world), but it does not alter the fact that I am experiencing the sensation in the 
subjective, first-person. I take consciousness to be similar to this; third-person 
ascriptions of “evidence” of consciousness (i.e., behaviour), do not account for the 
consciousness itself. It seems to me that Wittgenstein did not lose sight of the existence 
of the subjective element in relation to sensations and consciousness, but that later 
Wittgensteinians seem intent on concentrating only on the more definite objective 
elements. This example of Hanna’s seems to point to a thread that is present in the 
strategy of Wittgensteinians on dealing with various philosophical problems. If an aspect 
of a philosophical problem is proving difficult, or even impossible to solve, simply alter 
the aspect until it takes a different, but solvable form, and, amazingly, the problem will
119 John Searle states that, “.. .as far as the ontology of consciousness is concerned, behavior is simply 
irrelevant. We could have identical behavior in two different systems, one of which is conscious and the
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have vanished. With the present example, it can be seen that the idea of a private, 
subjective consciousness is problematic, so Hanna simply alters this troublesome aspect 
of consciousness to an aspect that concerns behaviour. By this alteration, it can be seen 
that the problem of consciousness is no more, as one’s behaviour is objective and capable 
of being publicly verified. Perhaps I am just being mischievous and tongue in cheek with 
the above suggestion, or am I?
Qualitatively Different Subjective Viewpoints of the Same Type 
Therefore, it appears that each living person has their own, individual, perceptual/ 
experiential, point of view on the world, which they keep until they die. Nagel talked of 
humans as having the same type of point of view, however, this does not mean that every 
human has the same qualitative point of view, or that these individual viewpoints are 
unchangeable. The subjective point of view which I have been discussing is a 
perceptual/experiential one, so, if there is a change in one’s sensory organs, there will be 
a corresponding change in one’s point of view. A person who has all his sense organs 
working normally will have a different point of view, from, for example, someone who is 
congenitally blind or deaf. Further to this, if someone loses their sight or their hearing, 
then their subjective point of view on the world can be said to have changed. Earlier in 
this chapter, it was seen that with two perceptually similar humans, it was not possible to 
imaginatively know what each other’s perceptions and sensations were actually like. Of 
course, one could still imaginatively take up the other person’s point of view, and just 
assume that it was probably similar to one’s own, so some approximation of another’s 
experience could be said to be possible. After all, it would be very difficult to go about
other totally unconscious”. Searle (1992) p.71.
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one’s life, surrounded by other people, without assuming that everyone else had similar 
experiences to one’s self. However, what about the situation concerning others who have 
radically different perceptual points of view to oneself, people who are blind or deaf, or 
both. Would it be possible to even get a useful or approximate idea of what their points 
of view are like?
This problem, and others are discussed in Sight Unseen, a book by Bryan Magee and 
Martin Milligan. The book consists of a series of letters that are exchanged between 
Magee and Milligan, the latter of whom has been blind since shortly after birth. They try 
to understand each other’s viewpoint on the world, and generally discuss problems of 
knowledge, and how this concept differs for each of them, due to their different sensory 
abilities. Magee makes the claim that the position of an unsighted person to a sighted 
person, may be similar to the position that a human with all his sensory faculties might 
find himself, if compared to someone who had extra-sensory capabilities, as well as the 
ordinary ones.120 In a sense, humans would appreciate that they were limited in how they 
apprehended reality, limited by the sense organs which they possessed to access that 
reality. On this latter point I agree with Magee. One’s subjective point of view on reality 
is limited to the sensory capabilities that one possesses. For example, our eyes are only 
receptive to certain wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum, while our ears can only 
detect sound within certain upper and lower limits. These biological limits control how 
much of the external world one can naturally access, although detectors can be built to 
artificially access the naturally unreachable parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, e.g., 
ultraviolet, x-rays, etc. If some humans suddenly started developing a new sense organ,
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in addition to their ordinary ones, then it could be claimed that this situation would be 
similar to that of unsighted and sighted people. However, we seem to be dealing with 
one situation which is really existing, and another situation which is only hypothetical. In 
reality, humans maximally have five sensory modalities (sight, hearing, touch, smell, 
taste), and these are integral in the description and definition of a human being. Now, a 
person who lacks one or more of these sense modalities, knows that it is a fact that other 
people do possess these lacking sense modalities, and would know that their point of 
view on reality was more restricted than other peoples’. Having said this, I think that to 
hold this latter view, one’s subjective point of view would have to change after one had 
experienced the sensory modality for some time, before losing it. For example, if one 
lost their sight after many years of possessing this modality, then one would certainly 
appreciate how one’s access to the external world had been reduced. Whereas, if one was 
congenitally blind, perhaps one would not have the appreciation that one’s access to 
reality was curtailed. Put another way, if one’s subjective point of view is radically 
decreased from what one is used to, then one will notice this, because, in effect, one will 
then have a new, changed, subjective point of view on the world. However, if one is a 
congenitally blind person, one’s subjective point of view will not have changed at all, it is 
the same point of view that one has always had, so one might not appreciate the lacking 
of a sensory ability in such a dramatic manner. By this, I mean that one will not have had 
the experience of what the lacking sense can provide, and so cannot immediately 
recognize how one’s current point of view on reality is curtailed. For example, Milligan 
states that “What I am immediately inclined to say is that my experience furnishes me
120 Magee/Milligan (1995) pp.xiii/xiv.
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daily with a great deal of evidence that others can do things which I can’t”. 121 Now, this 
shows that Milligan, who has basically had no experience of seeing in his life, cannot 
identify exactly what he is lacking in his viewpoint on the world. All he can deduce is 
that other people can do things which he cannot, which then leads him to conjecture that 
they have some sensory access on the world which he does not possess.
However, notwithstanding this point, the position of an unsighted person to a sighted 
person is one of existing reality. In contrast, the comparison of a human with all his 
senses to one that has an extra sense, is not reality, and I do wonder whether if it was 
reality, it would be the same position as that of unsighted to sighted. Magee mentions 
that other creatures have sense abilities that humans do not have, e.g., the bat and its 
sonar, but that humans do not consider themselves as handicapped by lacking this sense 
modality.122 Now, could it not be claimed that the reason for this is that a human would 
consider a bat as a different creature to himself, and so having different capabilities from 
a human. Part of the identification of human beings would be the normal sense 
modalities that humans possess. However, if humans started being bom with, say, an 
extra sense organ on the tops of their heads, for receiving infrared wavelengths, would 
average humans consider themselves as handicapped in comparison? It could be argued 
that the average human would consider these “extra-sensory” humans as different 
creatures to himself, like the case of the bat, and so consider that the new sense modality 
was not “extra”, but “different” to his own modalities. This situation would be in 
contrast to that of an unsighted human and a sighted human. The former would not
121 Magee/Milligan (1995) p.9.
122 Magee/Milligan (1995) p. 19.
consider the latter as a different creature to himself, due to the sighted human’s capacity 
for visual perception. The capacity of sight is one of the normal sense modalities that are 
possessed by humans, so in the case of an unsighted and sighted person, I believe that the 
sighted person would be viewed as having an “extra” modality, one which the unsighted 
person lacked. It could be said that the subjective point of view of a human goes towards 
the identity of that human. If something is added to (but not subtracted from) that 
subjective point of view, then it stops being a subjective point of view of a human, and 
becomes the point of view of something else. So it is a possibility that humans would not 
feel handicapped if faced with “extra-sensory” humans, they might just feel that these 
“new” humans had a “different” point of view on the world. In consequence, it is not 
clear-cut that Magee’s initial claim of similarity in the situations between humans/extra­
sensory humans and the unsighted/sighted is correct.
Magee and Milligan then go on to discuss whether a congenitally blind person can 
understand or have any concept of what “seeing” is like. Milligan is of the opinion that 
blind people can have some conception of what seeing is like for sighted people, and that 
the meanings of some visual-terms can be the same for blind and sighted people. For 
example, he claims that the word “see” means roughly the same for unsighted and sighted 
people, i.e., as “having a kind of awareness of things dependent on the functioning of the
1 9 ^eyes...” However, Milligan comes to the conclusion that there is something in the 
conception of seeing and the use of visual-terms that sighted people are aware of, and that 
blind people can never be aware of. Magee agrees with Milligan on this point, and goes 
further. He claims that blind people can only ever be acquainted with conceptual or
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propositional knowledge about the visual world; while the realm of direct visual 
experience or perception, will always be inaccessible to blind people.124 An example of 
what Magee is referring to could be the following. Consider someone asking “Do you 
know what the Eiffel Tower is like?” A blind person would be able to have access to 
propositional knowledge about the Eiffel Tower, that is, knowledge that can be put into 
propositions or sentences. For example, a tour-guide could be vocally informing tourists 
about details concerning the Eiffel Tower, or the blind-person may have a braille-version 
of a travel brochure (also, the blind person could use the other sense modalities that he 
did possess, such as touch, where he could touch and feel various parts of the tower). 
Similarly, a sighted person could also have propositional knowledge about the tower, by 
also listening to the tour-guide or reading the travel brochure. However, what the sighted 
person could also have, is direct visual perception or experience of what the Eiffel Tower 
is like, just by looking at it. It is this knowledge of visual experience that Magee believes 
blind people will never be able to have. Magee also thinks that this difference means that 
the conception of seeing and the use of visual-terms will always have different meanings 
for sighted and unsighted people. For sighted people the concepts and terms will always 
have a visual experiential content to them, which will be lacking with unsighted people. I 
tend to agree with Magee on this, a sighted person’s subjective point of view will be 
different to that of an unsighted person, leading to a difference in their respective 
characters of experience (in Nagel’s terms).
123 Magee/Milligan (1995) p. 13.
124 Magee/Milligan (1995) pp.30/1.
To finish this section, I will consider whether it is possible for a sighted person to adopt 
the point of view of an unsighted person, or vice versa. Not surprisingly, considering the 
conclusions that were reached earlier, I do not think that this is possible. It seems to me 
that we are individual, subjective, points of view, which each human can never escape 
from. To know what another person with the same type of point of view is experiencing, 
involves making an assumption based on one’s own experience. The probability is that 
one’s own subjective character of experience will be similar to another’s subjective 
character of experience, as the same viewpoint type is involved, but one will not be able 
to know for certain (i.e., to access the subjective first-person experience of the other 
person). Therefore, with the experiences of a sighted and an unsighted person, this 
adoption of respective points of view seems a non-starter, as the same viewpoint types, 
have in addition, perceptual differences between them. The subjective characters of 
experience of the sighted and unsighted persons will be radically different, so it seems 
that even to make an assumption of the other’s experience is not feasible. Now, this 
might well be doubted. For instance, it could be claimed that all one has to do is close 
one’s eyes to adopt the point of view of a congenitally blind person. Indeed, this might 
seem easier than a sighted person trying to adopt the point of view of another sighted 
person, as visually perceiving the external world could involve many types of variations 
on what is visually apprehended, e.g., there might be differences in the intensity and/or 
clarity of various colours perceived by different people. However, with a blind person, 
surely one cannot get variations on visually apprehending nothingness, maybe variations 
of blackness at the most. The situation is, however, not that simple. There might well be 
a great difference between closing one’s eyes after a lifetime of visual experience, and
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with what is apprehended by a person who has never had any visual experience. Also, 
Oliver Sacks notes that in congenitally deaf people, parts of the brain that are normally 
used for hearing are reallocated for visual use, and so could not congenitally blind people 
have parts of their visual cortex reallocated for auditory use?125 If this is the case, then it 
means that a sighted person’s auditory capabilities might be different to an unsighted 
person’s auditory capabilities. For example, a blind person might have the capability of 
forming auditory “images” of sounds to compensate for the lack of vision. Blind people 
might know the world through “pictures” supplied by their enhanced hearing, which are 
impossible to replicate in a sighted person. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for 
a sighted person to even assume to have the point of view of a blind person.
Interestingly, Nagel considers a similar question in his “bat” paper, although this 
concerns a person who is both blind and deaf, and he comes to the conclusion that the 
blind/deaf person’s point of view is inaccessible to a sighted/hearing person, or vice
1 9  f \versa. Having said this, Nagel still believes that the sighted/hearing person and the 
unsighted/deaf person each have a subjective character of experience, though these are 
radically different. He also states that intermodal analogies of the type, “red is like the 
sound of a trumpet”127 will not avail in bridging the gap between these different points of 
view of, say, unsighted and sighted persons. In contrast to this position, Janet Levin 
(1986) believes that an intermodal analogy of the type “red = sound of a trumpet” is of 
use to a blind person, “as long as he is told what pink and orange and green are like as
125 Sacks (1995) pp. 132/3.
126 Nagel (1974) p. 170.
127 Nagel (1974) p.179.
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well”.128 Levin’s reasons behind this conclusion are that “all sorts of experiences can 
provide the conceptual wherewithal for understanding what it is for experiences to be 
similar and different from one another along various dimensions -  what it is for them to 
differ in intensity, compatibility, and cause and effect”.129 However, I do not think that 
Levin is correct on this point. It seems to me that to understand how one experience is 
similar or different from another, one has to know what the other experience is like. The 
analogy of “red = sound of a trumpet” and, say, “pink = sound of a piccolo flute” might 
seem quite reasonable to someone who can see and hear, as they can appreciate the 
analogy between colours and sounds. But to a blind person, all they have to work with 
are the sounds, they do not have any conception of how these sounds analogically relate 
to visual perceptions of colour. Therefore, they cannot compare the sound with the 
supposed analogical colour, and so appreciate the similarity or difference between the 
experiences. Once again, it seems that one cannot escape from the individual subjective 
point of view that one has, while living a life in the world. During one’s life, that 
perceptual point of view might change, so changing how one experiences reality, but it is 
still one’s own subjective point of view, despite the changes which might occur to it. The 
link between subjectivity and a point of view seems essential, and unbreakable.
Conclusion
In this chapter, Nagel’s concept of a subjective point of view has been examined. It was 
seen that this concept was of central importance to Nagel, as he believed that it was only 
from a creature’s own subjective point of view that it could apprehend its own conscious
128 Levin (1986) p.486.
129 Levin (1986) p.486.
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experience. This apprehension of the subjective facts of the creature’s conscious 
experience then went towards building up the creature’s subjective character of 
experience, or what it was like for the creature to live its life. I think it is fair to say that 
if a creature is conscious and experiencing the world, then Nagel would consider that 
creature to have a subjective point of view on the world. As Nagel did not elaborate on 
the details of a creature’s subjective point of view, I took the liberty of setting forth what 
I thought that concept involved, specifically for a human. It seemed sensible to conclude 
that the point of view in question was a perceptual/experiential one, which involved the 
“input” from a human’s sense organs of the external world, and what this was like to the 
human concerned. This would include what such-and-such looked like, sounded like, 
tasted like, smelt like and felt like to the person. It seemed that the point of view in 
question was an individual or token one, with each human being having their own point 
of view. However, if this was the case, then there was the real possibility of there being 
the problematic consequences of epistemological solipsism and privacy of experience 
with Nagel’s position, as pointed out by Kathleen Wider. However, it seems that Nagel 
was aware of the danger of this, which resulted in his declaring that the points of view he 
had in mind were “types” and not “individual” ones. In this way, Nagel hoped to avoid 
the charge of solipsism being made against him. But, as we saw, it seems that the “type” 
of subjective point of view, was unable to escape the “individual” subjective point of 
view. One could not get away from one’s own subjective point of view, to take up 
another’s subjective point of view, even though the beings concerned were 
physiologically similar. So it did seem as though Nagel’s theses of points of view and 
the use of the imagination had the consequences of epistemic solipsism and privacy of
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experience. However, I am of the opinion that any theory of the mind/consciousness that 
dealt with subjectivity in a realistic manner (i.e., that did not try to explain the 
subjectivity away or just ignore it), would probably have a solipsistic element contained 
in it. Therefore, I personally take the view that the consequences of Nagel’s theses on 
consciousness are not to be seen as being untenable, worrying, to be avoided, etc. It 
seems to me the logical outcome of the reality of the situation with which we, as 
individuated beings, are faced; and an indicator that Nagel is taking the subjective aspect 
of consciousness seriously. Nevertheless, I must stress that this was just my opinion, and 
that Nagel would probably not agree that his concept of subjective points of view would 
naturally lead to epistemic solipsism.
Despite this, it seemed as though Nagel’s “what it is like” of phenomenal consciousness 
did not conflict with the arguments of Wittgenstein. These arguments mostly revolved 
around the introspection and inner designation of sensations as if they were outer objects, 
which Wittgenstein proved was a faulty way of thinking. However, with Nagel’s “what it 
is like”, there does not appear to be any introspection of one’s sensations and perceptions, 
one just experiences the sensations and perceptions as they occur, with no philosophical 
intentions involved. It could be said that Nagel’s conception of “what it is like” took 
place at the phenomenal level of experience, whilst Wittgenstein’s arguments only came 
into force at the psychological level of experience. If this distinction was accepted, it 
seemed as though Nagel’s phenomenal consciousness was at a primitive, subjective level, 
which passed under the difficulties posed by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In the final 
section of the chapter, the question was raised of whether humans, who had the same
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viewpoint type, but had qualitatively different individual points of view could adopt each 
others’ viewpoints. The answer reached was negative, it seemed as if one could not 
escape the individual, subjective point of view that one possessed, to apprehend another 
person’s point of view. This has been a recurring theme of the chapter, it is the 
importance and intrinsicality of the link between subjectivity and a point of view, a 
connection which Nagel believes is so important, if we are to achieve a full explanation 
of consciousness.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE OBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW
What is the Objective Point of View?
In attempting to answer the above question, it will be useful to compare the properties
that an objective point of view has with those that a subjective point of view was seen to
possess in the previous chapter. Nagel’s conception of the intimate relationship between
subjectivity and a point of view basically meant that the point of view in question was
intrinsically connected to the subject that possessed that point of view. That is, it was a
subjective perspective that could only be apprehended by the conscious, experiencing
creature who held that perspective. In contrast to this, an objective point of view is one
which should be available to various subjective points of view, and not just a particular
one. In this case, there is no intrinsic connection between the point of view and a subject.
Even though the objective point of view could be adopted by many subjects, it does not
1 ™specifically belong to any one subject, but is equally available to all of them. To 
illustrate this, consider several people each giving blood, one after the other. Later, one 
of these people exclaims “Blimey, I didn’t realise that giving blood was so painful!”. 
Now, this claim would involve a subjective element, in that it would be connected with 
the particular viewpoint of an individual. Of course, having made that statement, the fact 
that the person experienced pain whilst giving blood could now be claimed to be an 
objective fact of the world, as he did indeed experience the pain that he referred to with 
his exclamation. However, it is still essentially subjective, as it was only from that
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person’s subjective point of view that the pain concerned could be experienced, not from 
any other point of view (this might be slightly tautological, but I am trying to emphasize 
the intrinsic nature of the relationship between an experience and a subject). Now, 
contrast this with the claim that each of the people who gave blood, gave exactly one pint 
each. This would involve an objective viewpoint, in that it was not intrinsically 
connected to a specific individual’s viewpoint, but was a fact that could be checked from 
various points of view.
Indeed, the description of the objective point of view that I have given, is almost identical 
to the normal, everyday meaning of the expression “objective point of view”. However, 
while Nagel might not disagree with the above description, it is fair to say that the 
objective point of view he has in mind is more scientifically oriented, particularly to the
1 0 1
objectivity of the physical sciences, i.e., physics, biology, chemistry. In relation to 
this, Nagel has also put forward his conception of how the process or development of 
physical objectivity takes place. He has done this on a number of different occasions, 
and the following description is a sort of amalgamation of these different versions.132 
The starting point is an individual or particular point of view, which in my case would be 
my point of view, which I shall call MD. My point of view would involve all the 
perceptions, sensations and conscious mental states in general, that make up my 
subjective consciousness. I think that Nagel would say that this is my “subjective se lf’, 
in that I am directly aware of the reality of my subjectivity, and also which specific
130 Nagel (1974) pp. 172/3.
131 Nagel (1986) pp.7/8, Nagel (1994) p.220.
132 These versions are contained in Nagel (1979a) p.206, Nagel (1986) p.14, Nagel (1994) p.220, Nagel 
1997) pp.81,82.
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physical body that subjectivity is connected with. From this individual viewpoint, the 
move towards greater objectivity is achieved by abstracting away from the viewpoint 
concerned, and indeed away from a specifically human viewpoint altogether. This 
movement away from a general human viewpoint, means that the human perception of 
the world, i.e., what it looks like, sounds like, feels like, etc., is left behind. This 
movement away from the species-specific viewpoint of humans is made possible by 
realising that there is a mind-independent reality which need not be the same as the 
perceptual appearance of that reality which is available to humans. In this way, greater 
objectivity is arrived at by moving away from the human appearances of reality, to a view 
which does not include any species-specific appearances at all.133 This is the objective 
point of view of physical science, it is a view of reality that is not contained anywhere in 
that reality, it tries to view reality as it really is, not as it appears to any perceptual 
apparatus. This is what Nagel calls “the view from nowhere”. This view will include 
everything that the universe contains, including our world, with all the humans and other 
creatures that it contains, indeed, it will also contain a human called MD. But this 
objective viewpoint is of a centreless world, the viewpoint is not from MD’s perspective, 
it is not from any perspective. MD is just another human among millions of others, all of 
whom have viewpoints, but that are all contained in the objective point of view of 
physical science, which has no definitive centre to it.134 Nagel’s conception of the
133 This process is also described by E. Schrodinger, who states that, “By this [objectivation] I mean the 
thing that is also frequently called the ‘hypothesis o f the real world’ around us. I maintain that it amounts 
to a certain simplification which we adopt in order to master the infinitely intricate problem of nature. 
Without being aware of it and without being rigorously systematic about it, we exclude the Subject of 
Cognizance from the domain of nature that we endeavour to understand. We step with our own person 
back into the part o f an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes 
an objective world”. Schrodinger (1979) p. 127.
134 This “view from nowhere” is similar to the Total Perspective Vortex, which is mentioned in the late 
Douglas Adams’ The Hitch-Hikers Guide To The Galaxy. This fiendish device works by showing some
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development of physical objectivity could be viewed as a series of concentric circles, 
with the further out circles containing a more objective view than the inner circles. 
Indeed, the outer circles would contain everything that was in the inner circles, but the 
contents of the inner circles would now be viewed as appearances to the outer circles, the 
latter of which would be viewed by science as having a more accurate viewpoint of 
physical reality.135 I think that science would call the viewpoint of the outer circle “more 
accurate” because it would, at least at that moment, not contain any “appearances” of 
reality, it’s viewpoint would be the nearest approximation to “how things really were”, 
not from anyone’s specific point of view, but from the objective point of view. Of 
course, this might change in the future, with the present outermost circle being included 
in a “new” outer circle of objectivity, which would mean that the “old” outer circle would 
now be considered to contain “appearances” of reality, and so not be the most “accurate” 
viewpoint of reality anymore. This process of increasing objectification could well be 
continuous, and possibly have no end-point.
In relation to Nagel’s conception of objectivity, Biro (1993) has questioned whether 
Nagel has made a correct analysis of the objectivity that science strives for. Biro suspects 
that Nagel thinks that science aims for objectivity by describing the world in a language
poor soul the entire view of all reality (it is has something to do with a fairy cake), which contains a little 
arrow labelled “You are here”, to mark out the location of the individual concerned. This is usually enough 
to drive most people completely insane, though Zaphod Beeblebrox does come through this ordeal with his 
sanity intact. To find out how, you will have to listen to the radio-show, read the book, etc.
135 This process is similar to the way that a scientific theory is usually inclusive, in that it takes in the 
previous theory it replaces, and includes that theory in its objective view of the world. As Einstein states,
“.. .creating a new theory is not like destroying an old bam and erecting a skyscraper in its place. It is 
rather like climbing a mountain, gaining new and wider views, discovering unexpected connections 
between our starting point and its rich environment. But the point from which we started out still exists and 
can be seen, although it appears smaller and forms a tiny part o f our broad view gained by the mastery of 
the obstacles on our adventurous way up”. Albert Einstein & Leopold Infeld, The Evolution o f Physics, 
p. 152: fromZukav (1988) p.45.
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that is “accessible from all possible experience types and that the bat example shows that 
this aim cannot be fulfilled”.136 Biro then goes on to claim that science does not aim for 
this sort of objectivity, and that all the bat example shows is “that there may be facts
1 ^ 7inaccessible from a language correlated with an actual experience type (ours)”. With 
regards to this, I am not sure if Nagel does take this view on objectivity. He certainly 
believes that the “material” that science works with must be accessible to all possible 
experience types, and that this material must be dealt with in an epistemically objective 
manner, i.e., free from personal opinions, prejudices, particular points of view, etc. This 
is achieved by the process of objectification, which results in the objective point of view 
of science. Now, with regards to the bat’s conscious experience, Nagel does think that 
this “material” is not available to any other experience types (including ours), apart from 
the bat itself. However, he also believes that science, with its objective point of view, 
which does not take the viewpoint of any experience types at all, will also have trouble in 
investigating the true nature of the bat’s conscious experience. Nagel thinks that this is 
because of the intimate relationship between the bat’s subjective point of view and its 
conscious experience; a viewpoint that science moves away from in its striving to be 
objective. Of course, another kind of objectivity is that which can be achieved through 
intersubjective agreement. For example, consider that three people are examining a bat 
on the table in front of them. They might intersubjectively agree amongst themselves 
that the bat has a brownish appearance to all three of them. Therefore, it could be 
claimed that while they were looking at the bat, it was an “objective” fact that each of 
them were subjectively having a brownish visual perception. However, I do not think
136 Biro (1993) p. 186.
137 Biro (1993) p. 186.
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that this kind of objectivity is the same kind that physical science strives for. From what 
I understand, physical science aims for an objectivity which is mind-independent, i.e., not 
containing any subjective elements in its conception. It can be seen that intersubjective 
agreement necessarily involves a subjective element, and so is not mind-independent. Of 
course, in making this claim, I am not denying that intersubjective agreement does 
produce objective facts and judgements, or claiming that its judgements are “inferior” to 
those of physical science. I simply think that the “objectivity” of an intersubjective 
agreement is of a different kind to the “objectivity” achieved by science. The three men 
mentioned above could come to an intersubjective agreement that each of them was a 
conscious being, and this would be a perfectly correct, objective fact, about a certain state 
of affairs that was realized in the world. However, in trying to investigate the 
phenomenon of subjective consciousness, this is not the sort of objectivity that science 
would use. The objective viewpoint that science takes up is of the mind-independent 
variety, which I believe, is the kind that Nagel is referring to, when he claims that science 
will always abandon the subjective viewpoint in trying to explain various phenomena.
Another criticism of Nagel’s conception, involves his belief that a species will use 
scientific instruments to obtain measurements, instead of their own perceptual apparatus, 
and in the process they will escape their species-specific way of gaining information 
about the world. In this way the information they gain by this scientific measurement 
will be information that is not species-specific, but available to other types of observers 
as well.138 In criticising this position, Kekes (1977) and Foss (1993) point out that the 
scientific instruments and the output they produce will also be necessarily species-
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specific, as they are built by a particular species for the specific understanding by that 
same particular species. However, I am of the opinion that Kekes and Foss have 
confused the issues here. When Nagel talks of a view as being species-specific, I take it 
that he is referring to the unaided sense perceptions of that species, that is, what they see, 
hear, smell, etc. In other words, species-specific means what that species can apprehend 
of reality using its normal sense modalities. Now, if, as physical science postulates, there 
is a way that things really are, this means that the species in question will only be 
perceiving appearances of a deeper reality that is beyond their particular unaided sense 
experience. Therefore to escape their specific sense experiences they build scientific 
instruments to obtain information that might well constitute this deeper reality. Now, it is 
quite obvious that the scientific instruments themselves have to be understandable to the 
species that built them, so the results that they produce come in a form that is 
understandable to that particular species. In this sense, the scientific instruments are 
indeed species-specific. However, it is what the instruments are actually measuring, this 
is the part that is not species-specific. I think that this is what Nagel is referring to, it is 
the objective part of reality that is available to various species, whatever their subjective 
sense experiences. The instruments are species-specific, but the data they receive from 
reality are not species-specific. For example, consider a gamma-ray detector built by 
humans. Now, humans cannot normally detect gamma-rays through their sense 
experience, but with this detector they can. When the detector gives its readings of the 
intensity of the gamma-rays, this is in a form that humans can understand, e.g., a reading 
of numbers between 0 and 9. However, consider if a Zeta Reticulan were to look at this 
human gamma-ray detector, and the output that it produces. It is quite possible that it
138 Nagel (1979a) p.209.
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would not understand the human design of the detector itself, and almost certainly he 
would not understand the human numerical output that it produced. But, this would not 
stop the Zeta Reticulans building their own gamma-ray detector with its own specific 
output of intensity values in the range of.. .whatever. The point is this, both the humans 
and the Zeta Reticulans would be trying to escape their species-specific sensory 
experiences by trying to detect “objective” phenomena that were not species-specific, i.e., 
in this case, gamma-rays.
Having said this, the conception of the process of objectification has been amazingly 
successful for the physical sciences, especially physics, where theories have been created 
that can account for most of the physical phenomena that our universe contains. So, 
where is the problem? Well, the problem arises when physical science, with its 
conception of objectivity, makes the claim that it can produce a complete understanding 
of reality.139 It is this claim that Nagel is sceptical of, particularly in relation to the topic 
of subjective consciousness or the mind.140 It will be remembered that the starting point 
for the process of objectification began with the subjective point of view of an individual, 
with all its attendant perceptions, sensations, and thoughts; that is, the subjective 
phenomenal and introspective consciousness of the individual. However, it was this 
“subjective self’ that was left behind as the objective point of view was developed. In 
other words, the objective view of reality does not contain any subjective elements at all,
139 As I am writing this, there is much speculation that science has discovered the part o f the human brain 
responsible for religious revelation. Perhaps science might also eventually find the part of the brain 
responsible for making some people think that all there is in reality is objective in nature.
140 This is in contrast to Nagel (1997) p.92, where he vigorously supports the conception of an objective 
reality. However, in this case it seems to me that Nagel is attacking subjectivist conceptions of reality that 
deny any objectivity whatsoever. In relation to consciousness/mind, Nagel is not denying that there is an
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these are all left behind at the innermost concentric circle, as the process of 
objectification began.141 The result of this is that all the perceptions and thoughts of the 
individual have been given the label of “appearances”, and taken out of objective reality 
and relocated to the subjective consciousness or mind of that individual.142 If I were to 
look at the world from the objective point of view of physical science, I would see the 
physical body that I call MD, but this would be my “objective self’, a third-person view 
of MD.143 My subjective self, or the “I” that has conscious mental states would be 
excluded from the objective picture of reality.144 The effect is similar to that of viewing a 
figure in a shop security camera, and just for a split second, you do not realise that it is 
yourself that you are looking at. Therefore, the position is this. The physical sciences, 
using the method of physical objectification, claim that they can provide a complete 
understanding of reality. However, it can be seen that this is a dubious claim, as the 
subjective element of consciousness/mind is left out right at the start of the objectification 
process that is used by the physical sciences. Therefore, the method of physical science 
has an intrinsic incompleteness built into it, its inability to account for the subjective 
element of reality.145 The fact that there is no subjective element in the outlook of 
physical science is viewed by some as not too great a problem. This is the view taken by 
Lewis (1979), who agrees that science cannot provide a complete description of reality,
objective reality, he thinks that there is: it is just that this conception might not be able to capture all the 
elements that are in existence in the world, e.g., the subjective ones.
141 In connection with this point, Schrodinger states that, “The material world has only been constructed at 
the price o f taking the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing it; mind is not part of it; obviously, therefore, it 
can neither act on it nor be acted on by any of its parts”. Schrodinger (1979) p. 128.
142 Nagel (1994) pp.220/1.
143 A good discussion of these issues is contained in Malcolm (1988).
144 Nagel (1965) pp. 113/4. This is also similar to Wittgenstein’s example of the book “The world as I 
found it”, which would contain no reference to the subject of which the book was about. Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus, 5.631.
145 Nagel (1994) p.221.
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but that what it does provide is not affected by the omission of the subjective element. 
Using an analogy, he talks of a map that would be incomplete if it omitted some railway 
lines, as this would have distorted the map’s representation of the countryside. However, 
if the “location of this map” dot is left off the map, its representation of the countryside 
would not be affected at all.146 When talking of the “location of this map” dot, I take 
Lewis to be referring to a subjective element that was left out of the “objective” 
representation that the map provides. Now, with regards to the point that Lewis is 
making, Nagel would probably agree with him; in no way has physical, objective, reality 
been distorted by the omission of subjectivity. However, the problems start occurring 
when science takes the view that all there is in reality is physical and objective. This is 
when science tries to produce an objective map of the “location of this map” dot itself. It 
tries to explain subjective phenomena in an objective manner, with the result that these 
phenomena are distorted, as the property of subjectivity they possess is completely 
ignored or explained away. However, in the next section, a practical example of this 
conception of the objective point of view and the corresponding process of objectification 
will be given. It will then be shown why Nagel thinks that this method of physical 
explanation will falter with regard to the subjective element of consciousness/mind.
But, to conclude this section, a brief comparison will be made of Nagel’s conception of 
objectification, leading to the “view from nowhere”, with Spinoza’s earlier conception of 
the sub specie aetemitatis (or the “view from eternity”).147 The first thing to notice is 
that both conceptions rely on ascending levels of knowledge, in order to reach their
146 Lewis (1979) p. 144.
147 My discussion of Spinoza is influenced by Copleston (1959) pp.230-237, 244-247.
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respective goals.148 The lowest level of knowledge (i.e., inside the innermost concentric 
circle) for Nagel, was that of subjective, perceptual experience. The next level then 
treated these subjective perceptions as appearances, and put forward a more objective and 
scientifically correct portrayal of reality as it really is; and so on, until the ultimate 
objective point of view on reality, the view from nowhere, is reached. With Spinoza’s 
conception, the intellect has also to ascend several levels of knowledge. The first and 
lowest level is that of ideas of sensation or imagination (cognitio primi generis). This 
level equates with Nagel’s lowest level of subjective perceptions, and is viewed by 
Spinoza as involving sense perceptions. Spinoza judges the knowledge gained from this 
level as inadequate and confused, though it is still the way we get most of our 
information about the world. The knowledge gained from this level is confused, because, 
as with Nagel’s lowest level, it also is judged to consist of appearances only. From this 
first level, Spinoza then ascends to the second level of knowledge (cognitio secundi 
generis), which is said to consist of the adequate ideas of scientific knowledge. It is this 
level which Spinoza sees as providing a truer picture of the causal relations making up 
reality. This level contains adequate ideas that go to form the common notions from 
which the fundamental principles of mathematics and physics are discovered. It is 
difficult to decide whether Spinoza’s movement from the first to the second level of 
knowledge is entirely similar to the objectification of Nagel’s conception: the latter of 
which results in a more scientifically accurate view of the reality behind the appearances, 
that objective physical science strives for. There is certainly a similarity between the two 
conceptions, in that the first level of sense perceptions and everyday reality is left behind
148 The concept of ascending levels o f knowledge to reach some ultimate knowledge of reality is an age-old 
theme in philosophy, e.g., Plato and his theory of the Ideas or Forms.
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by both, and they enter a more abstract level dealing with the generalities of the physical 
sciences. However, it is debatable whether both conceptions then have the same 
scientifically “accurate” view of reality. Nagel’s conception certainly involves this view, 
but I am not sure whether Spinoza’s conception does as well. It is not certain that 
Spinoza’s adequate ideas of the second level are analogous to a process of objectification, 
and having a view “more faithful to reality”. Although, I suppose that in moving from 
specifics to generalities, one might employ a method of “stepping back” so to speak, to 
get a more overall picture, but I am not sure about this. In addition to this, even if one 
granted that Spinoza’s second level did provide a view “more faithful to reality” than the 
first, his other conception of how we are able to conceive reality, either under the 
attribute of thought or extension, would seem to complicate matters. The view one had 
of reality would depend on which attribute we were using to do the viewing, one would 
not have the single more “accurate” view that Nagel’s conception postulated. The only 
tentative reply that I can come up with on this point would be that even though there is a 
dual aspect with which reality can be viewed under, there is still only one under-lying 
system of causal connections making up reality. There are not two systems, one made up 
of bodies, for example, and another made up of minds, they are two aspects of the single 
system. Spinoza also believed that the order and causal connections of reality would be 
the same, whether one viewed reality under the attribute of thought or extension. 
Therefore, it might be said that despite the dual aspect component of Spinoza’s 
conception, one might still have some kind of “objective” view of a single reality, 
however, this is a debatable point.
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Spinoza’s third and final level of knowledge, is called intuitive knowledge {scientia 
intuitiva). It is from this level that reality can be viewed sub specie aetemitatis, which 
involves viewing the whole infinite causal structure of nature, all in one intuitive 
observation. Spinoza considered God and Nature as the same thing, so this all 
encompassing view was the equivalent of seeing everything as contained in God. This of 
course points to a major difference between the general philosophies of Spinoza and 
Nagel. Whereas Spinoza’s view from eternity was intimately connected with his theistic 
framework of reality, Nagel’s view from nowhere does not presuppose the existence of 
God, or have any religious overtones. I suppose that the presupposition of Nagel’s 
conception might be that science considers that everything in reality is contained in 
objective reality, i.e., the view from nowhere. However, despite this, Spinoza’s concept 
of sub specie aetemitatis, does seem very similar to Nagel’s conception of the view from 
nowhere. This latter conception could also be considered as the ultimate viewpoint of all 
objective reality, from which all causal connections, objects, and individuals can be seen 
to fit together in the cosmic scheme of things. However, I think there is one important 
difference between the two conceptions. With Spinoza’s “view from eternity”, the 
viewpoint of the person who has this intuitive view is included in the overall view. By 
this I mean that the subjectivity of the person who has the “view from eternity” is 
included in the conception. With the “view from eternity”, one is supposed to 
subjectively comprehend how one’s own insignificant existence is interconnected with 
the rest of reality. In contrast, Nagel’s “view from nowhere” does not include the 
person’s subjectivity in its conception. The person who has the conception may well 
include his own objective body in the overall view (i.e., under the mode of extension, as
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Spinoza would say), but the conception will not be subjectively centred on that body.
The view will be somehow outside of reality, looking in at it objectively, rather than 
looking out at it subjectively (as with Spinoza’s conception, I think). To clarify this 
point, imagine if all of reality was contained in one of those snow-globes (the type that 
you shake and the snow gets scattered about in the liquid that the globe contains). With 
Nagel’s “view from nowhere”, this would be outside the snow-globe, objectively viewing 
the globe and all of the reality that it contains. However, with Spinoza’s “view from 
eternity”, this would be from the inside of the snow-globe, subjectively viewing the 
reality that it contains and how one is connected to it. I am not sure whether I have 
explained the above point very clearly, however, there is a final conclusion that one could 
come to concerning the two conceptions. As mentioned earlier, whereas Spinoza saw 
everything as contained in God, physical science seems to see everything as contained in 
the objective “view from nowhere”; therefore it might be ironically claimed that the 
“God” of physical science is objectivity itself.
Subiective/Obiective Points of View and Consciousness
In explaining what he means by the objective point of view of science, Nagel uses the 
commonest form of scientific explanation, that is, a reduction. A reduction involves 
explaining one level of physical description in terms of an under-lying, more fundamental 
level of physical description, with the more fundamental level usually being causally 
responsible for the less fundamental level.149 It can then be said that the reduced level of 
physical description is “nothing but” the more fundamental level of physical description. 
Examples of this are, water consisting of H 20 molecules, sound consisting of waves
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travelling through a medium, etc. To explore the idea that Nagel has concerning 
objective and subjective points of view, and how they relate to consciousness (as set out 
in his 1974 “bat” paper), I will first consider how science would deal with a particular 
physical phenomenon in the world. Let us say that the phenomenon is the Aurora 
Borealis (Northern Lights), which is a colourful luminescence in the upper atmosphere 
above the North Polar regions. Before I start, I should make it clear that I will be making 
subjective/objective distinctions in the philosophical concepts of metaphysics and 
epistemology.150 I will be taking metaphysics to be concerned with what is actually 
existing in reality. This is similar to ontology, which is usually seen as a sub-section of 
metaphysics, although the latter is usually seen as being more general in its outlook on 
reality. However, for the purposes of this discussion, I will be taking metaphysics to be 
basically synonymous with ontology. With regards to the concept of epistemology, I take 
this to be concerned with issues of knowledge, i.e., how we find out about such-and-such 
in the world. Having defined some of the concepts I will be using, I will now get back to 
the point in hand, which is how science would reductively explain a physical 
phenomenon such as the Aurora Borealis. The first point to make is that the phenomenon 
in question is metaphysically objective in nature, that is, it exists in the objective, external 
world, and does not depend on the mind for its existence. If there were no perceivers in 
the world, there would still be a physical phenomenon taking place. Having said this, the 
fact that the Aurora Borealis is known for what it is, that is, a colourful luminescence in 
the atmosphere, is due to visual perception by humans. The experience that humans have
149 Nagel (1995) pp.98/9, Searle (1992) p. 116.
150 The reason I am bringing in the concepts of metaphysics and epistemology, is that a criticism of Nagel’s 
views on subjectivity and objectivity, made by Foss (1993), uses these concepts quite heavily. I will be
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of the aurora, portrays it as a colourful luminescence. This human sense experience of 
the aurora, is epistemically subjective, as it is intrinsically connected to the individual, 
subjective points of view of the human perceivers. In other words, the human perceivers’ 
sense experience of the aurora would be species-specific; only humans would have that 
particular visual phenomenology of the aurora.
The next step is where science comes in, a process of objectification is begun, to try to 
reach an objective point of view on the aurora. This is basically achieved by the building 
of scientific instruments with which to study the Aurora Borealis. The species-specific 
view of humanity is left behind, in order to describe the phenomenon in a manner not 
specific to any species. This is the epistemically objective point of view of science, 
which is not intimately tied to any particular point of view,151 it is Nagel’s “view from 
nowhere”. Of course, as stated earlier, the design of the instruments and the output they 
produce are species-specific to humans, otherwise no-one would understand the results 
that the instruments were producing. However, the important point is that the object of 
the instruments’ investigations is not species-specific. That science is able to change the 
point of view on the Aurora Borealis, and yet still be examining the same phenomenon, is 
due to the fact that the aurora is metaphysically objective. This means that it is not 
intrinsically tied to any particular point of view, even though it can be experienced from 
many subjective points of view. One can pass from a subjective to an objective point of 
view of it, and still know that one is describing the same phenomenon. However, with 
the gaining of the objective point of view, what has happened to the subjective
examining Foss’ arguments later, and so thought it would be useful to introduce the concepts he uses at this 
point, as it should make it somewhat clearer why I think Foss is mistaken in his criticism of Nagel.
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experiences of the aurora? Well, these experiences are usually redescribed as subjective
appearances, and located in the mind of the human perceiver. Science takes the view that
these subjective appearances are not really part of the phenomenon in question, and so
when it physically reduces the phenomenon to its more fundamental reality, the
subjective appearances are left behind, unreduced, in the subjective points of view of
which they are part.152 Therefore, science reduces the phenomenon of the Aurora
Borealis to its more fundamental reality: which is, that it is caused by an overloading of
the Earth’s radiation belts by high energy particles carried on the solar wind. This
resulting overload causes some of the high energy particles to escape the belts and
interact with gas particles in the atmosphere, which produces the emittance of radiation in
the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum, i.e., light. The light is viewed as an
effect of the deeper particle interaction, with the former consequently being experienced
by human perceivers. Another important point to mention about this process of
1reduction, is that it is intellectually transparent, which means that the mechanisms of 
the processes involved in moving from one level of physical reality to another are clearly 
understood. There is a kind of necessity in the understanding of the interaction between 
the high energy particles and the atmospheric gas particles, in producing light.
Now it is time for the big question. Can science take an objective point of view on 
conscious experience, and reductively explain it? The first point to make, and perhaps 
the most vital, is that there does seem to be an intrinsic connection between one’s 
conscious experience and one’s own subjective point of view (as Nagel has repeatedly
151 Searle (1992) p.18, Kosso (1998) p.16.
152 Nagel (1974) p.167, Searle (1992) p .l 15.
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claimed since his 1974 “bat” paper). By saying the connection is intrinsic, I mean that 
consciousness seems to be built into the subjective point of view; conscious experience 
and subjectivity seem to be intertwined at a deep level of reality. This view has some 
interesting consequences. Firstly, it appears that the existence of conscious experience 
(i.e. perceptions, sensations, intentional thoughts, mental images, etc.) is metaphysically 
subjective. This means that experience has a reality which is subjective, in contrast to the 
Aurora Borealis, which had an objective reality. In making this claim, there might well 
be accusations of begging the question. By this I mean that the subjectivity of conscious 
experience is being assumed as part of the premise of an argument, when it still has to be 
proven that conscious experience is indeed subjective. In answer to this I can only say 
that I see it as an empirical reality of the world that one’s conscious experience is 
subjective in nature. I do not foresee any major neuroscientific breakthrough that will 
suddenly prove that consciousness does not have the subjective reality we thought it did, 
but is in fact objective in nature. It is a fact of reality that one’s conscious experience is 
intrinsically subjective in nature, even if it is probable that the production of that same 
conscious experience has an objective source. Therefore, if one’s conscious experience 
only exists at one’s subjective point of view, this also means that one will only be able to 
apprehend it, as it is, from that same point of view. This results in one’s conscious 
experience being accessed in an epistemically subjective manner, that is, intrinsically tied 
to a particular point of view (one’s own). Therefore, it seems that conscious experience 
is both metaphysically and epistemically subjective.
153 Nagel (1995) p. 106, Nagel (1998) p.342.
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So, what happens when science then tries to explain conscious experience? Well, the 
process of objectification is begun, which will result in the objective point of view being 
taken on the phenomenon in question. This will involve moving away from any 
particular points of view, to gain an epistemically objective outlook on the phenomenon. 
But will this work for conscious experience? As Nagel stated in his 1974 paper, if one’s 
conscious experience can only be apprehended from one’s own subjective point of view 
(i.e. in an epistemically subjective manner), how is moving away from that point of view 
going to get us any closer to a “real” understanding of the phenomenon?154 The reasons 
for this doubt are the following. Firstly, if conscious experience is metaphysically 
subjective, and can only be apprehended from the subjective point of view, how can one 
be sure that one is still addressing the same phenomenon from the objective point of 
view? With the Aurora Borealis, this was a metaphysically objective phenomenon, it 
existed in objective reality, not intrinsically connected to any one point of view. 
Therefore, when the subjective point of view on the aurora was abandoned, one could 
still be sure that the objective point of view was concentrating on the same phenomenon: 
the aurora was manifestly observable from both the subjective and objective points of 
view. This point could be put another way; even though there was a distinction between 
appearance and reality in the observation of the aurora, one could still be sure that both 
the appearance and reality belonged to the same phenomenon.155 However, this state of 
affairs could well be doubted in relation to conscious experience. When one moves from 
the subjective to the objective point of view on experience, one cannot then judge the
154 Nagel (1974) p. 167.
155 This could also be stated in Fregean terms: With an objective phenomenon, one can have knowledge of 
it at the level o f sense, i.e., how it appears to a subject, but also be able to have knowledge o f it at the level 
of reference, i.e., facts about how it actually is in the world, the reality behind the appearance. This is
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subjective view as consisting of “appearances” of experience. This is because the 
appearance of conscious experience is actually its reality, there is no appearance/reality 
distinction to be made with conscious experience.156
Therefore, if one moves away from the realistic point of view on experience, that is, the 
subjective viewpoint, where can the objective point of view concentrate on? If it looks at 
neuronal interactions in the brain, how can it be certain that these neuronal interactions 
are the “reality” behind the “appearance” of conscious experience to the subject 
concerned?157 With the objective reduction of the Aurora Borealis, there was an 
intellectual transparency to the mechanisms involved in the processes concerned. One 
could “see” how one level of physical description could then be reduced to a more 
fundamental level of physical description, which was causally responsible for the reduced 
level. However, even though it is quite likely that neuronal interactions in the brain are 
causally responsible for conscious experience, the mechanisms of the processes involved 
are intellectually opaque; it is not known how the physical brain produces subjective 
conscious experience. This is the famous “explanatory gap” between mind and matter. 
With regards to the explanatory gap, there has been much debate as to whether it is an
possible because the phenomenon in question has an objective existence, however, there may be problems 
with a phenomenon which has a subjective existence, as will be seen.
156 Nagel (1974) p.174, Searle (1992) p.122, Alter (1999) p.8. It should be said that this point is similar to 
the point that Kripke (1971/72) had made in his “essentialist” argument against the identity theory o f mind. 
Indeed, in his “bat” paper, Nagel acknowledges this in footnote 11.
157 Again, in Fregean terms, consciousness cannot be viewed as being one way to the level o f sense, but 
another way to the level o f reference. It is not one phenomenon that can be viewed from two different 
points of view, rather, it appears that there are two distinct phenomena (consciousness and neuronal 
activity), which are viewed from two distinct perspectives, both of which are at the level o f reference. The 
reasons for this are the subjective existence of consciousness and the explanatory gap.
158 The phrase “explanatory gap” was first coined by Levine (1983).
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epistemological or metaphysical gap, or even if there is a gap at all.159 However, it seems 
to me that there certainly is a gap in our understanding in this area. Therefore, I think 
that the explanatory gap is definitely epistemological in nature, as it is certainly a lack of 
understanding in human knowledge that is responsible for our failure to explain how 
neuronal activity causes conscious experience. Taking this view does not commit oneself 
to dualism, one could still believe that conscious experience is a physical phenomenon, it 
is just that it is not known how it is produced in the brain. However, if one were to take 
the view that the explanatory gap is metaphysical in nature, then this would have 
ramifications for one’s outlook on reality. It would mean that there was some sort of 
dualism in existence, involving the phenomenon of conscious experience. It might not 
necessarily involve a dualism of substances, such as Cartesian dualism does, but involve 
a property dualism. With this latter view, there is only one substance in reality, that is, 
the physical, but in producing conscious experience, the physical has given birth to a 
distinctly non-physical property. This is the view that Nagel himself supports.160 
However, whether one takes an epistemological or metaphysical approach to the 
explanatory gap, the fact that there is a gap, is enough to cast doubt on whether conscious 
experience is strictly identical to neuronal activity. Therefore, what we are left with are 
two phenomena, subjective conscious experience and objective neuronal activity, both of 
which appear to be radically different to each other, and that have no apparent intrinsic 
connection to each other. Of course, just because conscious experience appears to be so 
different to neuronal activity in the brain, it does not mean that they may not be identical
159 See Levine (1993) for an epistemological view of the gap. See Chalmers (1996) for a metaphysical 
view of the gap. See Tye (1999b) for a view that the gap is just a cognitive illusion. See Block/Stalnaker 
(1999) for a critique of conceptual analysis in relation to the explanatory gap.
115
to each other in reality. This point goes back to an invalid objection to the Mind/Brain 
Identity Theory of the 1950’s, which involved Leibniz’s Law. This law stated that for 
two events to be identical, they had to have all their properties in common. Therefore, as 
the properties of a mental event were radically different to the properties of a brain 
process, it was claimed that they could not be identical. However, this objection was 
shown to be invalid, due to the fact that one must not confuse the properties of an 
experience with the properties of the object that is experienced.161 For example, even 
though the Aurora Borealis may be multi-coloured and 20 miles across, it does not mean 
that my actual experience of the Aurora Borealis is also multi-coloured and 20 miles 
across. The Identity theorists were claiming that it was the experiential state that was 
identical to a brain process, and that state would not actually contain the properties of the 
object which was experienced. Therefore, Leibniz’s Law was not a proper objection to 
the claim that a mental state could be identical to a brain process. However, having said 
this, there is still the problem of the explanatory gap, which suggests that there is a 
conceptual/logical difficulty in claiming that a physical process is identical to a non­
physical process. Therefore, the fact that conscious experience and neuronal activity 
appear to be radically different to each other, and also that there is no transparency in the 
physical processes by which the latter might produce the former, means that there appears 
to be a difficulty as to whether the same phenomenon is being observed when the move is 
made from the subjective to the objective point of view (i.e. from consciousness to 
neuronal activity). And this basically means that the success of a physical reduction of 
conscious experience is to be greatly doubted.
160 Nagel (1995) p.nl05. Although Nagel claims he prefers the term “dual aspect theory” rather than the 
term property dualism to describe his viewpoint.
116
I think that this is true even though one can get empirically reliable correlations between 
neuronal activity and conscious experience. For example, a subject could be shown an 
image of such-and-such, which results in a certain part of his brain producing a frenzy of 
neuronal activity. This correlation could occur every time the subject is shown an image 
of some kind. Would the neuroscientist conducting the experiment be entitled to claim 
that he had objectified some of the visual phenomenology of the subject, that is, what it is 
like for the subject to see the image in question? I don’t think it would. It seems to me 
that all we have in the above example is a correlation between two objective, physical 
phenomena, that is, the image and the neuronal activity. The phenomenal character of 
the subject’s experience is not being accessed at all. Consider another example, this time 
the neuroscientist has a probe with which he presses part of the subject’s brain, thus 
causing neuronal activity to take place in that area. While this occurs, the subject tells the 
neuroscientist what he is experiencing, e.g., “I can see blue flashing lights”, “I can hear 
the fade out of the piano notes at the end of The Beatles song A Day In The Life”, etc. 
Now, surely this must be viewed as objectifying some of the subject’s conscious 
experience. Well, possibly. But it will again be noticed that all we have is a correlation 
between two objective phenomena, that is, the neural activity and the verbal report of the 
subject.162 The phenomenal character of the subject’s conscious experience is still not 
really being accessed by the neuroscientist, even though we might grant that the neural 
activity does appear to be correlated with some inner, subjective experience. The 
problem for neuroscience is that, at the present time, the process by which neuronal 
activity produces conscious experience is not understood; therefore there isn’t any
161 Smart (1959), Searle (1992) p.38, Heil (1998) pp.80/1.
162 Chalmers (1996) p. 115.
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necessity in the correlations between neural activity and consciousness. This results in 
the correlations always appearing empirical and contingent. Now, some philosophers 
such as Flanagan (1992) view these neural correlates of consciousness as a quite 
satisfactory way of showing that consciousness is dependent on neural activity in the 
brain. Indeed, he believes that philosophers such as Nagel are putting an “impossibly 
high standard on intelligibility”163 in connection with consciousness; that is, Nagel wants 
a scientific explanation of how it is that objective neuronal processes seem to produce the 
subjective phenomenon of consciousness. However, it seems to me that one either 
explains a phenomenon or one does not explain a phenomenon. Correlations certainly 
play a major role in scientific explanation. With the example of the Aurora Borealis, 
scientists must have noticed correlations between the intensity of the solar wind and the 
intensity of the auroral displays in the night sky. Then, due to a process of inductive 
reasoning, they could claim that the solar wind was probably the cause of the Aurora 
Borealis. However, if the scientists then claimed that they had explained how the Aurora 
Borealis came about, I think that we would be correct to say that they had not yet 
produced an explanation, but had just come to an inductive conclusion about the probable 
cause of the aurora. To have an explanation, they would have to give a physical 
description of the mechanisms of the processes that took place, probably at an atomic or 
molecular level, that linked the phenomenon of the solar wind with the phenomenon of 
the Aurora Borealis. I think that the same applies to an explanation of consciousness.
One cannot claim to have explained how neuronal activity causes consciousness, just by 
inductively noting the correlations between neural activity and consciousness. From the 
correlations, one could claim that neuronal activity probably was causally responsible for
163 O. Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered, p .l 15: from Davies/Humphreys, eds. (1993) p.34.
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consciousness. But to have an explanation of why neuronal activity causes consciousness 
would require the same physical description of the mechanisms of the processes 
involved, as in the case of the Aurora Borealis. I do not think that asking for this type of 
explanation is putting an “impossibly high standard on intelligibility”, in relation to 
consciousness. It is just asking for the same sort of scientific explanation that is applied 
to all other phenomena that come under the scrutiny of physical science. If someone says 
to this that consciousness is not like any other phenomenon, then this may lead to rather 
awkward questions for the materialist, such as why consciousness is different from other 
phenomena. This in turn may lead one to question whether consciousness is actually a 
physical phenomenon, and to thoughts of some sort of dualism. The bottom line is this, if 
consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then it should be capable of having a physical 
explanation. Having said that, even if there comes a time when the physical mechanism 
of the production of consciousness is understood, this will still only objectify a part of 
one’s conscious experience. Only the subject will have direct access to his own 
subjective character of experience, despite the neuroscientists being able to explain how 
the phenomenon of consciousness arises. The upshot of all this, comes back to Nagel’s 
1974 “bat” paper. Even if one had all the objective, physical and neurophysiological 
information about the bat, one would still not know what it was like to be a bat. Only the 
bat would have the subjective point of view required to experience its inner life. Humans 
would be unable to access the subjective character of experience of the bat. This is the 
epistemological point. However, the metaphysical point would be that there is a 
subjective consciousness that is existing in reality, even though, in the scientific sense, it 
is a subjective reality and not an objective one.164
164 Nagel (1974) pp. 170/1, Searle (1992) pp.l 16/7.
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Having stated what I think is Nagel’s position on subjectivity, objectivity and 
consciousness, it is now time to look at criticisms that have been made against his views 
on these topics. One critic who has specifically targeted Nagel’s views is Jeff Foss, who 
did so in a shortened form in a 1989 paper,165 and then elaborated on these criticisms in a 
1993 paper.166 In the latter, Foss accuses Nagel of conflating a metaphysical version of 
the subjective/objective distinction with the epistemological version of the 
subjective/objective distinction.167 Foss claims that this conflation then leads Nagel to 
erroneously decide that physical science will be unable to obtain an objective analysis of 
the subjective character of experience of a being, because the being’s experience is 
necessarily subjective. Having sketched out Foss’s argument I will now look at it in 
more detail. Foss makes a subjective/objective distinction in relation to the concepts of 
metaphysics and epistemology, similar to the distinction I made at the start of this 
section. He then goes on to say that the consciousness of a subject is metaphysically 
subjective, as it essentially involves a metaphysical subject.169 However, for Foss, this 
does not mean that science is unable to obtain an objective view of the essence of 
consciousness. He argues that science aims for epistemic objectivity, that is, an 
“undistorted and accurate”170 view of reality. Therefore, just because one’s 
consciousness is metaphysically subjective, that is, it exists subjectively, it does not mean 
that science will be unable to adopt an objective point of view on that consciousness, as
165 Foss, J. (1989) “On The Logic Of What It Is Like To Be A Conscious Subject”. Australasian Journal 
o f Philosophy 67, pp. 205-20.
166 Foss, J. (1993) “Subjectivity, Objectivity and Nagel on Consciousness”. Dialogue 32, pp. 725-36.
167 Foss (1993) pp.728/9.
168 Foss (1993) pp.728/9.
169 Foss (1993) p.735.
170 Foss (1993) p.735.
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science aims for epistemic objectivity, and not metaphysical objectivity. As Foss’ 
argument was quite obscure, I will try to clarify it in what follows.
Let us now examine the conclusions that Foss has come to. Firstly, he thinks that
consciousness is metaphysically subjective, as it essentially involves a subject. I do not
think that Nagel would disagree with Foss on this point. Secondly, Foss claims that
science aims for epistemic objectivity, to achieve an accurate view of reality. Again, I do
not think that Nagel would disagree with Foss on this point either. Therefore, where do
their opinions divide? I think it is at the following point, where Foss states that:
If the two senses [metaphysical(m) and epistemic(e)] are kept distinct, then 
Nagel can be seen as fallaciously inferring the subjectivity(e) of some 
essential part (or any complete account) of the “subjective character” ...of 
consciousness, from the essential subjectivity(m) of the subjective character 
of consciousness (i.e., what it is like for the subject(m)).171
Here, Foss is claiming that because consciousness and its subjective character is 
metaphysically subjective, Nagel infers that the view on consciousness and its subjective 
character is essentially epistemically subjective as well. This is the conflation that Foss 
thinks Nagel is guilty of. The way that I think Foss is viewing this conflation will be 
given in the following interpretation of his position, this will be followed by the reasons 
why I believe that his idea on this conflation is mistaken. Foss could be claiming that 
because consciousness and its subjective character is metaphysically subjective, then 
there will naturally be an epistemically subjective view on this consciousness, that is, 
what it is like for the subject concerned. However, this is the relativized and distorted 
view that one usually has from an epistemically subjective point of view. This does not
171 Foss (1993) pp.728/9.
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stop science taking an epistemically objective point of view on consciousness, to search 
for the reality behind the relativized view. For example, consider when a subject looks at 
the Aurora Borealis, it appears from the epistemically subjective point of view of the 
subject to consist of streams and bands of different colours. However, when science 
takes an epistemically objective point of view on the Aurora Borealis, its reality is then 
revealed, which concerns interactions between high energy particles and gas particles in 
the upper atmosphere. Couldn’t this be the same for consciousness? As I stated earlier in 
this section, however, I do not think the case of consciousness is as straightforward as 
that of the Aurora Borealis. The important difference is that one’s consciousness is 
metaphysically subjective (a point which Foss accepts), while the Aurora Borealis is 
metaphysically objective. One can have a subjective, relativized view of the aurora, and 
then switch to the objective, non-relativized view of the aurora, and still know that the 
same phenomenon is being observed in both views. This is because the Aurora Borealis 
has an objective existence, which can be accessed from various points of view. However, 
with consciousness, its reality is subjective, and it can only be accessed from one point of 
view, the subjective point of view of the person concerned. This epistemically subjective 
viewpoint on consciousness is not a relativized and distorted view on consciousness, it is 
the only authentic view one can have of consciousness, due to the latter’s metaphysically 
subjective existence. Therefore, as I see it, the essential reality o f consciousness is 
contained in the epistemically subjective point o f view. It is this fact that produces the 
situation of epistemic solipsism, which was discussed in the last chapter. One can only 
know that one’s own mind exists in a first-person manner, because one has that 
epistemically subjective access to it, that no-one else has (with regards to your own
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mind). Of course, each person probably does have that epistemically subjective access to 
their own respective minds, but that access is individual and specific to each person. This 
is what creates the other-minds problem, only the person whose mind it is, can know that 
that their mind is existing, because only that person has that specific access to it (This is 
all I will say on this troubling topic here, as I do not wish to be embroiled in it again). 
Therefore, to then adopt an epistemically objective point of view on consciousness/mind, 
will be to move away from the subjective point of view on it, to where? If one starts to 
look at neuronal interactions in the brain, it is not certain that this will provide the 
“reality” behind the subjective view on consciousness. The subjective character of 
experience and neuronal interactions are two completely different phenomena, while the 
mechanism of the process by which the latter might produce the former is also 
completely unknown. The upshot of this is that the epistemically subjective view on 
consciousness and its specific character is the only view from which we apprehend what 
consciousness really is. Therefore, contrary to Foss, the epistemically subjective 
viewpoint is the only viewpoint we can adopt on the reality of consciousness. If any 
other viewpoints are adopted, there will always be doubts about whether we are referring 
to the same phenomenon as viewed from the subjective viewpoint.172
172 In addition to this, there is a second interpretation of Foss’ position which is altogether more strange. 
This has Foss claiming that the subjective/objective distinction of metaphysics has some formal laws that 
dictate what the metaphysical subject and object consists of. For example, at one point he states:
Nor is there anything in S-O(m) itself concerning the ontological status of the subject(m) and 
the object(s)(m). The subject(m) may be a Cartesian thinking substance, a Sartrean neant or 
a functionalist instantiation of a program. The object(s)(m) of the thought may be as physical 
as the king o f Spain, as abstract as the King of spades or as unreal as the present king of 
France. Foss (1993) p.729.
I must admit that I am puzzled by the above passage. Perhaps Foss is taking the metaphysical to be more 
formal and generalized than the ontological aspect. The ontological aspect deals with phenomena that are 
actually existing in this world, while the metaphysical aspect is more elevated and deals with all sorts of 
possible realities. Personally, I have taken the metaphysical to be roughly equivalent to the ontological,
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Materialism and Subjective Consciousness 
Materialist Theories o f the Mind
Therefore, it is Nagel’s opinion that when science adopts the objective point of view on 
the mind/consciousness, it will move further away from the only point of view that has a 
realistic access to that consciousness, that is, the subjective point of view. However, this 
objective outlook on reality is not confined just to the sciences such as neurophysiology. 
It has also permeated many areas of philosophy, in particular, the philosophy of mind. 
This was one of the main reasons why Nagel wrote his 1974 “bat” paper, he was 
attacking what he saw as the “reductionist euphoria”173 of the time, concerning theories 
purporting to explain the mind or consciousness. These theories were all objective and 
materialist in nature, and Nagel believed that they led to false or incomplete analyses of 
the mental and its concepts. For a theory to be described as objective and materialist, this 
usually meant that the theory in question had a particular outlook or attitude to certain 
concepts and phenomena. For example, in being objective, this meant that the theory 
would probably not include any subjective elements. All the elements of the theory could 
be analysed from the third-person point of view, and so the theory was basically a theory 
of other peoples’ minds, not of one’s own mind. In being materialist in nature, this meant 
that the theory contained a causally closed view of the mind, that is, there were only 
going to be physical causes and physical effects contained in it. Therefore, as one can
meaning that when I talk of the metaphysical, and the subjective/objective distinction thereof, I am 
referring to empirical phenomena in the world that either have an objective or a subjective existence. For 
example, my subjective consciousness is a metaphysically subjective reality, whilst the body that I call 
mine is a metaphysically objective reality. If Foss is complicating things by claiming that the metaphysical 
subject/object can be anything whatsoever, then I think that he is trying to use formal qualifications to 
obscure what is actually existing in the world in which we live, i.e., a subjective reality and an objective 
reality.
173 Nagel (1974) p. 165.
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imagine, this view was going to have a damaging effect on something as immaterial or 
non-physical in appearance as one’s mind or consciousness. Some brief examples of 
objective/materialist theories of mind will illustrate these points.174
What could be termed the “classic” materialist theory of mind, was that of behaviourism. 
The basic principle of this theory was that there were no mental states, only behaviour. 
Reference to mental states was analysed away and reduced to reference to behaviour or 
dispositions to behave. For example, to say that a person desires/wants a pint of beer, 
means that he is disposed to leave the pavement that he is walking along, enter a pub, 
walk up to the bar and ask for a pint of beer. I called behaviourism the “classic” 
materialist theory of mind, because it seems to contain everything that any materialist 
could wish for. Firstly, the theory is completely objective and third-person in its 
application. There are no problematic subjective elements to it, all the elements are 
objective and available for public scrutiny. It is also firmly materialistic, as there are no 
non-physical appearing beliefs or desires to be dealt with. However, it can be seen that 
because behaviourism is third-personal in its approach, it is always describing someone 
else’s mental states in terms of their behaviour, never one’s own mental states. If one 
were to apply it to oneself, that is, in the subjective first-person, the effect would be quite 
bizarre. For example, you would realise that you wanted a pint of beer, only when you 
entered the pub, walked up to the bar, and asked for a pint of beer. This might have come 
as a great shock to you, if you only thought that you were out for a quiet stroll in the 
evening air. The problem for behaviourism is that if all one’s mental states are reduced 
to behaviour, then one does not have any mental states such as beliefs and desires, that
174 For a good discussion of these issues, see Searle (1992) Ch.2.
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actually cause or are responsible for your corresponding behaviour. In the subjective 
first-person, it is quite obvious that one does have mental states such as desires and 
beliefs, whatever one considers these states to be in reality.
Now, a behaviourist could argue that the beer example given above was too simplistic 
and also unrealistic, in that the person would realise that he wanted a pint of beer better 
than anyone else, as he would know his own dispositions to behave better than anyone 
else. However, this then raises some awkward questions for the behaviourist. 
Presumably, if a man was walking along a street and suddenly had a disposition to 
behave in a way that resulted in the gaining of a pint of beer, when he first had the 
disposition, i.e., before any observable behaviour occurred, this disposition could well be 
described as a subjective and private state, as only he would be aware of his own 
disposition. This then leads onto the question of what exactly a “disposition” is. The 
usual behaviourist answer is that a disposition is similar to the property of fragility that, 
for example, a wine-glass possesses, which means that when it is dropped onto the floor 
it usually breaks. The wine-glass is then said to have the disposition of being fragile, 
which means that when it is dropped it usually breaks. This explanation of what a 
disposition is does not seem very convincing to me. Firstly, it seems to be disanalogous 
to the case of a conscious human being having a disposition. After all, the wine glass has 
the disposition of being fragile in relation to an external observer; the wine-glass itself 
doesn’t realise that it has this disposition, in fact it doesn’t realise anything. In contrast to 
this, consider a man having a disposition to obtain a pint of beer. The first thing to notice 
is that due to the man’s own subjective consciousness, he himself realises that he has this
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disposition. It is not an objective, third-person disposition, but is a subjective, first- 
person disposition. There need not be any overt behaviour in relation to this disposition, 
the man could simply stand still and decide that he wanted a pint of beer. An external 
observer would only be able to come to the conclusion that the man had a disposition to 
stand still. Therefore, it would appear that a disposition is something subjective, different 
in kind from behaviour, but that was causally related to the consequent behaviour. It 
seems that behaviourism has simply taken what would normally be described as a 
“mental state” and redefined it as a “disposition”, and then tried to obscure this fact by 
fusing the latter with objective behaviour. This is quite a rational strategy for 
behaviourism to take, if it tries to be more sophisticated. The reason for this is that it will 
have to admit the existence of certain private, subjective, states, if it is to approach some 
semblance to the reality of the situation. However, this runs contrary to the main purpose 
of behaviourism, i.e., the reduction of mental states to overt behaviour or dispositions to 
behave. Therefore, behaviourism must somehow try to obscure this inconvenient 
situation it is faced with. It seems to me that if behaviourism tries to be more 
sophisticated, then some element of subjectivism will always start creeping back into the 
picture. A further problem for behaviourism was that it seemed impossible to reduce all 
mental states to behaviour or possible behaviour. The way one behaved seemed to be 
inextricably linked to further mental states, e.g., beliefs and desires. For example, if a 
man has the disposition to behave in a way that will result in the gaining of a pint of beer, 
he will also have many background-beliefs which are linked to his overt behaviour, e.g., 
that beer is sold in pubs, that walking through a doorway is the usual way for entering a 
building, that standing at the bar will facilitate being served by the bar-person (although
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this belief is sometimes mistaken) and so on. However, to get back to Nagel’s point 
about a theory of mind such as behaviourism, it can be seen that because behaviourism 
was objective and materialist in nature, then subjectivity and conscious experience were 
left out of the analysis completely, as he had stated.
One more good example of what Nagel was referring to, is contained in another 
objective/materialist theory of the mind, which is called functionalism.175 There are 
several different varieties of functionalism, however, they all seem to have the following 
point in common: the description given to a mental state of an organism depends on its
11 f \causal relations to input stimuli, to other mental states, and to the output behaviour.
So, for example, my belief that the ice-cream van is approaching, is based on my auditory 
perception of the ice-cream van’s distinctive, jingly tune, which, together with my desire 
to buy an ice-cream, results in me leaving my house and heading for the street as quickly 
as possible. It will be seen that as with behaviourism, part of the definition of the mental 
state still depends on one’s objective behaviour. However, one advantage of 
functionalism over behaviourism is that it does involve mental states, so that there is not 
the problem of outward behaviour having no causal relation to the mental states which 
are responsible for that behaviour. Having said this, functionalism does create problems 
for itself, especially if it was trying to portray itself as a complete theory of the mind.
This is because in functionalism, mental states are defined completely by their causal 
relations, and do not involve any other factors. The result of this is that there is no room
175 It must be noted that functionalism does not necessarily have to be a materialist theory, as the causal 
relations in a system may be realized by non-physical components. However, the realizers in most 
functionalist theories are nearly always physical in nature.
176 Searle (1992) pp.40/1.
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in functionalism for the qualia or qualitative character that some mental states also have, 
and for subjective consciousness in general. In fact, subjectivity could be completely 
removed from the equation, as the causal relations could be objectively worked out and 
studied. This means that functionalism is an incomplete or partial theory of mind. Worse 
still, it leaves itself open to criticisms that threaten its credibility as even a partial theory 
of mind. The reason for this is what Block (1978) calls its “liberalism”. One criticism of 
the earlier type-identity theories of mind was that they were “chauvinistic” in their 
outlook. This was because it was claimed that only brains of the sort that humans 
possessed could be capable of having minds. This was one problem that functionalism 
did not have, as it thought that a system having a mind or mental states simply depended 
on the system’s causal relations between input, inner functioning, and output.177 It also 
did not matter what the system was composed of, it could have been made of anything. 
These aspects contributed towards the so-called “multiple realizability” of functionalist 
theory. However, the resulting liberalism engendered by multiple realizability, meant 
that functionalism could assign a mind or mental states to any number of bizarre systems 
that it was hard to believe were conscious, just so long as the causal/functional relations 
in that system had the correct organisation.178 An example of one of these so-called 
“absent qualia” cases is Block’s thought experiment involving the entire population of 
China being connected up, so that their functional organisation was identical to that of the 
human brain. In a case like this it would be hard to credit the connected-up population of 
China with an inner subjectivity or consciousness, that was gained solely because of their 
particular functional organisation. This factor seems to point to the conclusion that a
177 Searle (1992) pp.41/2.
178 Levine (1997) pp.380/1.
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system’s functional organisation is independent of the phenomenon of conscious 
experience. As well as cases of “absent qualia”, cases of “inverted qualia” are also 
conceivable. These latter cases usually involve two beings having the same functional 
organisation but receiving different qualia, e.g., where one person has a qualitative 
sensation of red, the other person has a qualitative sensation of blue, etc. This seems to 
point to the possibility that functional states do not determine what qualitative states a 
being can apprehend.179 Therefore, these criticisms show that functionalism’s version of 
the mind is a completely causal/functional structure, with no thought given to subjectivity 
or consciousness. This means that functionalism, despite the merit of including “mental 
states” in its organisation, is an incomplete theory of the mind.
Materialism, Consciousness and the Future
As the above examples of behaviourism and functionalism show, subjectivity and 
consciousness usually get very short shrift in materialist theories of the mind. Indeed, 
Nagel is of the opinion that theories such as these will never adequately deal with what he 
thinks is the major component of the mind, that is, subjective consciousness. Despite the 
addition of further behavioural or functional concepts in these theories, they will never
1 ROeven approach an explanation of the phenomenon of consciousness. As well as feeling 
this way in relation to philosophical theories of the mind, Nagel is of the same opinion 
with regards to neuroscience. He thinks that we need a huge conceptual advance in 
explanation to truly understand the mind-body problem, and not just more empirical data
1/9 Levine (1997) pp.380/1.
180 Nagel (1995) p.101.
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from the usual methods of understanding.181 In trying to understand the concept of how a 
mental event could also be a physical event, Nagel thinks we are in the same position as a 
pre-Socratic philosopher, who declared that matter is energy. There would be no way for 
the pre-Socratic philosopher to understand the hypothesis, let alone determine whether it 
was true.182
There have been criticisms of Nagel’s position on this issue, in particular from Patricia 
Churchland (1996) and Kathleen Akins (1993). With Churchland, her main point appears 
to be that we do not really know what science will and will not be able to understand in 
the future, just because we cannot solve a particular problem at the present time.183 She 
thinks that Nagel, and other philosophers such as Colin McGinn, are committing the 
nonformal fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantium, or the argument from ignorance. This 
fallacy involves using one’s present ignorance on a matter, as a premise for drawing a 
substantive conclusion on that matter.184 For example, just because no-one has ever 
disproved the existence of God, it would be a fallacy to use this as a premise for claiming 
that God did exist. Conversely, just because no-one has ever proved the existence of 
God, it would also be a fallacy to use this as a premise for claiming that God did not 
exist.185 Therefore, in Nagel’s case, when he claims that he does not think that science 
will solve the “hard” problem of consciousness, because it had not been solved up until 
then, he is arguing from ignorance, to fallaciously reach the conclusion that science will
181 Nagel (1994) p.220.
182 Nagel (1974) p. 177.
183 Churchland (1996) p.43.
184 Churchland (1996) p.41.
185 The position that one should take on this issue, is perhaps one of agnosticism (unless o f course you are 
religious in the first place!). However, this point does have an interesting result. Just as it could be called a 
“belief’ to think God exists, it could also be called a “b elie f’ to think that God does not exist.
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never solve the problem. Now, it is true that in his “bat” paper, Nagel does make claims 
such as the following: “Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really 
intractable”, and “Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less 
interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless”.187 The first quotation above is 
quoted by Churchland in her paper, but is Nagel really saying that science will never 
solve the mind-body problem? In the dictionary (or at least, my dictionary), “intractable” 
seems to be defined as “being hard to solve” or “difficult”. So Nagel could be construed 
as just claiming that consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really hard to 
solve or really difficult; not that it will never be solved. In addition to this, it seems to me 
that Nagel does give a reason for why he thinks the problem of consciousness is 
intractable. This is because, for Nagel, subjective consciousness can only be 
apprehended from the subjective point of view, whereas, science will adopt an objective 
point of view on consciousness, and so move away from the subjective view. Nagel is of 
the opinion that it is the subjective character of experience (“what it is like”) that must be 
given a physical explanation by science, in order to properly understand consciousness. 
Now, one could of course disagree with Nagel’s reasoning on this, for example, one 
could argue that the subjective character of experience need not be given a physical 
explanation, in order to have an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of 
consciousness. However, the point is that Nagel has given a reason for why he thinks 
consciousness is intractable; for why science has not solved the problem at the present 
time, and why it will find it difficult to solve in the future. So, he is not just arguing from 
ignorance, but is giving his reason for why he thinks there is ignorance, and might well
186 Nagel (1974) p. 165.
187 Nagel (1974) p. 166.
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be ignorance in the future. Interestingly, it could similarly be claimed that McGinn 
(1989) is also not arguing from ignorance on consciousness, but is giving an explanation 
for this ignorance. In McGinn’s case, his reason is his idea of cognitive closure, whereby 
we are prevented from achieving the conception of a psychophysical link by our very 
constitution, and the way that we have to form our conceptions and ideas.188
The message from Akins (1993), is mainly the same as Churchland’s message. That is, 
just because we do not understand consciousness at the present time, we still do not really
1 ftQknow what science will or will not be able to discover in the future. She examines the 
strong intuitive feeling of arguments like Nagel’s, which claim that there will always be 
some subjective residue, the “what it is like” part of a creature’s consciousness, which 
science will never be able to reach. The intuition usually has it that science will only be 
able to explore the physical parts of a creature, the neurophysiology of the brain, the 
perceptive/representative apparatus of the creature etc. However, Akins’ point is that the 
qualia of a creature does not exist on its own, apart from the physical parts of the 
creature. It is enveloped in the representational/conceptual apparatus of the creature as 
well, which goes towards making the qualitative character of the creature’s experience 
what it is.190 This is a fair point. However, one would have thought that Nagel’s 
conception of the subjective point of view did consist of the creature’s representative and 
conceptual environment, as well as the qualitative character of its experience. When
188 McGinn (1989) p.350. Also in relation to McGinn, on several occasions in her paper, Churchland 
mentions the point that just because we do not understand a phenomenon, it is not a metaphysical problem 
about the phenomenon itself, a mystery actually existing in nature, but is an epistemological problem that 
we have. Churchland (1996) p.42. This is a valid point, but one that McGinn had also made several times 
in his 1989 paper. McGinn (1989) pp.362/3. Indeed, it could be claimed that this point was the main thesis 
of McGinn’s 1989 paper.
189 Akins (1993) p.272.
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trying to adopt the point of view of the bat, it was not just the bat’s qualia that would be 
apprehended, but the bat’s own subjective environment would be included in the 
attempted adoption of the viewpoint. In his “bat” article, Nagel questions whether it 
makes any sense to talk of a human possessing the “internal neurophysiological 
constitution”191 of a bat; because if one did, then one would not be a human anymore, one 
would be a bat, and so not be considering what it was actually like being a bat, one would
t Q9just be living the life of a bat. This statement occurred when Nagel was in his 
“difference of kind” mode of thought, in relation to what it was like to be a bat. That is, 
when he thought that it was not possible for a human to imaginatively take up the point of 
view of a bat. However, even if a creature’s qualia do depend on its neurophysiology, 
and science can thus examine the neurophysiology, as it is physical, I am not sure that 
this will bring science much closer to the subjective consciousness of the creature.193 
This is roughly the situation that we have with human qualia at the moment.
Explorations of human neurophysiology are getting deeper and more intricate, and yet the 
subjective element of consciousness that is involved with the neurophysiology is no 
closer to being directly examined.
So, what is the future for attempting to understand the phenomenon of mind or 
consciousness? In Nagel (1998) he put forward a challenge for the philosophical 
community. This challenge involved finding a method of showing how irreducible
190 Akins (1993) p.269.
191 Nagel (1974) p. 169.
192 Nagel (1974) p. 169.
193 Alter (1999) makes a similar point on p.9.
134
subjectivity could be connected to the physical properties of an organism.194 Nagel
wondered if a conception was possible of how an objective, physical event, such as a
brain process, could at the same time be necessarily essential to a subjective event which
was apparently non-physical, such as a conscious mental state.195 This challenge has
already been taken up by Harre (1999), who has come up with a very clever conception
of how to view the psychophysical link. Harre criticises the way Nagel has set out the
problem of the psychophysical link, he thinks that it is wrong to keep using the
substance-property metaphysics to frame the problem. He states that:
...the challenge, as I see it, will be to develop a metaphysical scheme in 
which both brain states and phenomenal experiences can find a place, but 
which does not perpetuate the substance-property metaphysics.196
Harre believes that the problem concerns the way that the psychophysical link is always 
conceived as a physical process/entity which is necessarily correlated with a mental 
process/entity. He feels that this view is hampered by the difficulty of conceiving the 
actual link between the physical and the mental, and by the fact that the psychophysical 
link always appears to be contingent, when we want it to appear necessary.197 In answer 
to this, Harre adopts a new ontology to look at the psychophysical problem, based on the 
ideas of Niels Bohr and J.J. Gibson. Using this ontology, the psychophysical link is 
basically ignored, as Harre believes the situation can be viewed as affordances that are 
given to different perceptual systems. By this he means that a brain process can be 
viewed by the ordinary visual sensory organs, this is the affordance given to them, but 
that the same brain process can also be viewed by the subject, from “inside”, so to speak,
194 Nagel (1998) p.338.
195 Nagel (1998) p.342.
196 Harre (1999) p.256.
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an affordance given to his own proprioceptual system.198 Using this method, Harre
claims that the psychophysical problem then becomes a case of different affordances,
which view the “whatever-it-is” from the material standpoint and from the subjective
standpoint. He declares that:
.. .this metaphysics allows us to sideline any form of the identity thesis, that a 
molecular state is the same state as the correlated phenomenological state, 
and to sideline any form of the causal thesis, that molecular states cause 
phenomenal states. Both types of states are affordances of ‘whatever-it-is’ to 
different and distinctive modes of access.199
In this way, the “whatever-it-is” is viewed as neither material or subjective, but the actual 
way of observing it is distinguished by material and subjective modes of access. Harre’s 
conception of the mind-body problem is certainly a radically different one, which was 
after all what Nagel was asking for in his challenge. However, I am not quite sure about 
it. The conception certainly does not solve the mind-body problem, something which 
Harre admits himself. But the question which is bothering me is whether, in the above 
example, we are getting different affordances of the same phenomenon or “whatever-it- 
is”. Earlier in his paper, Harre refers to the fact that depending on the way we observe 
light, it can either take on a wave-form or a particle-form. If one observes light using the 
double-slit experiment, it shows its wave-like form, whereas, the particle-like 
characteristics of light can be shown if we perform an experiment which shows the 
photoelectric effect.200 The problem was this. How could light have both a wave-form 
and a particle-form? It seemed impossible. It was Bohr who came up with the answer. 
The wave and particle characteristics of light were not actually properties of the light
197 Harre (1999) pp.257/8.
198 Harre (1999) p.265.
199 Harre (1999) p.267.
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itself, they were properties of our interactions with the light.201 Either the wave-form or 
the particle-form of light would appear, depending on which apparatus we used to 
observe the light. Using Harre’s terminology, the double-slit experiment would give us 
one affordance of light, while the photoelectric experiment would give us another, 
different affordance of light. Now, this is all very interesting, but the point I wish to 
make is the following. With the two affordances that we are given, we know that they 
are both from the same phenomenon, that is, light. However, if we now follow Harre and 
make the same distinction for viewing brain processes and subjective states, are we 
certain that they are affordances of the same phenomenon or “whatever-it-is”? Harre 
takes the view that our sensory apparatus gives us one affordance of the “whatever-it-is”, 
while our proprioceptive system gives us a different affordance of the “whatever-it-is”. 
However, I think that it is not at all clear that we are referring to the same “whatever-it- 
is” in the both cases. Because of the explanatory gap in relation to physical states and 
mental states, Harre must be just assuming there is a connection between the brain 
process and the subjective state. Now, there is nothing wrong in doing this. But Harre is 
claiming that the phenomenon or “whatever-it-is” is providing two different affordances 
to the two different ways of observing that “whatever-it-is”. In answer to this, it could 
well be claimed that there is in fact no identical phenomenon or “whatever-it-is” present 
during the two observations. From this, it could also be claimed that there are no 
different affordances being given by one and the same “whatever-it-is”. It might be just a 
fact that if you observe a brain process, all you will see is the brain process, while if you 
experience a subjective state, all you are experiencing is the subjective state. They are
200 Zukav (1988) p. 116.
201 Zukav (1988) p. 116.
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two separate observations of two different phenomena, not two different observations of 
the same phenomenon (as in the case of light). This is a complicated point, but it might
909well be an issue for Harre’s conception of the mind-body problem.
Having said this, I believe the attempt to come up with a conception or thought 
experiment that shows the necessary connection between the mental and the physical is 
an extremely difficult proposition. At first glance, it might appear that examples of 
scientific discoveries and breakthroughs might give us a clue how it is to be achieved.
For instance, the problem might seem reminiscent of how a thought experiment helped 
Einstein to produce his General Theory of Relativity. Briefly, Einstein wanted to have an 
explanation of a single phenomenon, as viewed from a uniformly moving frame of 
reference and as viewed from a non-uniformly moving frame of reference. Could one 
physical theory be valid for observers in the two different frames of reference, in 
explaining the phenomena that they saw in their respective reference-frames?203 In 
relation to this, Einstein came up with a thought experiment that involved some people 
trapped inside a lift, whose cables had just snapped and which was plummeting towards 
the ground. To cut a long and complicated story short, from this thought experiment, 
Einstein came up with the insight that in a situation like that, it would not be possible to 
differentiate between “uniform accelerated motion and a constant gravitational field”.204 
This was Einstein’s principle of equivalence: that in certain situations, gravity is
202 However, it is interesting to note that Harre’s conception of two different affordances of consciousness 
given by the “what-ever-it-is” is somewhat Spinozistic in character. Spinoza’s idea was that the mental and 
the physical were two different aspects of one fundamental substance, which would be causally responsible 
for both aspects. It is also interesting to note that this Spinozistic conception of the mind-body relationship 
is the one that Nagel himself is inclined to favour, see Nagel (1994) p.222.
203 Zukav (1988) pp. 182/3.
204 Zukav (1988) p. 187.
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equivalent to acceleration. This idea does seem quite similar to the problem that is before 
us, that is, how to view a physical process from one point of view, and conceive that this 
is equivalent to a subjective event viewed from another point of view. We just need to 
come up with a thought experiment like Einstein’s, which will enable us to see the 
equivalence of the physical and the subjective. However, the situation is not exactly the 
same. Of course, Einstein’s thought experiment that led to the development of his 
General Theory was a brilliantly unique insight, and if he had not come up with his 
conception when he did, it is not at all obvious or inevitable that the breakthrough would 
have been made by someone else.205 But, having said this, in coming up with his thought 
experiment concerning the principle of equivalence, Einstein was still dealing with 
concepts that were in existence at that time, even though he conceived of them in a 
radically new way. Gravity and acceleration were known concepts, and were also both 
objective and physical phenomena. For Einstein to conceive of a new conceptual relation 
between gravity and acceleration was a tremendous achievement, but it was not
9  Cif\conceptually impossible in principle. Contrast this situation with that of conceiving a 
psychophysical link. A brain process is certainly an objective and physical phenomenon, 
and is conceptually understood as such, although, the mechanisms by which a brain 
process manages to produce a mental event are not known. In addition to this, the 
corresponding mental event is subjective and non-physical in appearance. These two 
concepts appear so radically different, that it does seem in principle, a conceptual
205 With regards to Einstein and general relativity, Sir Roger Penrose states that “It is one of those theories 
which might not have been arrived at by anyone else. Often one thinks that there is this relentless march of 
science. It does not matter much who gets there. But I think Einstein’s general relativity is an example 
where it was not part o f this march of science...It was a highly original idea and a very profound one, and I 
could quite believe that it might not have developed even by now”. Bragg/Gardiner (1998) pp.275/6.
206 This was pointed out to me by my supervisor.
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907impossibility to come up with an intelligible and coherent relationship between them. 
How is one supposed to conceive a relationship between an objective, physical 
phenomenon, and a phenomenon which only has a subjective existence and is non-
90Sphysical, in that it does not seem to occupy physical space like other phenomena? This 
leads me to think that Nagel may well be quite correct when he claims that a radically 
new conception is needed in order to conceive of a psychophysical link. It may take 
more than the steady, onward march of science in order to make the breakthrough on this 
phenomenon (in contrast to Churchland’s view?). Indeed, if the new conception is not 
forthcoming, the psychophysical connection may remain undiscovered. However, if the 
equivalence of the mental and the physical could be conceived, I think that it might well 
change the way we look at reality. This is certainly what happened when Einstein 
conceived the equivalence of gravity and acceleration. This led him to view the orbits of 
planets, stars, etc, as explainable by conceiving of space-time as being bent and dented, 
with the planets and stars rolling around the edge of these dents in space-time.209 This 
replaced the Newtonian view of planetary orbits, as involving forces acting on various 
objects from a distance. Thus, a new view of reality was bom.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined Nagel’s conception of the objective point of view and how 
successful this conception would be in explaining the mind or consciousness. The 
objective point of view was reached by a process of objectification, which moved away 
from particular subjective points of view and from generally human points of view
207 Alter (1999) comes to the same conclusion.
208 Nagel (1998) p.339. Nagel refers to McGinn (1995) in connection with this issue.
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altogether. It was by this process that the “view from nowhere” could be arrived at, 
which was the view from no particular point in reality, it was conceived as a view outside 
of reality, observing a mind-independent reality that was centreless. It was this objective 
point of view or view from nowhere that the physical sciences strived for. This 
viewpoint of physical science has been amazingly successful in explaining the workings 
of reality, that is, objective physical reality. The objective viewpoint was normally 
utilised in the commonest form of scientific explanation, that of a physical reduction on a 
phenomenon. In examining a metaphysically objective phenomenon, science could leave 
behind the subjective point of view on the phenomenon, placing these subjective 
“appearances” inside the mind of the observer, and not including these in the “real” 
scientific description of the phenomenon. Despite changing from a subjective to an 
objective point of view on the phenomenon (by taking up an epistemically objective 
viewpoint), one could still be quite sure that it was the same phenomenon that was being 
examined, as it was metaphysically objective. However, this was the big problem that 
science had when it tried to carry out a physical reduction of the mind/consciousness. It 
was seen that one’s consciousness had a metaphysically subjective existence, that was 
also only available to the person concerned, in an epistemically subjective manner. Thus 
when science tried to move away from the subjective “appearance” of consciousness, by 
taking up an epistemically objective standpoint, it in effect left what was the actual reality 
of the consciousness behind. By then examining, say, objective processes occurring in 
the brain, one could not be sure that it was the same phenomenon (subjective 
consciousness) that was being examined from the objective point of view, due to 
consciousness having a metaphysically subjective existence. Therefore, it seemed as if
209 John Gribbin: in Bragg/Gardiner (1998) p.281.
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Nagel was quite right, and that it would be doubtful whether a normal physical reduction 
could be successfully carried out on the mind/consciousness. It was also seen that this 
objective point of view had been imported into most materialist theories of the mind. The 
result of this was that these theories always seemed to be partial or incomplete, as the 
subjective character of mind was usually omitted, with an objective, third-person view of 
the mind usually being put forward. Finally, it was seen that Nagel thought that progress 
on understanding consciousness would be extremely difficult within the current 
framework of science, and was of the opinion that a radically new conception of the 
mental and physical was required, in order to move forward.
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MAIN CONCLUSION
In this main conclusion, the first point to make is that Nagel’s overall work on 
consciousness has been very important and influential in its contribution to the 
philosophical debate on the mind/consciousness. With regard to his 1974 paper, “What is 
it like to be a bat?”, which this dissertation has mainly concentrated on, it seems that it 
fully deserves to be called a “classic” paper in the history of philosophy. It was, and still 
is, a highly influential paper, which contains several themes and many interesting 
arguments and ideas. It was also a brave moment to publish the paper when he did, as 
not many philosophers at the time held, or at least publicly aired, the views that Nagel 
did. This was a time when optimism in materialist explanations of the mind, especially 
involving scientific reductionism, was very high (as can be seen with the number of 
relevant entries in the first footnote of his “bat” paper). It was intellectually brave to put 
forward arguments on why science might not be able to reductively explain the 
phenomenon of conscious experience, even though, of course, nowadays this is a more 
widely-held position (although, materialist positions on the mind/consciousness are still 
the most popular).
In looking at what Nagel meant by the use of the phrase “what it is like”, it was seen that 
there were several strands of thought involved with this phrase. In my opinion, the first 
strand involved an epistemological problem for humans (though Nagel himself denies 
this), in that Nagel wanted to know what it was like for the subject himself to have his 
own experiences, i.e., what it was like for the bat to be a bat. He came to the conclusion
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that this was impossible to know, a human would have no idea what the conscious 
experience of the bat was like, as this was only perceivable from the perspective which 
the bat itself occupied. The two points of view, that of the bat and the human, were so 
radically different to each other, that the latter could have no conception of what it was 
like to be the former. This conclusion also had a metaphysical consequence, Nagel 
thought that there were certain facts in the world that were beyond the understanding of 
humans, i.e., the subjective facts of the bat’s character of experience. Science could 
objectively examine the bat’s neurophysiology etc., but would not be able to examine the 
bat’s own subjective character of experience, as it had the wrong point of view with 
which to achieve this. However, Nagel also seemed to give a second, less severe, 
interpretation to his phrase “what it is like”. This involved the claim that it might be 
possible to achieve a conception of what it was like to be a bat by using the imagination, 
a possibility that Nagel had earlier seemed to rule out. The problem had now changed 
into one of human conceptualisation, it did not involve what it was like for the bat to be a 
bat, but whether it was possible for a human to imaginatively gain a conception of what 
the bat’s subjective point of view might be like. Therefore, it seemed as if the problem 
was not now beyond human understanding, but was something that could be 
intellectually approached, with varying degrees of success, depending on how accurate 
the conceptualisation of the bat’s point of view was. In examining this situation, I used 
the distinction put forward by H.O. Mounce, between a “difference of kind” and a 
“difference of degree”. The first interpretation of the “what it is like” phrase, which 
involved what it was like for the bat to be a bat, would be an example of a difference of 
kind. This meant that the question at issue was completely beyond human understanding,
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and no amount of intellectual effort would be able to bridge the gap involved. However, 
with the second “conceptual” interpretation of the “what it is like” phrase, this would be 
considered as a difference of degree. This would mean that the question at issue was not 
totally beyond human understanding, but could be amenable to some sort of intellectual 
effort, to gain a modicum of understanding. Therefore, when Nagel changes the problem 
from being totally incomprehensible to being partially comprehensible (a fallacy which 
Mounce thinks many philosophers are guilty of), it can be seen that he has also changed 
the essence of the original problem, with the result that the two problems are importantly 
different.
This importance comes to the fore when the Ability theory of Laurence Nemirow and 
David Lewis was considered. It was my opinion that Nagel’s second “conceptual” 
interpretation of his “what it is like” phrase may well have influenced the development of 
the above-mentioned theory. With Nagel claiming that “what it is like” involves the use 
of imaginative abilities to gain a certain conception, it is not a great leap to come to the 
conclusion that the Ability theorists do, that “knowing what it’s like may be identified 
with knowing how to imagine”. However, even though it is not a great leap, it does have 
great significance for Nagel’s views on consciousness. Instead of there being subjective 
facts of experience (e.g., of the bat), which are beyond scientific investigation, there are 
now only imaginative abilities that the subject possesses, which should not be expected to 
fall within the remit of physicalism (which only claims that all the facts/information in 
the world have a physical nature). The subjective consciousness of the bat itself has been 
completely ignored, and the problem is now one of how a human could imaginatively
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adopt the point of view of the bat. However, it was hopefully shown that the main 
arguments of the Ability theory are dubious, to say the least. For example, to know what 
it is like to see the colour red, certainly involves more than just the gaining of abilities to 
imagine, remember, recognize, etc., the red colour. One knows what it is like to see red, 
as one is perceiving the red, it is a subjective, experiential fact, that red looks a certain 
way to the person concerned. While the perception is going on, it is a case of “knowing 
that” red looks a certain way, not a case of “knowing how” to imaginatively conceive of 
the red colour. After the experience of seeing red, it is quite feasible that one does gain 
certain abilities to imagine red, remember red, etc., although even this possibility could 
be open to doubt. It could be that the Ability theorists have played on a confusion with 
the definition of “ability”. One could take the view that mental capacities such as 
imagination, recognition, and so on, are already present, in an a priori fashion, in the 
mind, which then utilises the experiential information which is gained during sensory 
perception. It could then be claimed that what is gained during an experience is not an 
imaginative ability, but the “raw material”, which is then used by the innate imaginative 
abilities. Be this as it may, it seemed to me that the Ability theory had conflated the 
meanings of “knowing such-and-such” and “imaginatively knowing such-and-such”, with 
the result that the importance of the actual experience is played down. However, it 
appears that Nagel’s subjective facts of experience cannot be so easily replaced by 
subjective abilities, as the Ability theorists wish. Therefore, it is still possible that there 
are subjective, experiential facts, which are only available to the subjective point of view, 
and which an objective science will not be able to access.
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With regards to Nagel’s concept of a subjective point of view, it was seen that if a 
creature was conscious and experiencing the world, then, according to Nagel, it would 
have a subjective point of view. It was only from its own point of view that a creature 
could apprehend the subjective facts of its own experience, which then went to make up 
its subjective character of experience. I think it is fair to say that Nagel sometimes 
referred to the subjective point of view (of, say, a human) as an individual one and 
sometimes as a type. That the subjective point of view was a token or individual one 
seems to me the most natural and sensible interpretation, however, if one took this option 
it was seen to have the problematic consequences of solipsism and privacy of experience 
(as predicted by Kathleen Wider). I believe that it was for this reason that Nagel decided 
that the subjective point of view would be a type and not a token. In this way, two 
humans would “know” what each was experiencing, due to the fact that their points of 
view were of the same type, which in turn, was due to their physiologies being similar. 
However, it was shown that one could not really escape completely from the “individual” 
to the “type” of point of view, if, for example, one tried to use the imagination to do this 
(it would still be the case that one would only definitely know what one’s own experience 
was like): the result seemed to be epistemic solipsism. However, in my view, this was a 
plus for Nagel’s views on consciousness (although he wouldn’t agree), as it gave an 
accurate picture of the reality of the situation that individuated beings are faced with. 
Indeed, it made me think that any theory of mind/consciousness that took subjectivity 
seriously would be faced with the problem of some form of solipsism, as it is an 
inescapable fact that we each only experience our own subjectivity in the first-person 
manner. I also thought it was phenomenal consciousness that Nagel was referring to,
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when he talked of one’s conscious experience being apprehended from the subjective 
point of view. The phenomenal consciousness of a creature involved what it felt like to 
be that creature just living its life, without any philosophical intentions or introspection of 
its own perceptions and sensations. It was for this reason that I also thought that Nagel’s 
conception of “what it is like” would not conflict with arguments of Wittgenstein, such as 
the Private Language argument and the beetle-in-the-box analogy. Both of these 
arguments seemed to involve introspection of one’s sensations or perceptions, which then 
led to confusion and error. However, Nagel’s phenomenal consciousness seemed more 
primitive than this, at a lower level than the introspected, psychological consciousness of 
Wittgenstein’s arguments, and so would be unaffected by them.
Nagel’s ideas in relation to his “what it is like” conception and the subjective point of 
view have influenced my own views on consciousness. In what follows I will give my 
own views on the possible position and status of consciousness in the world. I am not 
claiming that these are also Nagel’s views on consciousness, but it seems to me a natural 
extension of his views that have been put forward so far. Firstly, I think that 
consciousness is a biological and subjective phenomenon. Certain organisms have the 
property of consciousness through some process which occurs in their brains. I take it 
that this is a natural development, even though it is quite mysterious to the organisms 
themselves. Consciousness is always subjective, at least on the Earth, because each 
organism has its own respective brain in its own respective body. Therefore, each 
organism has the subjective point of view on its own conscious experience. I am not 
claiming that only human brains produce consciousness, many other creatures on the
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Earth certainly have their own individual brains in their own individual bodies. It seems 
to me quite reasonable to assume that they have their own subjective points of view as 
well (perhaps the bat’s subjective consciousness is not as complex as a human one, due to 
the differences in size and complexity of the respective brains). I am also not claiming 
that brains producing consciousness have to look like terrestrial brains. In other parts of 
the universe there might well be exotic creatures with organs that appear radically 
different to ours. However, they might also have their own neuronal-type processes 
going on in certain organs of their bodies, that gives them subjective consciousnesses of 
their own. The point is that the phenomenon of consciousness has a uniquely biological 
origin; indeed, one might say that consciousness is biologically realizable. So, for 
instance, even if a Zeta Reticulan happened to be a silicon-based creature (in contrast to 
us carbon-based creatures), it could still have conscious mental states, as it was still a 
biological entity. Therefore, at least from the viewpoint of this part of the universe, I see 
the inclusion of a biological element as a necessary condition for the production of 
consciousness. Having said this, the biological element is of course not a sufficient 
condition for the production of consciousness. There are biological organisms of which it 
would be somewhat doubtful to say that they possessed a subjective consciousness, e.g., 
amoebas and others of the Protozoan phylum. It would seem that a certain level of 
biological development and complexity would have to be achieved in order to be fairly 
certain that subjective consciousness was present. I do not believe that the preceding 
view is being overly chauvinistic with regards to the presence of consciousness, but is 
only being realistic. The multiple realizability of functionalism seems to liberal in its 
views on what can be said to have conscious mental states, whilst the panpsychist view of
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consciousness, which sees consciousness as somehow intrinsic to reality, meaning that 
everything has psychical or mental elements contained in it, seems to be highly 
implausible; although, this could just be a lack of imagination on my part. Therefore, I 
believe that the idea that computers, robots, etc. may eventually be built that possess their 
own subjective consciousnesses, is highly improbable. No matter if a robot contained a 
silicon chip replica of a human brain, which was exactly like it, both structurally and 
functionally, I do not believe that there would be something it was like to be that robot 
(although of course, I wouldn’t know this for certain, due to the factor of epistemic 
solipsism!). Even though the silicon chips were behaving like neurons, they would still 
not actually be neurons. Even though it might be claimed that the silicon chip complexity 
was equivalent to the neuronal complexity, the former complexity would be of the wrong 
sort (i.e., there would be no biological component) for consciousness to occur. Of 
course, it must be said that just because something might be considered “implausible” or 
“improbable”, it doesn’t necessarily mean that it is not actually the case. I am only 
putting forward what I think is the situation.
Whether one considers the above views as feasible or not, it is undeniable that human 
beings are one set of creatures, each of whom, possesses their own subjective 
consciousness. The question then addressed, was whether an objective science could 
offer an adequate explanation of such a subjective phenomenon as conscious experience. 
In his “bat” paper, Nagel is of the opinion that science will find it very difficult to provide 
a satisfactory explanation of the mind/consciousness. His reason for thinking this 
involves what is probably the most memorable argument from that paper, i.e., if one’s
150
consciousness can only be apprehended from the subjective point of view, and science 
methodologically takes up an objective point of view to explain phenomena, how is it 
going to provide an explanation of consciousness by moving away from the only 
viewpoint from which it is perceivable? I examined this argument using the commonest 
form of scientific explanation, that of a physical reduction. When examining a 
metaphysically objective phenomenon (one that had an objective, mind-independent, 
existence), it seemed as if the reduction worked well in providing an explanation of the 
phenomenon. Science would begin the process of objectification, by moving away from 
the subjective appearances of the phenomenon (the epistemically subjective viewpoint), 
and take up an epistemically objective viewpoint on it, which was the theoretical “view 
from nowhere”. In doing this, science was able to abandon the epistemically subjective 
“appearances” of the phenomenon, and place those in the mind of the perceiver. In this 
way it then reached the “reality” behind the appearances, normally involving sub-atomic 
interactions which provided the mechanisms for the production of the phenomenon.
Also, there was usually an intellectual transparency in how the under-lying physical 
interactions came to produce the phenomenon in question, one could “see” how the 
phenomenon came into existence from its sub-atomic origin. There is also a further 
point, one which I think is the most important: in moving from the epistemically 
subjective viewpoint on the phenomenon, to an epistemically objective viewpoint on the 
phenomenon, one could still know that it was the same phenomenon being examined 
from both viewpoints. There were not two different phenomena in each viewpoint, it was 
the same phenomenon that both the “appearance” and the “reality” belonged to. The
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reason one could tell this, is that the phenomenon had a metaphysically objective 
existence, and was consequently able to be viewed from different viewpoints.
However, when the same process of scientific reduction was applied to one’s 
consciousness, it was seen that there were grave doubts as to whether an adequate 
explanation could be provided of that particular phenomenon. The reasons for these 
doubts are the following. The first point to notice is that one’s conscious experience is a 
metaphysically subjective phenomenon, i.e., it has a subjective, mind-dependent, 
existence. The consequence of this is that one’s subjective consciousness could only be 
apprehended as it “really is”, from the epistemically subjective viewpoint. The reality of 
the phenomenon of consciousness was only contained in the individual, subjective, point 
of view. Therefore, when science began the process of objectification, and took up an 
epistemically objective viewpoint on consciousness, it was moving away from the only 
viewpoint from which the consciousness could be apprehended for what it was. If 
science then examined objective processes in the brain, and tried to claim that the latter 
were the “reality” behind the “appearance” of consciousness from the subjective 
viewpoint, there would be immediate difficulties. For instance, one would not be able to 
know whether the same phenomenon of consciousness was being examined from the 
epistemically subjective viewpoint and the epistemically objective viewpoint. One would 
not know whether the “appearance” and “reality” belonged to the same phenomenon.
The main reasons for this are that consciousness has a subjective existence and that there 
is no intellectual transparency in how, say, neuronal processes in the brain produces the 
consciousness (the explanatory gap). Therefore, it seems that the reality of consciousness
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is contained in the epistemically subjective viewpoint, which is the result of the 
metaphysically subjective existence of one’s consciousness. If the explanatory gap is 
then added to this situation, it appears that we have two different phenomena in the 
epistemically subjective and objective viewpoints respectively. Therefore, it seems that 
Nagel was quite correct in his assertion that it was doubtful whether a physical reduction 
of consciousness would succeed.
Indeed, I also suspect that Nagel is quite correct in thinking that we will need a radical 
change in our conceptual framework of thinking about how objective processes can 
produce subjective states. Personally, I cannot see how the explanatory gap will ever be 
bridged, or how the impasse between the subjective and the objective will ever be broken. 
Even if neuroscientists delve “deep” into the processes of the brain, and narrow down 
their search to, say, one particular process that occurs between the synapses, how will 
they really know that is the process that produces consciousness? One might imagine a 
situation where the neuroscientist was able to temporarily “switch o ff’ the particular 
brain-process in a subject. If it could be determined that the subject then lost his 
conscious experience, until the particular brain process was “switched on” again, this 
would be a fairly certain indicator that the brain process in question was essential to the 
production of consciousness. But how is the determination of loss of subjective 
consciousness going to be made? The neuroscientist may very well have chosen the 
correct brain-process for causing consciousness, but I cannot see how he will ever prove 
it to any satisfactory degree. The consciousness will always have a subjective existence, 
which is not reachable by the objective methodology of the neuroscientist. I think that
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the best that can be achieved will be a “fairly strong probability” that a process of such- 
and-such is responsible for the appearance of consciousness, but no more than this: the 
explanatory gap will never be officially closed. Of course, this problem is also connected 
with the situation of epistemic solipsism, which I tentatively thought that human beings 
are actually in. After all, we only consider that human beings are conscious creatures, 
because each of us, individually, knows that he/she is conscious, and then quite naturally 
we each generalize from our own particular case (whether this is valid or not). This was 
why I earlier thought that we would never actually know if it was possible to build a 
robot which had a subjective consciousness. The reason for this is fairly obvious, only 
the robot itself would actually know if it possessed the subjective consciousness in 
question. All we would be able to do is listen to its exasperated cries for recognition as a 
conscious entity, and decide whether to believe it or not. This all comes back to the 
point, I believe, that a creature can only apprehend its conscious experience from its own 
individual, subjective, point of view.
What conceptual change will have to be made to overcome the problem of relating the 
physical to the subjective, I don’t really know. Nagel himself states that one cannot 
criticize the objective point of view for not containing any subjective elements, as it 
would not be an objective point of view if it did contain these elements, and vice versa. 
Problems only arise when the claim is made that what is contained in the objective 
viewpoint is all there is in reality, i.e., if a phenomenon is not contained in the objective 
viewpoint, then it does not exist, and must be an illusion. Perhaps it will involve ignoring 
the concepts of subjective/objective altogether, just for the psychophysical issue. The
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problem may be framed in one, new, conceptualisation, that makes no distinctions of 
empirical reality, but includes everything in one section of space-time (like an 
underground railway map, with the different levels of tracks overlaid on top of each 
other). Then again, perhaps it won’t. However, even if there is no conceptual or 
technological breakthrough, it does not necessarily mean that consciousness itself is a 
strange, non-physical entity that somehow emerges from the physical. Of course, it could 
be, perhaps the explanatory gap is metaphysical in nature. But it is just as likely that the 
explanatory gap is only epistemological in nature; that consciousness is actually a 
physical phenomenon, but one that is seen from a bizarre angle that we don’t normally 
associate with physicality, and so is puzzling to us. I think that the main point of Nagel’s 
“bat” article, and indeed of all his work on consciousness, is to show that even though 
consciousness may be puzzling and mysterious, and at present cannot be explained, there 
is no need to get worried or embarrassed about this. When that happens, the urge is then 
to try to get rid of the problem as quickly as possible; by ignoring it, or calling it 
something else which we do understand, or by denying that it exists at all. We should 
just admit that as well as an objective reality, there is also a subjective reality in the 
world, i.e., subjective consciousness; and, to paraphrase Schopenhauer, one must take 
into account both of these inner and outer realities, in order to solve the “riddle of the 
world”. I think that this is a message which Nagel has consistently put forward over the 
years, in a very intelligent and accessible way.
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